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Abstract
This thesis addresses two important topics in environmental and resource economics: social 
discount rates for the far-distant future and biodiversity conservation and deforestation. In Part 
1 social discount rates which decline with time horizon (Declining Discount Rates or DDRs), 
and their importance for analysing long term projects are discussed. Chapter 1 summarises 
the recent theoretical and applied literature and highlights some remaining gaps which are 
the focus of chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 solves a puzzle concerning one of the rationales for 
DDRs set by Gollier 2004a and provides some simple rules for incorporating intergenerational 
equity into Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA). Chapter 3 discusses the empirical issues surrounding 
determining a usable schedule of DDRs for CBA. The importance of time series model selection 
for the interest rate is highlighted.
In Part 2 I focus in international agreements for biodiversity conservation and national 
policies for reforestation. Chapter 4 models global biodiversity conservation as a North-South 
bargaining game and shows that current international agreements may provide perverse strate­
gic incentives in their attempt to solve this game and distribute the surplus. One conclusion of 
this analysis is that the incremental cost compensation for land use changes in the biodiverse 
south, offered by the Global Environment Facility under the Convention on Biodiversity, may 
not be sufficient to preclude strategic behaviour and further losses of biodiversity. Following 
on from this, chapter 5 looks at the household level impact of another important land use 
compensation policy: the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP) of the Peoples Repub­
lic of China. We use programme evaluation methods to gauge the impact of the temporary 
compensation packages offered to participants in the SLCP on the level and source of rural 
household income, income distribution and poverty alleviation. This allows an analysis of the 
sustainability of this programme in reaching its objectives.
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Overview
Part 1: T im e V arying Social D iscount R ates
Part 1 of this thesis concerns social discounting and in particular the use of declining discount 
rates in the evaluation of public policy with long-term impacts. Chapter 1 introduces the 
underlying theory for the determination of the social discount rate and introduces the reader to 
recent contributions on the theory of declining discount rates. The practical implications of this 
theory are also investigated. The review highlights two anomalies concerning the contributions 
of Weitzman (1998) and Gollier (2004a), one theoretical and one empirical. These constitute 
the focus of chapter 2 and chapter 3, which are summarised below.
Chapter 1: Discounting: the long and the short of it.
Chapter 1 provides a detailed overview of the theory that underpins social discounting starting 
with the familiar Ramsey-Koopmans formulations and axiomatic justifications for constant 
discounting and moving on to the more recent contributions concerning declining discount 
rates.(DDRs). The use of DDRs is of most consequence in evaluating projects and interventions 
which have consequences in the extremely long-term, e.g. climate change, and their use has 
been advocated partly in response to the apparent tyranny of conventional discounting on values 
accruing to future generations and the issues of inter-generational equity that arise.
Firstly, we explore the social discount rate when costs and benefits expressed in units of 
consumption, that is where consumption is the numeraire. We then discuss the arguments that 
have been espoused for the use of DDRs when in a deterministic environment. Contributions 
here include seminal works by Fisher and Krutilla (1975) and more recent work by Weitzman 
(1994), both of which relate specifically to the role of environmental linkages in determining 
the discount rate. Once uncertainty in the discount rate or its determinants is introduced
10
the arguments for using DDRs become even more compelling. Weitzman (1998, 2001, 2004a, 
2004b) and Gollier (2002a 2002b, 2004) provide important contributions in this light helping 
to pinpoint the conditions under which the social discount rate declines over time. In the 
former, DDRs are a simple consequence of the convexity of the discount function, the nature 
of the probability distribution and certainty equivalence analysis in a risk neutral environment. 
For Gollier, whose work is entrenched in asset pricing and the analysis of the yield curve, the 
decline in the discount rate schedule is more a question of preferences for risk, precaution and 
prudence. Lastly, the literature on growth and sustainability has contributed to the debate 
on DDRs, focussing the role of the utility discount rate. Important contributions include 
Chichilnisky (1997), Chichilnisky and Heal (1996), Heal (1998) and Li and Lofgren (2000, 
2001) each of which show the importance of DDRs for the achievement of particular axioms of 
intergenerational equity and sustainability.
In the course of this summary a number of anomalies arise, particularly with regard to the 
work of Weitzman (1998). The strength of his approach, especially for the practitioner of Cost 
Benefit Analysis (CBA), lies in the apparent ease with which it can be operationalised (see e.g. 
Newell and Pizer 2003, Weitzman 2001). Indeed, the case for DDRs based on this rationale 
has recently been accepted by the UK Government and is now incorporated into the Treasury 
Green book (HM Treasury 2003). However, weakness of this approach include its reduced 
form nature and assumptions about societal risk preferences: risk neutrality. In particular 
Gollier (2004a) provides a critique of Weitzman (1998) showing that in the Weitzman framework 
whether one employs an Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) or Expected Net Future Value 
(ENFV) evaluation criterion determines whether the burden of risk is placed with current or 
future generations, and consequently whether the social discount rate is declining or increasing 
over time. In the absence of societal risk preferences this is a puzzle, since any decision on 
intertemporal risk allocation seems arbitrary.
Indeed it is these two aspects of the DDR debate that are the focus of Chapter 2 and 3. 
Chapter 2 resolves the tension between Weitzman (1998) and Gollier (2004a) while Chapter 3 
provides guidance in the determination of the empirical schedule of discount rates suggested by 
Newell and Pizer (2003).
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Chapter 2: Time is the healer: A resolution of the Gollier-Weitzman rift, or: 
Just keep on discounting at a declining rate but...
Chapter 2 addresses the puzzle posed by Gollier (2004a) which has emerged from discussion of 
the work of Weitzman (1998, 2001).
In a recent paper, Gollier (2004a) provides a simple argument which casts doubt on the 
validity of Weitzman’s argument. Gollier argues that whether or not the certainty equivalent 
discount rate is declining or, by contrast, increasing depends entirely upon the evaluation 
criterion that one applies to a particular investment decision. While Weitzman (1998) considers 
the an Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) criterion when in deriving the declining certainty 
equivalent rate, Gollier shows that if one maximises an Expected Net Future Value (ENFV) 
criterion, the resulting certainty equivalent rate is in fact increasing. Gollier goes on to argue 
that choosing between the two criteria is akin to choosing the location in time of the risk 
associated with the investment: the ENFV criterion places the risk with the future generations 
while the ENPV criterion places the risk with the present generation. Naturally, in the risk 
neutral environment of Weitzman (1998), we cannot rely on economic arguments to guide us 
in this choice and ultimately, any decision is arbitrary. In response to this puzzle Gollier says 
about himself and Weitzman:
‘we cannot both be right in fact to tell you the truth, I think that we are both
wrong’
Chapter 2 shows that the ‘puzzle’ put forward by Gollier has a straightforward resolution 
and that there is a clear sense in which Weitzman (1998) and Gollier (2004a) can both be 
right. It is demonstrated that the model in Gollier (2004a) does not prove that the discount 
rate increases with the passage of time. On the contrary, the socially efficient discount rate is 
declining irrespective of the criteria employed in CBA. However, we demonstrate that Gollier 
is correct in saying that the discount rate is increasing with one time variable. We prove that 
as the evaluation date, that is the numeraire date employed for assessing the investment, moves 
further into the future, the discount rate at a particular point in time increases. The latter is 
the insight discovered by Gollier (2004a) and it is in this sense that both Gollier and Weitzman 
are both right.
Having proven that the discount rate is a declining function of continuous time it is no 
surprise to find that decisions can be time inconsistent: this is an important feature of DDRs
12
applied in CBA. That is, projects which are viable at one evaluation date may not be viable at 
later evaluation dates purely as a result of the passage of time. In light of this we develop some 
simple ‘intergenerational efficiency’ rules to determine how far into the future, that is, for how 
many generations, a given project would pass a CBA. While not solving the problem of time 
inconsistency completely, this presents a clear, practical method of evaluation based on internal 
rates of return by which projects can be ranked taking into account intergenerational equity.
Chapter 3: Characterising uncertainty in the discount rate: Does model se­
lection affect the certainty equivalent discount rate?
From the perspective of the practitioner, although the theoretical discussions about DDRs 
offer a theoretical path through Baumol’s ‘dark jungles of the second best’ and the apparent 
intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off contained therein, they are of little value unless the 
theory can be operationalised. In the case of Gollier (2002a, 2002b, 2004b) and Weitzman 
(1998) it is uncertainty that drives DDRs, with regard to future growth and the discount rate 
respectively, thus the question of implementation is one of characterizing the uncertainty of 
these primals in some coherent way. However, of these two approaches it is Weitzman (1998) 
that has proven to be more amenable to implementation mainly because the informational 
requirements stop at the characterization of uncertainty.
The two applications of Weitzman (1998) that exist have taken different approaches stem­
ming from different interpretations of uncertainty. Weitzman (2001) defines uncertainty by 
the current lack of consensus on the appropriate discount rate for the very long term. More 
recently, Newell and Pizer (2003) (N&P) suggest that while we are relatively certain about the 
level of discount rates currently, there is considerable uncertainty in future. They character­
ize interest rate uncertainty econometrically which provides a working definition of the CER 
based upon an econometric model and allows empirical estimation of the CER schedule. These 
applications bring to light some interesting issues concerning the characterization of interest 
rate uncertainty. Firstly, in both cases persistence of interest rates is important. In N&P the 
existence of persistence is an empirical question: does a unit-root exist? This is a question that 
is not satisfactorily answered by N&P. Furthermore, since there are several additional avenues 
available for the characterization of interest rate uncertainty than the few that they consider, 
model selection should be an important consideration for determining the empirical schedule of 
discount rates.
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The empirical issues surrounding N&P are the main concern of this chapter and we build 
upon the following points. Firstly, given the N&Ps interpretation of uncertainty, model selec­
tion is likely to be an important determinant of the CER. Furthermore, tests for stationarity, 
structural breaks, model misspecification and comparisons among models based upon efficiency 
criteria should guide model selection for the practitioner. This chapter revisits these issues for 
US and UK interest rate data and shows that in both cases misspecification testing generates 
a natural progression away from the simple AR(p) specification used by N&P towards models 
which explicitly consider changes in the time series process over time.
The practical importance of these points are illustrated using US and UK interest data to 
estimate the CER schedule and two case studies: climate change and nuclear build. The former 
allows a direct comparison to the work of N&P, while the latter brings to light the different 
econometric specifications that are appropriate in the UK context and the limitations of DDRs 
in resolving the issues of inter-generational equity.
Main Results of Part 1
The main results of part 1 can be summarised as follows:
1. The Gollier-Weitzman Puzzle with regard to the certainty equivalent discount rate is 
resolved. The schedule of social discount rates in this framework is still declining with 
the passage of continuous time £ la Weitzman (1998) however it is increasing with the 
evaluation date, that is, the date at which the project is evaluated and which provides 
the temporal numeraire.
2. It is shown that time inconsistency not the choice of evaluation criterion is the main 
explanation for the anomaly noted by Gollier that the verdict of a project appraisal 
changes depending upon the evaluation criterion employed.
3. We develop rules for Cost Benefit Analysis that assist the practitioner in coming to terms 
with the time inconsistency that is inevitable in this environment. The rules are encap­
sulated by the determination of an intergenerational internal rate of return (IIRR).
4. The issue of model selection in the determination of an empirical schedule of discount 
rates is shown to be of considerable moment.
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5. Model selection using empirical tests shows a natural selection towards models that ac­
count for structural breaks in the data, and hence changes in the underlying characteri­
sation of the probability distribution for the discount rate.
6. The practical significance of model selection is highlighted. Using our preferred state 
space model it is shown that the value of a reduction in atmospheric carbon is increased 
by over 100% compared to constant discounting, and over 80% when compared to the 
mis-specified model of Newell and Pizer (2003).
Part 2: B iod iversity  and D eforestation: T he Im pacts o f Interna­
tional A greem ents and N ational P olicies
Part 2 of the thesis presents two perspectives, one theoretical the other empirical, on another 
important issue within environmental and resource economics: biodiversity conservation and 
deforestation. Chapter 4 takes a global perspective on biodiversity conservation and looks at 
how international institutions capture and share the global benefits of North-South cooperation 
in biodiversity conservation, and the perverse incentives that these institutions may give rise to. 
Chapter 5 looks at a national compensation policy for reforestation of cultivated lands in the 
People’s Republic of China. Given the temporary nature of compensation in this policy there 
is some considerable concern with regard to its long-run sustainability. This chapter analyses 
the impacts of this policy upon household incomes, income distribution and poverty alleviation, 
upon each of which the sustainability of the policy depends.
Chapter 4: North-South bargaining in joint production: The biodiversity 
bargaining problem.
Chapter 4 provides a new perspective on international institutions for the conservation of bi­
ological diversity. The need for global cooperation for the conservation of biological diversity 
has long been understood. In stylized terms, the developed North values highly biodiversity 
in the developing South. The global nature of the benefits from biodiversity means that the 
North and South cooperate in arriving at the land-use decisions that determine the amount 
of biodiversity conserved. This requires an appropriate allocation of their individual physical 
resources, but an agreement on a reasonable division of the global surplus. The need for coop­
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eration is particularly palpable in the biotechnology sector. Research and development (R&D) 
in biotechnology in the North generates innovations from which both regions stand to gain. 
However, it is countries in the South that are endowed with the biological diversity required 
as inputs into biotechnological R&D. North-South exchanges of biodiversity inputs and biotech 
outputs offer scope for considerable welfare gains if cooperation can be realised.
However, the informational nature of these goods hinders this mutual exchange. Since 
markets cannot be relied upon to facilitate the exchange of such goods, countries agreed in early 
1990s to create international institutions in order to ensure cooperation. The Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992 and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement represent the most pertinent examples of institutions that increase investment into 
both biotechnological R&D in the North as a result of rents earned on intellectual property; and 
transfers going into conservation in the South under the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
the financial vehicle created by the CBD.
One problem with the institutions thus designed is that by most estimates, the rate of 
degradation of biodiverse habitats in the South does not seem to have been affected by their 
introduction. Various explanations are possible: government failure such as perverse subsidies 
(Margulis 2004), dysfunctional property rights (Southgate 2000), lack of complementary farm­
ers’ rights (Soete and Droege 2001), corruption (Smith et al. 2003) etc. However, this chapter 
argues distinctly that the very institutions designed to stimulate conservation actually create 
incentives for biodiversity loss.
To understand the underlying biodiversity bargaining problem that gives this chapter its 
name, we apply the tool of cooperative bargaining theory to derive propositions regarding 
the bargaining frontier, from which a measure of efficiency of the institutions chosen can be 
derived, and the set of feasible and individually rational strategies of the bargaining parties. 
A particular focus of this inquiry is whether -  in a manner similar to the idea of ‘rational 
threats’ posited by Nash (1953) -  the degradation of biodiversity is a bargaining option for 
the South. This approach generates a number of results, chief among which is the prospect 
that current institutions are not robust to rational threats by the South. In other words, 
continued degradation of biodiversity may very well be in the interest of the South even in the 
presence of conservation rewards paid through the GEF. In addition we show that, although the 
institutional arrangements are globally and individually welfare-improving, they are generally 
second best. In sum these results suggest a number of policy prescriptions and imply that if
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the policy choice is between choosing to protect R&D outputs or R&D inputs, the South may 
prefer a regime that protects intellectual property rights (such as TRIPS) to the conservation 
rewards of the GEF.
Chapter 5: The Sloping Lands Conversion Programme of the People’s Repub­
lic of China: Impacts on income, income distribution and poverty alleviation
Whereas chapter 4 highlighted the potential importance of the nature and level of the com­
pensation scheme in land use policies, in chapter 5 we analyse the actual impact of an impor­
tant national reforestation compensation scheme: the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme 
(SLCP) or ‘Grain for Green’ programme of the Peoples Republic of China. This policy started 
in 1999 and has two main objectives. Firstly, and primarily, the SLCP intends to generate 
river basin/watershed related environmental benefits by reforesting currently cultivated highly 
sloped land in the upper reaches of a number of important river systems. Indeed, the SLCP 
was hatched in direct response to the loss of topsoil, siltation of streams and the increased flood 
events witnessed in many river basins in recent years, most notably the Yangtze River and the 
Chao and Bai rivers in the North East of China, each of which was subject to severe floods 
in the summer of 1998. The blame for the severity of these floods was placed squarely with 
deforestation (World Bank 2001). Farmers are compensated for changing their land uses in this 
way and the relatively generous nature of the compensation package serves the second objective 
of the policy: rural poverty alleviation. Compensation comes in the form of cash, in-kind grain 
and occasionally tree-seedlings and technical assistance (Xu et al 2001).
The compensation provided to households under the SLCP is limited in duration to a period 
of 5 or 8 years, and for this reason, there is great speculation as to whether or not the SLCP will 
be sustainable in the long-run with regard to its two main objectives: environmental benefits 
and poverty alleviation (Uchida et al 2004, Xu and Cao 2002, Gong and Xu 2000, CCICED 
2000). Of course, these two goals are inexorably linked since participating households will only 
maintain lands reforested under the SLCP if their welfare in the period after compensation 
ceases is at least what it was under their former land-use practices. That is, the sustainability 
of the SLCP requires that the incomes of the poor households that are the stated focus of 
the programme are permanently raised as a result of the temporary subsidies, and hence some 
households will need to be lifted permanently out of poverty. But is this likely to happen and 
if so, how?
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Ultimately, the implied hope among policy makers within the Chinese government in this 
regard is that temporary compensation for setting aside land will enable households to find 
alternative and more lucrative sources of income which permanently raise household welfare 
thereby removing incentives to revert back to their former practices when compensation ceases. 
One obvious way in which increased welfare is envisaged is through the production of forest 
goods from the forested SLCP land. Other alternatives include increased livestock production 
or off-farm income. But what has been the impact of the programme on participants compared 
to non-participants? have the sources of income changed as a result of participation in the 
SLCP? Has overall income risen? What has been the impact on poverty alleviation? Empirical 
evidence so far is scant and subject to a number of data and econometric problems.
In order to answer these questions and obtain unbiased and efficient estimates of the impact 
of the SLCP there are two econometric issues arising from particular features of the intervention 
and its target group. Firstly, there is the question of selection for participation in the SLCP. 
While in principle participation in the programme is voluntary, evidence suggests that whether 
selection is voluntary, compulsory or a mixture of the two, depends upon location. In each 
case selection is likely to be non-random and based on household and local characteristics that 
are not always observable to the analyst. Hence, the econometric approach must provide an 
identification strategy that accounts for this. Secondly, it is well known that there are local 
and household level determinants of rural poverty (see e.g. Jalan and Ravallion 2002, Park 
et al 2002) and also that semi-subsistence households differ in the nature and severity of the 
constraints, frictions and market failures that they face, and which effectively define them (Key 
et al 2000). Consequently, responses to public interventions such as the SLCP are likely to be 
extremely heterogenous both geographically and at the household level. Indeed, this has been 
shown to be the case in China (Chen and Ravallion 2003). It is clear therefore that any empirical 
approach which attempts to estimate programme impacts needs to accommodate observable 
and unobservable heterogeneity in two dimensions: selection into the programme and in the 
specification of the impact.
In this chapter we go some way towards answering these questions and address these econo­
metric issues. We use programme evaluation techniques whose objective is to ensure that the 
non-experimental data is used in such a way that the SLCP mimics a randomised control exper­
iment. Using matched difference in differences we obtain estimates of the average impact upon 
participants compared to non participants (the average treatment on the treated), the impact
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across different quantiles of the income distribution (quantile treatment effects) and the impact 
on poverty alleviation. We define poverty in a conventional manner: the proportion of people 
living beneath a particular level of income, but this definition gives rise to another question: 
against which yardstick should this be measured? Given that there is wide disagreement on 
this issue in China, and given the possibility of heterogeneous impacts at different quantiles 
of the income distribution, we follow Chen and Ravallion (2003) and assess poverty alleviation 
against a continuum of poverty lines. Finally, we say something about the sustainability of the 
SLCP in light of the estimations.
Main results of Part 2
On international agreements for biodiversity conservation
1. Current institutional arrangements in the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and its fi­
nancial mechanism the Global Environment Facility (GEF) represent an ‘extreme point 
contract’ in that the South is left indifferent between cooperation and non-cooperation.
2. Consequently, the current international institutions which address global biodiversity con­
servation are not robust to the use of rational threats as a bargaining ploy by the South.
3. Current institutions, including intellectual property rights (IPRs) under the TRIPS agree­
ment, may be globally and individually welfare improving, but they are generally second 
best.
4. Payment for the stock of biodiversity in addition to payments for incremental costs will 
be required in order to remove these perverse incentives, contrary to the GEF which only 
considers the latter.
5. The South may prefer an institution that protects the outputs of biodiversity in R&D, e.g. 
intellectual property rights, rather than the inputs, that is biodiversity itself, as occurs 
under the CBD and GEF.
On the Impact and sustainability of the Sloping Lands Conversion Policy:
1. Analysis of the participation decision shows that the SLCP targets low productivity land 
and yet does not always target the poor.
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2. In villages where participation is partly voluntary, poor households self select and are 
more likely to participate.
3. The temporary compensation increases net household incomes on average for participants 
in the SLCP.
4. These increases in income come from two sources:
i) the compensation itself, which, on average, outweighs the value of lost cultivation, and
ii) participants in the SLCP increase activity in the off-farm labour market, with income 
increasing from this source compared to non-participants.
5. The average increases in income are the result of significant impacts at the lower quantiles 
of the income distribution, not at the higher quantiles, where the impact of the programme 
on income is negligible.
6. The impact of the programme on poverty alleviation differs widely depending upon the 
yardstick against which poverty is measured. In the presence of the compensation, at the 
commonly used $2 per capita per day measure, the impact is negligible, however at the 
$1 per day and the official poverty line of Y640, there is approximately a 10% reduction 
in the proportion of households beneath that level.
7. Once subsidies axe removed however, although the average level of income for participants 
is not significantly different from non-participants, and the same can be said for the lower 
quantiles of income, poverty increases among participants as measured from the lower 
poverty lines.
8. On balance, the analysis shows that the sustainability of the SLCP is by no means guaran­
teed once subsidies end, since, given the choice, participants could improve their incomes 
by reverting back to their former land-uses. This accords with other analysis on these 
data which shows that up to 60% of households state that they would convert SLCP land 
to cultivation upon cessation of compensation.
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Part I
Time Varying Social Discount Rates
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Chapter 1
Discounting: The long and the short 
of it
Abstract1
The last few years have witnessed important advances in our understanding of time pref­
erence and social discounting. In particular, several rationales for the use of time-varying 
social discount rates have emerged. These rationales range from the ad hoc to the formal, 
with some founded solely in economic theory while others reflect principles of intergener- 
ational equity. While these advances are to be applauded, the practitioner is left with a 
confusing array of rationales and the sense that almost any discount rate can be justified.
Chapter 1 draws together these different strands and provides a critical review of past and 
present contributions to this literature. In addition to this we highlight some of the problems 
with employing DDRs in the decision-making process, the most pressing of which may be 
time inconsistency. We clarify their practical implications, and potential pitfalls, of the more 
credible rationales and argue that some approaches popular in the environmental economics 
literature are ill-conceived. Finally, we illustrate the impact of different approaches by ex­
amining two investments with long-term consequeneces, namely global warming prevention 
and nuclear power.
This introductory chapter serves to isolate some of the questions and puzzles, both theo­
retical and practical, that have arisen from the literature. Two of these avenues of research 
constitute the focus of Chapters 2 and 3.
^ h is  chapter draws from a discussion paper of the same name authored by Ben Groom, Cameron Hepburn, 
Phoebe Koundouri and David Pearce. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1.1 Introduction
Debates about discounting have always occupied an important place in environmental policy 
and economics. Like all other investment, investment in the environment involves incurring costs 
today for benefits in the future. Whether a public investment is efficient or not is determined 
by social cost benefit analysis (CBA). In a competitive economy, the socially efficient level of 
investment is attained by investing in projects where the net present value (NPV), determined 
by discounting costs and benefits at the social discount rate (SDR) over the time horizon, is 
greater than zero. It follows that the level of the SDR is critical in determining whether an 
individual public investment or policy will pass a CBA test.
Quite separately from arguments over whether the discount rate should be positive or not 
(e.g. Broome 1992, Olson and Bailey 1981), economists and others have argued at length 
over which of several potential discount rates should be used as the SDR (e.g. Marglin 1963, 
Baumol 1968, Lind 1982). Several candidates exist, the most widely recognised of which are 
the social rate of return on investment (r) and the rate at which society values consumption 
at different points of time, the Social Rate of Time Preference ((5). The distinction between 
these discount rates is most important in the second best world in which distortions to the 
economy, such as corporate and personal taxes or environmental externalities, prevent these 
rates from being equalised. The choice of SDR is inherently complicated in such situations 
and is dependent upon wide variety of factors such as the extent to which public investment 
displaces or generates consumption or private investment throughout the lifetime of the project, 
the extent to which project risk is captured by the discount rate, and assumptions concerning 
reinvestment (Lind 1982, Portney and Weyant 1999). However, one thing common to much of 
the past literature is that, whatever the rate chosen, the relative weights applied to all adjacent 
time periods would be invariant across the time horizon considered. That is, discounting would 
be exponential.
A common critique of discounting is that it militates against solutions to long-run environ­
mental problems: for example, climate change, biodiversity loss and nuclear waste, which need 
to be evaluated over a time horizon of several hundred years. The question arises: What is the 
appropriate procedure for such long time horizons? There is wide agreement that discounting 
at a constant positive rate in these circumstances is problematic, irrespective of the particular 
discount rate employed. With a constant rate, the costs and benefits accruing to generations
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in the distant future appear relatively unimportant in present values terms. Hence decisions 
made today on the basis of CBA appear to tyrannise future generations and in extreme cases 
leave them exposed to potentially catastrophic consequences. Such risks can either result from 
current actions, where future costs are carry no weight, e.g. nuclear decommission, or from 
current inaction, where the future benefits carry no weight, e.g. climate change. The inter- 
generational issues associated with discounting have puzzled generations of economists. Pigou 
(1932) referred to the deleterious effects of exponential discounting on future welfare as a ‘de­
fective telescopic faculty’. More recently Weitzman (1998) summarises this puzzle succinctly 
when he states:
‘to think about the distant future in terms of standard discounting is to have an 
uneasy intuitive feeling that something is wrong, somewhere
Discounting also appears to be contrary to the widely supported goal of ‘sustainability’ which 
by most definitions implies that policies and investments now must have due regard for the need 
to secure sustained increases in per capita welfare for future generations (Wald Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987, Atkinson et al. 1997). Also, by attaching little weight 
to future welfare conventional discounting appears to ignore any notion of intergenerational 
equity.
A recently proposed solution to this problem is to use a discount rate which declines with 
time, according to some predetermined trajectory, this raising the weight attached to the welfare 
of future generations. It is immediately obvious that using a declining discount rate (DDR) 
would make an important contribution towards meeting the goal of sustainable development.
So, what formal justifications exist for using a DDR and what is the optimal trajectory of the 
decline? This paper reviews recent contributions addressing these two issues in different ways. 
We tie together the different approaches — some deterministic, others based on uncertainty, 
some based upon intergenerational equity, others on considerations of efficiency — and in so 
doing we highlight some important theoretical and practical issues that arise with DDRs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 .2  provides a brief review of the theory under­
pinning social discount rates. Section 1.3 presents the arguments for DDRs in a deterministic 
world. In Section 1.4 we review the literature on uncertainty and discount rates and show that 
the argument for DDRs is most compelling here. In Section 1.5, we examine the arguments for 
DDRs founded on intergenerational equity and in Section 1.6 we summarise some of the hy­
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perbolic discounting literature. Practical issues arising from the use of DDRs in policy making 
are considered in Section 1.7, and two case studies are examined in Section 1.8. Section 1.9 
concludes.
1.2 Social D iscount Rates: A  B rief R eview
1.2.1 The Ramsey model
In this Section we take the Ramsey growth model as our starting point and describe the deriva­
tion of the socially optimal discount rate. In so doing we provide the general framework in 
which the ensuing discussion of DDRs takes place and show the relationship between the social 
rate of time preference 8, the private return to investment, z, the social rate of return to invest­
ment, r, and the ‘utility discount rate’ or rate of pure time preference, p. Each of these rates is 
a contender for use as the SDR, where the appropriate discount rate for use in CBA depends 
upon the numeraire employed. For example, the utility discount rate, p, is the appropriate 
discount rate for costs and benefits that are measured in utility. Alternatively, in the Ramsey 
model r, i, and 8 represent the appropriate SDRs when costs and benefits are measured in 
consumption equivalents, as is usual practice in CBA. In both cases the SDR represents the 
rate of change of the value or shadow price of the numeraire (Dasgupta 2001)2.
The conventional approach to CBA is based on neoclassical growth theory and underpinned 
by utilitarian ethics. The utilitarian approach holds the view that individual preferences count, 
the behaviour that we observe within the economy reflects individuals’ preferences and these 
preferences ought to be reflected in the societal decision making process3. Where the numeraire 
is units of consumption, the SDR is endogenously determined within the Ramsey framework by 
optimal saving, consumption and production decisions over time and in this sense it is preference 
based. Although there are a number of abstractions in this model, which often exist for the 
sake of tractability, it represents a useful starting point for the discussion of the discount rate 
and its economic and ethical content.
In the Ramsey model households wish to maximise the discounted intertemporal sum of 
utility over an infinite time horizon, discounted at the utility discount rate, p. In this way
2 The shadow price or accounting price interpretation strictly refers to a decentralised economy, rather than
to a social planner.
3 See Pearce et al (2003) for a discussion.
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we temporarily abstract from the perfectly plausible idea that individuals have different rates 
of pure time preference, p{. Households are modelled as an infinitely lived representative agent 
whose intertemporal welfare is assumed to be time-separable. In continuous time the maximand 
for the representative agent is therefore:
POO
U(c(t ))= / u [c (t)] exp (—pt) dt (1.1)
Jo
where the felicity function, u( . ) , is time invariant and has the following properties: v! (.) > 0 , 
u" (.) < 04. Households can supply labour and earn a wage income w (t) and are assumed to 
hold assets: loans or ownership claims to capital, a (£), which earn a rate of interest r  (t) , which 
is taken as given. The associated flow budget constraint can be written as:
a = w (t) + r (t) a (t) — c (t) (1 .2 )
Firms are also modelled in the Ramsey model. Profit maximising firms rent capital, k, from 
households at a rental price, R, to produce output, y, using a concave production technology, 
f (k) .  They do so up to the point at which the marginal return to capital equals the rental 
price: f  (k) =  R. Since capital, k, and loans, are assumed to be perfect substitutes as a store 
of value, it must be the case that their prices are equal: R = r (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995)5. 
Furthermore, in the absence of externalities and other distortions, it must be the case that the 
social marginal return to capital coincides with the private rate of return, i. It is well known 
that the solution to this yields the familiar Ramsey rule6:
i — r — p + 6g — 8 (1.3)
where g = c/c, and 6 represents the preferences for smoothing consumption over time and 
is known as the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. 6 is a measure of the curvature of 
the utility function and is mathematically equivalent to the coefficient of relative risk aversion:
4Where u' (.) represents the first derivative with respect to c, u" (.) the second, etc. This notation holds
throughout the paper and for other functions where no confusion arises.
In the Ramsey model, the felicity function is also assumed to satisfy the Inada conditions: u' (c) —> 0 as c —> oo
and u' (c) —» oo as c —» 0.
5For simplicity we abstract from depreciation, population growth and technological changes here.
6See for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p63) for a clear derivation.
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The left hand side of (1.3) reflects the return to saving: the rate of interest r, which must 
equal the social and private marginal productivity of capital. The right hand side can be 
thought of in a number of ways. We have defined the term 8 as the social rate of time pref­
erence, which reflects the change in relative value that society places on units of consumption 
at adjacent periods of time. The right hand side of (1.3) can also be thought of as the rate of 
return to consumption and as a consequence it is frequently referred to as the Consumption 
Rate of Interest (CRI). In general, 8 and CRI axe considered to be conceptually different, the 
former representing the intertemporal weights placed on consumption by society, and the latter 
representing the same but for individuals. It is frequently the case that the latter is used to 
measure the former using observed rates of return on savings (Lind 1982).
In sum, Equation (1.3) shows that on the optimal path in the competitive economy individ­
uals (the social planner) will choose their consumption and savings such that their consumption 
rate of interest (social rate of time preference) is equal to the rate of interest on savings. Like­
wise, firms will employ capital such that the rate of return is equal to the rate of interest in the 
economy. In the competitive economy without distortions, social and private rates of return 
coincide.
1.2.2 Interpretation and extensions
Ramsey interpreted Equation (1 .1 ) as the maximand of an infinitely lived representative agent 
acting as a trustee for current and future generations in choosing consumption and saving. 
Central to this interpretation is a bequest motive: the infinitely lived agent reflects an immortal 
extended family containing many finitely lived altruistic families. These families are connected 
by a series of intergenerational transfers to their children who in turn give to their children etc. 
Although there has been criticism of this approach, there is at least some agreement that this 
abstraction represents a convenient framework for long-term analysis (T6 th 2000, Stephane et 
al. 1997, Manne 1995)7.
One deficiency from the perspective of environmental economics is the absence of explicit 
consideration of stocks and flows of environmental assets. This deficiency has been addressed 
in numerous papers in the realm of optimal growth in which stocks of environmental resources
7Manne (1995) and Stephan et al. (1997) compare this approach to an Overlapping Generations model (OLG) 
in the context of climate change policy and find that the OLG model offers little in the way of additional policy 
insights.
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(s(t)) are explicitly introduced as a determinant of utility in order to represent amenity values 
and other preferences for the environment (see e.g. Brock 1977, Heal 1998, Chichilnisky 1997, 
Li and Lofgren 2000). In such cases instantaneous utility is represented by u(c(t), s (t)), and 
the behaviour of environmental stocks captured by associated equations of motion reflecting the 
extent to which the resource is renewable and the impact of consumption or production on the 
environment. Such analyses are frequently directed to the question of optimal and sustainable 
growth and are also explicitly concerned with notions of intergenerational equity. In effect, such 
approaches extend the realm of preferences that count in CBA to more explicitly include those 
of future generations.
Ramsey (1928) described the discounting of utility, that is, placing different weights upon 
the utility of different generations, as ‘ethically indefensible’. Harrod (1948) famously stated 
that discounting utility represented ‘rapacity and the conquest of reason by passion’. Ramsey 
reflected this belief in his analysis of optimal growth by assuming that p = 0 , and since that time 
these opinions have been the subject of much contemplation by economists and philosophers 
alike8. However, given (1.3) is should be clear that this by no means implies that costs and 
benefits measured in units of consumption should not be discounted. With positive growth and 
concave utility the SDR will be positive, hence discounting consumption streams in CBA can 
be synonymous with the equal treatment of generations’ welfare (Lind 1995).
It is common in theoretical work to employ a positive, time invariant utility discount rate
reflecting both alternative beliefs about time preference and the need for tractability. This
practice is not without some theoretical basis. Olson and Bailey (1981) look at the implications
of assuming p =  0  for optimal consumption paths. One finding is that the high levels of
saving implied by this assumption do not tally well with the empirical evidence. This, they
argue, provides a strong rationale for assuming a positive rate of time preference. In a more
general preference framework, Koopmans (1960) took an axiomatic approach to this inherently
ethical question. He showed that the existence of impatience, that is, the use of a positive
utility discount rate, which is constant over time (p > 0 , pt — p) is implied by the presence of a
number of very particular axioms concerning the intertemporal welfare function U (c), among
8 There are a number of arguments either way concerning utility discounting. Economists’ arguments for 
p >  0 are freqently concerned with the high level of savings and the immiserisation of current generations that 
may result in the traditional infinite horizon model. Others suggest that since impatience is observed among 
individuals it should be reflected in the decision making process. Philosophers and economists alike are not 
agreed that these arguments are entirely satisfactory.
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other things. For example, U (c) must be continuous in its arguments, stationary over time and 
satisfy a condition known as ‘period independence’. That is, preferences for benefits and costs 
at a particular period of time are independent of those in the past or future.
Indeed, Koopmans went on to show that the same axioms imply that U (c) takes the time- 
separable form shown in (1.1). Of course, like any separability assumption, time-separable 
preferences are not entirely defensible and are considered by many to be problematic. Barro 
and King (1984) for example, show how time-separability places restrictions upon the relative 
responses of consumption and leisure to changes is relative prices and permanent income. In­
tuitively, it seems unlikely that current and future tastes will be independent of decisions made 
in the past.
Discounting utility at a constant rate, p, insures the decisions made by the representative 
agent/social planner are time consistent, that is, the planner will not change his plan purely as 
a result of the passage of time (Heal 1998, Gollier 2002a). Indeed, time consistency and Koop- 
man’s period independence assumption are closely related. One feature of discount rates that 
vary over time, on the other hand, is that they tend to invoke time inconsistent behaviour and 
all its associated travails (Strotz 1956, Barro 1999, Hepburn 2003). In this regard, in addition 
to the theoretical and ethical arguments concerning the utility discount rate, a great deal of 
attention has been paid to the discount rates that individuals actually employ. The so-called 
hyperbolic discounting literature provides considerable evidence that individuals use time vary­
ing discount rates in their everyday decision making (e.g. Frederick et al. 2002, Loewenstein 
and Prelec 1992, Henderson and Bateman 1995). It is frequently posited that such time prefer­
ences can explain behaviour as diverse as ‘savouring’ or ‘dread’ effects and seemingly irrational 
behaviour such as addiction and other ‘slippery slope’ phenomena. Weitzman (1998) notes 
that, although this behaviour typically refers to short-run behaviour there is an evolutionary 
argument for using time varying discount rate for the longer term: since we only observe those 
who survive, hyperbolic discounting must be an effective survival strategy. Similar ideas are 
developed by Dasgupta and Maskin (2002). Such observations generate something of a puzzle 
when one considers the ethical underpinning of CBA described above, that is, that preferences 
count. The evidence raises the question: Is a model of time preferences that describes irra­
tional and often inefficient behaviour a suitable model for social CBA? This is an issue that is 
discussed further in Section 1.6.
The discussion in the previous Sections has shown that to a great extent the social discount
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rate can be considered to be a derived concept. In the Ramsey world the SDR is emerges from 
the optimising economy, while, Koopmans focussed the discussion about the utility discount 
rate on the underlying axioms of intergenerational justice that one is prepared to adhere to. In 
this sense the SDR is not ‘ethical raw material’ (Dasgupta 2001).
1.2.3 Selection of the discount rate
The Ramsey rule in Equation (1.3) shows why it is valid to consider the social rate of time 
preference, 6, and the rate of return on capital, from hereon r, as candidates for the socially 
efficient discount rate for projects or policies whose costs and benefits axe measured in consump­
tion equivalents. If projects are to be financed by current consumption or investment then the 
rate of return on these projects ought to be compared to that which prevails in the economy. 
Investment will be efficient if projects are selected in this way. In the perfectly competitive 
paradigm all rates are equal and hence it does not matter which rate; i, r, or 8, is used for 
CBA.
Furthermore, true to the ethical underpinning of CBA described above, the Ramsey rule 
reflects the particular facets of individual preferences that provide the rationale for discounting 
the future in a deterministic world: 1) impatience, reflected by the utility discount rate or pure 
rate of time preference, p, and 2 ) the wealth effect represented by the term 9g, where 9 is greater 
than zero if households axe averse to consumption fluctuations9. The wealth effect describes 
how individuals will plane less value upon additional units of consumption in the future if their 
belief is that incomes at that time will be higher as a result of economic growth. This effect 
will be amplified if there is a strong desire to smooth consumption over time. As we shall see 
in Section 1.4, when uncertainty with regard to growth is introduced, preferences for risk also 
play a role in determining the socially efficient discount rate, as reflected by the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion: 9.
In reality, it will not be true that i = r = 8 and the debate about discounting has concerned 
when and whether it is appropriate to use z, r or 8, or some combination thereof (Lind 1982, 
Baumol 1968). For example, assuming for the moment that i = r, distortionaxy income and 
coxporation ox profit taxes will in general cause the rate of return on capital to differ from 
the social rate of time preference. In general it will be the case that r > <510. Imperfect
9This is so if the felicity function is concave: u' (.) >  0 and u" (.) < 0 = >  9 >  0.
10 to see this consider the following example. If corporation taxes are 50% and income taxes are 25% then if
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competition and externalities in production will cause private and social rates of return to 
capital to diverge: i 7  ^ r. Furthermore, the appropriate discount rate for a particular project 
will depend upon the extent to which a project is funded by consumption or by displaced 
private investment. It has been argued that, other things equal, a project funded entirely by 
consumption should be discounted by 8 while a project funded entirely by the latter should be 
discounted by the private rate of return on capital, i (Lind 1982). Subsequently, others have 
suggested that projects funded by a mixture of the two should be discounted at a rate which 
reflects an average of the two rates, weighted by the proportions in which consumption and 
private investment finance the project (Haveman 1969). Another suggestion is to convert all 
costs and benefits into consumption equivalents using the shadow price of capital approach and 
then to use the 8 as the SDR (see e.g. Bradford 1975)11. In addition to these factors, the 
rate of reinvestment of returns and the riskiness of private versus public investments axe also 
considered to be determinants of the socially efficient discount rate (Baumol 1968). With regard 
to risk it is commonly thought that the risk free rate of return is appropriate for the appraisal 
of public projects due to risk pooling available to governments. (Samuelson 1964, Arrow 1966, 
Lind 1982). Nevertheless, each of these factors requires consideration when determining the 
correct level of the discount rate in what Baumol called the ‘dark jungles of the second best’ 
(Baumol 1968).
1.2.4 Common practice and definitions
There are many factors that need to be considered when determining the socially efficient
discount rate for use in CBA. This leads to the difficult prospect of different discount rates
for different projects (Lind 1982). It is common practice for governments to abstract from
detailed adjustments, such as those described above, and employ more practical rules of thumb.
6 =  6% then when firms invest they must pay dividends to shareholders such that they obtain a 6% return. This
means that the shareholders must earn a pretax profit of 8% (plus 25%) while investors/firms must earn 16%
(plus 50%). I.e. i =  16%, 6 =  6%, and the rates are divorced.
11 The shadow price of capital is simply the present value of the future stream of consumption benefits associated
with £1 of private investment discounted at the SRTP. In the case of a 2 period project yielding benefits
B t =  [B \ , B 2 ] and a private investment yielding the rate of return on private capital, r, of 16% one year hence,
then the consumption lost as a result of the public project as a result of the £1 displaced from the private project
is £1.16. This is the shadow price of private capital and the public project is viable if the following inequality
holds: +  ( i^ ) 3 — 'Hi* This criteria differs from that in which simply the private rate of return on capital
is used as the discount rate.
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For example, in the ‘Green Book: Appraisal and Analysis in Central Government’, the UK 
government recommends the use of the social rate of time preference as the test discount rate 
for CBA (HM Treasury 2003). This rate is recommended for use across all departments, for all 
projects and is calculated to be 8 = 3.5%12. The policy in the US is more tailored. It is proposed 
that investments external to the government are evaluated at a rate reflecting the average return 
in the private sector, currently 7%. Alternatively, internal investments are evaluated at the rate 
of return on treasury bonds, 4%. The shadow price approach outlined above is also suggested 
for certain appraisals where the social rate of time preference is assumed to be reflected by the 
return on treasury bonds (Newell and Pizer 2001). The use of the rate of return on treasury 
bonds reflects the commonly held view that it is the risk free rate of return that is applicable 
to public investments. In any event, whatever the choice of SDR, usual practice is to employ 
the current estimate for all periods of time. One of the few exceptions to this rule is the U.K. 
government, which has recently introduced a declining schedule of discount rates to the Green 
Book for use in long-term projects (HM Treasury 2003)13.
Projects are appraised by establishing their Net Present Value (NPV) determined by sum­
ming up the net benefits that occur at each moment in time, where the net benefits are deter­
mined using accounting prices and are weighted by the discount factor;
a(t) = e x p ^ J  — 6(s)ds^ (1.4)
which, reflects the value of the numeraire in each time period. As stated above, the discount rate 
is most frequently defined as the rate of change of the value of the numeraire or discount factor. 
However, there is a distinction to be made between average and marginal rates. The average 
rate of discount can be thought of as the rate which if applied constantly for all intervening 
years would yield the same present value as indicated by the discount factor. This rate can be 
derived for any time period from the simple rearrangement of (1.4):
6a (t) = ~^ \na( t )  (1.5)
The marginal rate of discount is the period-to-period rate of change of the discount factor and 
can be calculated as follows:
12This is based upon the following figures: p  =  1%, 0 =  1 and g =  2.5%. 0 =  1 when preferences were 
logarithmic for example.
13These policy changes came in response to previous reviews of the discounting literature (OXERA 2003).
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M t) = - f e w  =  (16)
a(t) a(t)
It is common practice to assess the NPV of a project using a constant discount rate. Thus 
a partial equilibrium framework is implicitly assumed with the discount rate exogenous, the 
assumption being that the project is too small to influence the economy as a whole. Again, 
this accepted practice arises out of convenience and does not completely reflect the optimising 
economy outlined above, particularly for large projects. Clearly, where the discount rate is 
constant for all time periods, marginal and average rates coincide: 8a = 8m = 8. However, 
where the discount rate is time dependent, for example, where we have declining discount rates 
(DDRs), this distinction can become important.
1.3 D eclin ing D iscount R ates in a D eterm in istic  W orld
1.3.1 Growth (g) and consumption smoothing (0)
The Ramsey rule in Equation (1.3) shows the determinants of the socially efficient equilibrium 
discount rate: pure impatience, p, the desire for consumption smoothing, 9, and growth, g. 
With certain knowledge of each of the parameters on the RHS of (1.3) the social rate of time 
prefence, 8, is known with certainty, and in the competitive economy we know that it will be 
equal to the private and social return on capital. Given these consumption based determinants 
of 8, it is interesting to consider the its level and how it might change over time.
Firstly, as Dasgupta (2001) makes clear, given the definiton of 8 in (1.3), negative growth
could, quite reasonably induce to negative social discount rates, particularly if one takes the
view that p = 014. Similarly, if growth is known to be declining then the discount rate will be 
declining. To add some form to this analysis we can see from the definition of <S15:
d c d9 dg . _N
di s { t ) ~ d i 9 + e m  (L7)
Hence, there are a number of situations in which the SDR will be declining in this deterministic
setting. Firstly, if we maintain the assumption that 6 > 0 and constant over time ( |f  = 0)
l4This would not occur in the optimal Ramsey set up however since, for example, / '  (fc) > 0.
15 We thank an anonymous referee for alerting us to this approach.
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then DDRs will occur if growth is decreasing over time: ^  < 016. A diminishing rate of growth 
is a very real possibility and may be particularly relevant when considering climate change 
prevention. With declining growth If this is the case then the appropriate discount rate for the 
long-term ought to be declining where =  0. The point here is that projects which aim to 
avert climate change should no longer be considered in a partial equilibrium context (Dasgupta 
2001). Clearly, the behaviour of the efficient discount rate over time is highly dependent upon 
the preferences of the representative household, in particular the level of 6 and its evolution 
over time with changes in income. This is summarised in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1: Assuming that the pure rate of time preference is constant over time, in
the deterministic case the socially efficient discount rate will decline unambiguously over time 
if, for whatever reason, growth is declining (increasing) | |  < 0  (jgj- > 0  ^ and preferences axe 
such that 0 > 0 (9 < 0) and 6 is inversely related or unrelated to income, regardless of the level 
of growth, g.
Proof: The proof comes from inspection of the right hand side of (1.7). For the second
term to be negative requires that where growth is decreasing, ^  < 0, (increasing, ^  > 0), 9 
must be positive (negative). For the first term to be non-positive requires that either i) ff = 0, 
as in the example above; ii) g > 0 and < 0; or iii) g < 0 and > 0. Clearly in case i) if
< o (jjL > O^then < 0 if 9 > 0 (0 < 0). Case ii) and iii) are satisfied if preferences are 
such that 6 is inversely related to income, making the level of growth unimportant.
Our first finding is that DDRs can emerge in a deterministic world because of predictable 
changes in the growth rate and associated changes in preferences for consumption smoothing or 
risk. Given that 9 is mathematically equivalent to P ratt’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
the preferences required for each of the cases above can be though of as follows: Case i) 
requires preferences akin to constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), while cases ii) and iii) 
require preferences which are akin to decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA). Clearly there 
exists a number of other cases in which DDRs may emerge where the first term and second
16 That 6 remains constant in the presence of positive or negative growth is akin to the commonly used modelling 
assumption that agents in the economy have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Clearly, this interpretation 
makes only partial sense in the deterministic case in which it is more sensible to talk of constant intertemporal 
substitution.
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term axe of opposite sign and yet their sum is still negative. In such cases the level of the 
parameters, 9, g, and their time derivatives are important. We do not isolate these conditions 
here. It suffices to note that growth, individual preferences and their behaviour over time 
are important determinants of the SDR in the deterministic case and that fluctuations in the 
discount rate used for discounting consumption equivalents can be a natural outcome of the 
traditional Ramsey model. The analysis here also provides a useful introduction to the work 
of Gollier (2 0 0 2 a, 2002b) which looks at the long-term discount rate under uncertainty. Under 
uncertainty the interpretation of 9 as reflecting preferences for risk becomes more intuitive.
1.3.2 Environmental value and externalities
A second justification for DDRs in a deterministic world arises from the work of Weitzman 
(1994). It is well known that environmental externalities in consumption or production can 
cause the social and private rates of return on capital to diverge. Weitzman (1994) provides 
theoretical conditions for an ‘environmental’ SDR based upon the social rate of return to capi­
tal, which is lower than the private rate. In so doing Weitzman (1994) isolates the conditions 
under which DDRs emerge. His model incorporates two main ideas: society values environ­
mental resources positively and the production of consumption goods can generate negative 
environmental externalities. These two basic tenets generate a tension between private invest­
ment and public investments in environmental protection, driving a wedge between the private 
and social rates of return. The model can be thought of as follows. If national income is either 
consumed, invested or diverted to environmental expenditures we can write:
Y(t )  = f  (k (t)) = C (t) + 1 (t) +ip (t)
where /  (.) is the production technology, C (t) is consumption, I  (t) is gross investment and 
-0 (t) is expenditure on reducing environmental damage, a social cost external to the production 
process. The relation between environmental expenditures and environmental damage as a 
proportion of income is defined as17:
f = G(f) (1.8)
where G^ < 0 and > 018. If investment is increased at time t by a marginal reduction
17G (.) is assumed to be continous and monotonic and is constant returns to scale.
18Where G^ and are the first and second derivatives of G(. )  with respect to ip.
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in consumption, keeping environmental expenditures constant, the private rate of return on 
capital can be thought of as:
(1.9)
Hence the private rate of return, i , on capital, k, is equal to f  (k ). When production 
generates environmental externalities the social rate of return, r, will differ from the private rate. 
Rather than modelling the effect of environmental externalities directly, e.g. through explicit 
modelling of preferences for environmental resources, Weitzman imagines that environmental
environmental clean-ups and the latter is the elasticity of environmental improvement (i.e.
damage can be reduced.
Notice that the social rate of discount, r, is lower than the private rate, z, for all positive 
levels of Z  and E. For a given level of Z, when the elasticity is low, and environmental 
expenditures are ineffective at cleaning up environmental damage, this divergence is increased. 
Weitzman’s interpretation, from the perspective of optimal growth, is that this is a signal that 
the economy is finding prior environmental damage difficult to undo and the solution might 
be to reduce growth. Alternatively, where the elasticity is high, a better solution might be to 
increase environmental expenditures (Weitzman 1994).
19The total derivative of D  =  Y G  (^-) is: 0 =  G  (.) +  YG^  (.) ^  . Rearranging this gives i// =  ^
damage must be maintained at some initial level, D. Given (1.8), this can only be achieved 
by a marginal increase in environmental expenditures, z// =  diverted from each unit of 
incremental output, Hence, the social rate of return on investment can be thought of as 
the rate of return in terms of output minus the rate of increase in expenditure required to 
maintain environmental standards:
By taking the total derivative of (1.8) with respect to Y  and solving for z// we are left with the 
term19:
r = + (1 .1 1 )
where Z = ^  and E — —Z ^ .  The former is the proportion of national income spent on
reducing D) with respect to environmental expenditure or the ease with which environmental
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The implications of this analysis for the discount rate are twofold. Firstly, under fairly 
general conditions, the existence of consumption externalities reduces the level of the social rate 
of return below the private rate. This is because society must divide the marginal return from 
investment between consumption and environmental protection. Secondly, the socially efficient 
discount rate will be declining over time if the proportion of income spent on environmental 
goods, Z, is increasing over time. With positive growth this is guaranteed if environmental 
resources are luxury goods. A similar result holds if the elasticity of environmental improvement 
is declining over time.
Changing values for the environment were the focus of earlier work on discount rates 
for environmental projects by Fisher and Krutilla (1975). They suggested that these evolv­
ing preferences could be simply captured by assuming that the marginal Willingness to Pay 
(WTP) or accounting price for the environment would change at some pre-determined rate, 
say a. WTP would then grow exponentially from some initial level WTPq such that WTPt = 
W TPq exp (a t) . The present value of these environmental benefits at time t would then be 
equivalent to:
PVwtp  — WTPoexp ((a — r) t) (1-12)
where r is the SDR, which represents the rate of change in the accounting price for the nu­
meraire. Fisher and Krutilla defined the ‘environmental’ discount rate as the net rate u = r — a, 
suggesting that the change in the accounting price for the numeraire and environmental goods 
can be captured by this net discount rate. This net rate is constant over time and captures a 
prediction about the evolution of values from WTPq.
One example of the mechanism for this process is to assume that the increase in WTP 
is driven by income growth such that a = eg, where g is the growth of income and e is the 
income elasticity of WTP (Gravelle and Smith 2000). Both Krutilla and Fisher (1975) and 
Horowitz (2002) reflect on the effect of resource scarcity on WTP for environmental goods in 
this framework. Both perspectives provide arguments for increasing WTP for environmental 
goods and hence a reduction in the level of the (time invariant) discount rate for the relevant 
benefit or cost20.
The conditions under which DDRs emerge differ from those of Weitzman (1994). In the 
Fisher and Krutilla model if the proportion of income spent on environmental goods is increas­
20Gravelle and Rees (2000) focus on health benefits for example.
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ing, i.e. growth is positive and environmental goods are luxuries (g > 0 , e > 1), then the 
environmental discount rate should be lower than r, yet constant over time. DDRs emerge 
from the Fisher and Krutilla analysis if the parameters which define the evolution of WTP 
(a) are changing over time21. Furthermore, whereas Fisher and Krutilla’s discount rate applies 
solely to environmental costs and benefits, Weitzman’s presumably applies to all costs and ben­
efits. The former has become known in the literature as a ‘dual discounting’ approach, since it 
refers to discounting different costs and benefits at different rates, and has received considerable 
attention in climate change modelling (Tol 2004, Yang 2004).
Both Weitzman (1994) and Fisher and Krutilla (1975) have been criticised on a number 
of counts. In many ways Weitzman’s environmental discount rate is difficult to interpret in 
light of the reduced form set up and, in particular, the absence of an explicit modelling of 
preferences, environmental goods and externalities. The assumption that some arbitrary envi­
ronmental standard, jD, must be maintained captures these effects but makes the subtraction 
of environmental expenditures from the private rate of return in (1.10) rather ad hoc. More 
generally, it is thought that deriving the ‘effective’ or ‘environmental’ discount rate using (1 .1 2 ) 
or other dual discounting techniques, and using this as the SDR obscures several issues (e.g. 
Arrow et al 1995, Horowitz 2002). As can be seen from the discussion of the Ramsey equation 
(1.3), there is a completely different set of assumptions that connect the social rate of return 
to capital, r, growth, g, and preferences (e.g. for the environment, e). The discount rate is a 
poor vehicle for capturing these various factors and in the long-term doing so implies a num­
ber of very strong structural assumptions. A more widely accepted alternative is to apply the 
time invariant SDR, e.g. r, to benefits and costs evaluated in consumption equivalents which 
reflect the evolution of WTP through time. This disentangles issues of evolving values for the 
environment from issues of discounting and ‘does not change the discount rate to apply to the 
consumption stream’ (Arrow et al 1995)22.
1.3.3 Limitations of the financial markets
One of the fundamental assumptions underlying the use of discounting in cost benefit analysis 
is that the potential exists for the transfer of resources across generations. That is, the use
21Horowitz (2002) for example appears to confuse Weitzman (1994) and Fisher and Krutilla (1975) in this 
sense.
22Preliminary work by Traeger (2004) shows that this widely held view may not be true where there is limited 
substitutability between environmental and produced goods in the utility function.
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of the discount rate, e.g. r, to evaluate a project implies that funds could alternatively earn 
that rate of return in the economy. When considering the long run this implies the existence of 
a mechanism to facilitate intergenerational transfers of these alternative returns (Lind 1995). 
There are a number of reasons why this assumption can be called into question. Firstly, financial 
markets only cover the relative short term, with assets having maturities limited to about 30-40 
years. Secondly, although it is possible for investments to be rolled over as and when they 
mature and there are numerous fiscal and other policies which can redistribute assets across 
generations (Bradford 1999), it is not clear that governments will be able credibly to commit 
to such a course of action (Arrow 1999). Some authors suggest that these facts alone provide 
some further justification for DDRs.
Rabl (1996), for example, effectively interprets p in (1.3) as the inequality aversion para­
meter for the current generation and the term Qg as the inter-generational inequality aversion 
parameter. Since financial markets cover only a limited duration, he argues, the duration over 
which the current generation can redistribute its wealth through time is limited. Hence, p 
should be excluded from estimates of the discount rate for horizons greater than those reflected 
by the financial markets. He suggests that the SDR should be the social rate of time preference 
as measured by p +  9g within the duration of financial assets and Qg thereafter. This captures 
the idea that Qg represents real growth in the future: real resources for future generations 
which is not directly constrained by the financial markets. This results in a declining ‘stepped’ 
schedule for discount rates. Rabl’s interpretation does not represent an attempt to determine 
the efficient discount rate and is rather ad hoc. It does, however, raise the questions concern­
ing the assumptions underlying discounting in CBA, that is, the existence of intergenerational 
transfers.
Indeed, it is perhaps the fact that we are uncertain about the long-run market rate of return 
that the social rate of time preference is frequently used for CBA. In other words, rather than 
looking to financial markets for answers concerning the correct discount rate for the long-run, 
perhaps the economic arguments associated with the consumption based determinants of the 
discount rate will be more fruitful.
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1.4 D eclin ing D iscount R ates in an U ncertain  W orld
When uncertainty with regard to the determinants of the discount rate is introduced to the 
analysis the case for DDRs is even more compelling and much of the recent debate concerning 
DDRs has centred upon the analysis of uncertainty concerning future states of the world, in 
particular the social rate of return to capital, r, (e.g. Weitzman 1998), and growth, g (e.g. 
Gollier 2002a, 2002b, 2004b). In particular, just as Weitzman (1994) introduced preferences for 
environmental goods as a determinant of the SDR, Gollier shows that in an uncertain world 
preferences for risk are important.
1.4.1 Uncertainty about the social rate of return (r)
Weitzman (1998) developed ideas first formalised by Dybvig et al (1996) and shows how un­
certainty regarding the interest rate interest rate, r, leads to DDRs23. Clearly, there are good 
reasons to expect that r is uncertain in the long-run. For example, there is uncertainty con­
cerning capital accumulation, the degree of diminishing returns, the state of the environment, 
the state of international relations, and the level and pace of technological progress. Dybvig et 
al (1996) showed that when there is currently uncertainty about the short-term interest rate, 
the discount rate that should be applied to extremely distant time periods, strictly as t —> oo, 
is the lowest rate with a positive probability of being realised. A proof of this is shown in Ap­
pendix 1. This argument suggests lower socially efficient discount rates at the limit, but says 
nothing about the path of these rates over time: i.e. the shape of the yield curve24. Weitzman 
(1998) went on to show the relationship between the socially efficient discount rates and the 
time horizon. He shows that, when agents wish to maximise the expected NPV in choosing 
between an investment at an uncertain per-period risk free interest rate, r, or in a project that 
yields a sure benefit in period t , the socially efficient discount rate (before the realisation of the 
uncertain risk free rate) is declining with time. In other words, the yield curve is declining. In 
order to understand these results we derive Weitzman’s certainty equivalent discount rate, show 
a proof that the limit of this discount rate as t —» oo is the lowest possible value and provide a 
numerical example.
With certain discount rates the discount factor is given by a(t) as shown in equation (1.4)
23 Similar ideas have been expressed in Sozou (1998) and Azfar (1999).
24The yield curve shows the term structure of financial assets, that is, how the rate of return varies for assets 
with different maturities.
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above. When the social rate of return is uncertain however, there are numerous potential states 
of the world, each with an associated discount factor and probability of realisation. If there are 
j  states of the world then the discount factor at time t associated with each is:
a,j (t) =  exp /  rj (s) ds'j (1-13)
where it is assumed here that the interest rate can be a function of time: r (t). Given uncertain 
future discount rates it becomes necessary to derive a summary measure of the discount factor 
and discount rate. Weitzman uses certainty equivalent analysis for risk-neutral agents and 
defines the certainty equivalent discount factor (CEDF) as the expectation of the discount 
factor. From this he derives the certainty equivalent discount rate (CER)25. Supposing that each 
potential discount rate rj is realised with probability p j, such that "Epj = 1 and rj E [rmin, rmax] 
(j  = 1, ...,n). The certainty equivalent discount factor for a risk neutral agent is defined as26:
A(t) = E 6XP (~~ L  f j  ^  dS) = ^ Vj0jj ®  ’^14^
From this it is possible to define both the average and marginal certainty equivalent discount 
rates at time t, corresponding to the definitions in Section 1.2: r%ER and r%ER respectively:
exp ( - r ° ER (t) t)=  A (t) (1.15)
which implies:
r? £*(«) =  -J ln [A (t)] (1.16)
whereas:
-SB (i) = 4 f  (L17)
25This is not crucial for this particular result to hold but is important for ease of exposition. The certainty
equivalents could be defined to incorporate higher moments of the distribution of discount rates and to reflect
risk aversion, but with a loss of tractability.
26Note that the probability densities are assumed to be time invariant. This is not necessary for the result but
as we shall see later, the nature of the probability distribution is of considerable importance for any estimated
schedule of certainty equivalent discount rates.
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The former is the rate of discount that if applied in every period from 0 to t would yield the 
same value as the expected discount factor at time t. The latter is the instantaneous, period- 
to-period rate27. Weitzman (1998) works with r^ER, noting that at the limit, as t —> oo, they 
are precisely the same, and shows that r%ER declines continuously and monotonically over time 
and that its limit as t —> oo is r min. More generally, Gollier (2002b) shows that an arbitrage 
exists if, prior to realisation of r, (1.15) does not hold. That is, thinking of the right hand 
side of (1.15) as the (uncertain) price of a claim to £ 1  at time t discounted using the certainty 
equivalent discount factor, and the left hand side as the present value of the benefit, it is clear 
that in equilibrium both sides must be equal. Hence, the certainty equivalent discount rate is 
the equilibrium socially efficient rate for risk neutral agents prior to the realisation of f 28.
The mechanics of Weitzman’s results axe as follows. From (2.1) and (1.17) it is easy to 
show that the certainty equivalent marginal rate can be written as a weighted average of the 
potential realisations of r:
r%ER = '52v>j (t)rj
3
where the weights in this case are simply: Wj (t) = pjtij (t) /T,pj(Lj (t) and EWj (t)
the derivative of this with respect to time we obtain:
J t rmER =  M  rj  =  ~ Y l  wi  W  ~  rmER) 2 (L19)
j j
which is clearly negative29. That the limit of linif_ +00 r ^ R — rmin comes from noticing that,
27It is the definition of the average certainty equivalent rate in Equation (1.16) that has lead some commentators
to describe Weitzman’s CER as a restatement of Jenson’s inequality since it effectively defines r a ER as the
harmonic mean of exp (—rj t)  (Newell and Pizer 2001). For example, if there are two possible interest rates
with associated probabilities (r i,r2) and (pi,p2) respectively then exp( r£ERt) =  -p i > which is
a weighted harmonic mean of exp (n t) and exp (r2t) ■ This definition is strictly different to Weitzman’s which is
effectively a weighted arithmetic mean.
28Another way to think about this is so say that, in the face of uncertain r, agents are unsure as to how to
evaluate the opportunity cost of the project, and hence which discount factor to employ in determining the NPV.
This is equivalent to stating that if agents desired a sure benefit of £1 at time t, then given that they face an
uncertain discount factor before the realisation of r, they are uncertain of the contribution they should make
(Gollier 2002a). Agents must make some judgement of the discount factor and will use the certainty equivalent
discount factor.
29The last step is not entirely obvious, so we elaborate. Dropping the m subscript from r ^ R, note that:
Wj (t ) =  wj  (t ) (EWi (t ) n  -  rj )  -  Wj (t ) (r CER -  rj) ,  therefore f t r CER =  £  Wj (t ) (r CERrj -  r2) =  (r CER)2 -
(1.18) 
= 1. Taking
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where n  = rmin
Wj  ( t ) 
lim 3 = 0
t->00 W\  ( t )
which means that as t  —» oo the weights associated with all but the lowest discount rate tend to 
zero due to the presence of d j  (£), and yet, since SWj  ( t )  = 1 , the weight for the lowest discount 
rate, w\ (£), must tends towards l 30. The intuition behind this is that since the weights for 
each realisation (Wj ( t ) )  contain the discount factors aj (£), in scenarios with higher discount 
rates the discount factors decline more rapidly to zero. As such, the weight placed on scenarios 
with high discount rates itself declines with time, until the only relevant scenario is that with 
the lowest conceivable interest rate. In effect, the power of exponential discounting reduces the 
importance of future scenarios with high discount rates to zero, since the discount factor in 
these scenarios goes to zero. Since in the ex ante equilibrium the certainty equivalent rate of 
discount must equal the socially efficient discount rate in all periods of time, this results in a 
SDR which declines over time.
Num erical Example of W eitzm an’s CER: Appendix 2 works through an explicit ex­
ample of Weitzman’s certainty equivalent discount rate. Table 1.1 shows the resulting schedule 
of marginal and average discount rates over continuous time assuming that (r i,r2 ) =  (5%, 2%) 
and (pi,P2 ) = (0.5,0.5). Table 1.1 reflects the aspects of the certainty equivalent discount rate 
described above. Both the average and the marginal certainty equivalent rates are declining 
monotonically through time while approaching the lowest possible realisation in the long-run:
^min — 2 % .
1.4.2 The need for an analysis of preferences
Weitzman’s argument seems very convincing: uncertainty in the discount rate itself leads to an 
arbitrage in which the socially efficient discount rate is a declining function of time. In addition, 
the apparent ease of application renders it appealing to the practitioner (see Appendix 2 ). 
However, Gollier (2004a) argues that Weitzman’s logic relies critically upon a tacit assumption
Yhwj ( t ) r j  - This term is equal to that obtained by multiplying out (1.19). That is, noting that EWj (t) =  1 we
get: -  wj  (t) (r2 +  (r CER)2 -  2r j rCER) =  2(rCER)2 -  (r CER)2 -  X) wj {t) and we are done.
30Gollier (2002a) provides an elegant proof of the following: limt_.oo r ^ ER =  rmin, i.e. for the averager CER,
by appeal to Pratts Theorem.
43
Year (£)
10 50 1 0 0 2 0 0 500
Discount factor (ai (£)) 0.819 0.368 0.135 0.018 0.000
Discount factor (a2 (£)) 0.607 0.082 0.007 0.000 0.000
CEDF {A (f)) 0.713 0.225 0.071 0.009 0.000
Marginal CER ( r ^ ) 3.277% 2.547% 2.142% 2.007% 2 .0 0 0 %
Average CER {r^ER) 3.388% 2.983% 2.645% 2.345% 2.139%
Table 1.1: Numerical Example of Weitzman’s Certainty Equivalent Rate
that the current generation should bear the risk of variation in the SDR. He illustrates this 
point by using the opposite assumption.
Weitzman’s certainty equivalent rate defines the discount rate that should be used when 
the objective is to maximise the Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) of investments given 
uncertainty in the interest rate. For example, an agent may wish to compare the return to an 
investment of £1 with fixed future benefit, say £ Z  in year T, to an alternative investment with 
a random rate of return, r. She ranks these alternatives by calculating the ENPV. Following 
Gollier (2004a) in such a case the ENPV rule can be represented by:
EN P V  : ZE  [exp (—fT)] -  1 > 0 (1.20)
If this condition holds, then the agent should proceed with the project. Given that max­
imising ENPV is the objective, and using (1.16), the (average) certainty equivalent per period 
discount rate in this environment can be defined as rPV:
exp ( - rpv t) =  E  [exp {-ft)] =$> rPV = - i  In [E [exp (-r£)]] (1-21)
which is declining over time (t) as described above.
Alternatively, imagine that we want to maximise the expected net future value (ENFV), i.e. 
we wish to rank our projects on the basis of maximising the value of assets that accumulate to 
future generations. The ENFV rule can be thought of as:
E N F V  : Z — E  [exp {fT)] > 0 (1.22)
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In this case the certainty equivalent per period interest rate, rFV, that produces the same 
outcome as the random interest rate is that which satisfies:
exp (rFVt) =  E  [exp (ri)] ==>■ rFV = i  In [E [exp (ft)]\ (1.23)
Clearly, rpv  ^  rFV. Furthermore, rFV it is easy to show that the latter is increasing 
over time. Hence, Gollier claims, when we rank projects by ENFV the socially efficient dis­
count/interest rate, is in fact increasing over time. The arguments shown above can be used to 
show somewhat symmetrically, that rFV converges to the highest possible value of r as t —► oo.
So, confusingly, whereas in the absence of uncertainty the two decision criteria are equivalent, 
once uncertainty regarding the discount rate is introduced the appropriate discount rate for use 
in CBA depends upon whether we choose ENPV or ENFV as our decision criterion. In the 
former case discount rates are declining and in the latter they are rising through time. Which 
of these criteria is preferable?
Gollier (2004a) explains that the two criteria differ in their temporal allocation of residual 
risk. Using ENPV implies that the present generation (strictly, t = 0) bears the risk. This is 
because, once the discount rate is realised (r) the NPV may or may not be positive. Since the 
payoff in the future (Z) is certain, any residual losses are borne by the present generation. It 
is as if they have a secure payoff for future generations but a random payment in the present 
(Gollier 2002a). For example, if the ENPV equalled zero, but the realised discount rate is 
greater than the certainty equivalent rate: r > rPV, the project is not viable ex post, and 
investors must internalise the opportunity cost. The symmetric argument to this is the case 
where ENPV < 0 and r < rp v . However, using ENFV implies that future generations bear 
the risk. The present generation makes a certain contribution to the project («£1), but the rate 
at which the fund accumulates, and hence the outcome in the future (exp(rT)), is uncertain 
before the realisation of f. Any shortfall is borne by the future.
Consequently, so the argument goes, choosing between these two decision criteria under 
uncertainty appears to be solely a question of the temporal allocation of risk. Given the 
risk neutral environment we cannot appeal to risk preferences in order to make this decision. 
Gollier argues that economic theory provides no guidance in the Weitzman set-up since current 
and future preferences for risk are effectively assumed away. However, the financial literature 
concerning the yield curve is replete with such considerations and in a number of subsequent 
papers Gollier returns to this literature to describe the role of risk preferences in determining
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DDRs (Gollier 2002a, 2002b, 2004b). The following Section describes these contributions.
1.4.3 The effect of uncertain growth (g) on the Social Time Preference Rate
(5)
In a deterministic world we noted that there are two underlying characteristics of individual 
preferences which determine the social rate of time preference, 6; i) pure impatience, p, and 
ii) the desire to smooth growing wealth over time, 6. In a competitive equilibrium individual 
preferences to discount the future are balanced against the risk-free market rate of return, r. The 
marginal benefits of consumption and saving are equated. Where there are frictionless financial 
markets, if the risk free rate of return determined in this way is used as the test discount rate 
for public projects the result will be an optimal level of investment (Gollier 2002a).
The difficulty for the long run is the absence of financial assets whose maturity extends 
to the horizon associated with the new types of projects and policies that the government is 
faced with, e.g. global warming. Government bonds, for example, do not extend beyond 40 
years in general. In the absence of a measure of the long run discount rate determined by 
financial markets, Gollier (2002a, 2002b) turns to economic theory to provide some answers. 
In doing so he provides a potential solution to the conundrum encountered above concerning 
the temporal allocation of risk in the risk neutral environment of Weitzman. The question of 
whether agents in the present or the future should bear the risk associated with investment 
decisions is answered by reference to individual preferences for risk, their evolution over time 
and the analysis of the social rate of time preference, 6.
Gollier uses the framework of a ‘tree economy’ (Lucas 1978) in which growth is uncertain 
and represented by g in order to look at the determinants of the equilibrium interest rate31. 
The growth rate of the economy is taken as the ‘primal’ of the model rather than the risk 
free rate itself, as in the case of Weitzman (1998). As in Section 1 .2 , agents make saving 
and consumption decisions to maximise their expected utility, E [u (c)], in each period of time, 
t , given their expectation of future growth. Following Gollier we illustrate the arguments in
31 The tree economy describes a situation in which each individual is endowed with some productive capital, 
a tree, with uncertain exogenous growth rate, g, in the form of fruits. The fruits are perishable and therefore 
borrowing and lending occurs within periods with debts repaid by growth in future periods. In effect, therefore, 
capital is exogenous, and the interest rate that sustains the equilibrium is determined by individual characteristics 
that make up 6.
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discrete time. The first order condition for expected utility maximisation provide us with the 
determinants of the short-term risk free interest rate, r (c), in this economy and can be written 
as:
1 + r(Ci) /}£[u'(c(l + gt+i))] (L24)
See Appendix 3 for the derivation. Equation (1.24) says that utility maximising individuals 
will equate the ratio of current and future expected marginal utility to the short term (gross) 
interest rate, where future utility is discounted by the rate of pure time preference, that is 
(3 =  ^ — 1. There is no productive sector in this model, therefore the risk-free rate represents 
the preference-based determinants of the discount rate.
The effect of certain growth upon the short term risk free rate has been described above. 
Gollier extends this analysis to describe the effect of uncertain growth on the short and long­
term behaviour of the discount rate. One point is immediately clear. Uncertainty in growth 
will reduce the discount rate when the marginal utility of consumption is convex, in which case 
Jenson’s inequality holds: E \u' (c (1 + <7t+i))] > u' (E [c* (1 4- pt+i)]). This introduces another 
economic reason why individuals discount the future. Faced with uncertainty about future 
income levels, individuals will value additional units of consumption in the future and will save 
for precautionary reasons, resulting in a reduced risk free rate (Kimball 1990, Gollier 2001).
To recap, there axe now three main characteristics of individual preferences that determine 
the risk free rate: 1) pure time preference, p. 2) the wealth effect reflected by, 0, and 3) 
precaution: the desire to engage in precautionary saving in the face of uncertain income growth. 
The latter is reflected in the degree of convexity of marginal utility of consumption and hence is 
dependent upon the third derivative of utility. Individuals axe said to be prudent when marginal 
utility is convex: u'" (.) > 0  (Kimball 1990).
In order to quantify the effects of these different determinants of the discount rate it is 
useful to augment the Ramsey rule. Appendix 3 shows that the associated expression for the 
risk free rate under uncertainty is:
r = p + 0E [gt+i] -  0.5var [gt+i] 9P (c) (1.25)
Determinants l)-3) axe represented on the RHS of (1.25) respectively. The term P (c) = ppry 
is a measure of relative prudence and is distinct from preferences for consumption smoothing
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and risk aversion which is reflected once more by 0 (Kimball 1990). Hence, economic theory 
states that the equilibrium risk free rate is decreased under uncertain growth when agents are 
‘prudent’ (when u"' > 0 .), and increased by the desire to smooth growing consumption over 
time. Consequently, the overall effect depends upon the balance between the prudence effect 
(the third element) and the wealth effect (the second element).
Equation (1.25) represents the short-term risk free rate: e.g. the return at t of a bond that 
yields a cash flow at time t + 1. However, the thrust of this discussion concerns the nature of 
the long-run risk free rate for use in CBA. The analysis can be extended to the long-run in a 
fairly straightforward manner. The per-period rate of return evaluated at time t of an asset 
which matures at time , t + n, can be defined as a simple extension of equation (1.25):
the term structure against time. This is naturally of interest since it tells us the discount rate 
that should be applied in CBA for costs and benefits that occur at each date.
In general, the interest rate will depend upon the maturity. For example, it is well known
from equation (1.26). This outcome is analogous to the discussion concerning deterministic 
growth in Section 1.3. However, in order to control for these effects, Gollier (2002a) undertakes
of the yield curve then depends upon the nature of the preferences held by individuals and the
Gollier (2001, 2002a, 2002b) presents several results of interest. Firstly, when individuals 
display Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) the yield curve is flat and the prudence and 
wealth effects exactly compensate one another. This corresponds to the conventional situation
that there is no possibility of recession in the future, and individuals display Decreasing Relative
(1.26)
where the denominator represents the value of marginal utility at time given the expected 
accumulation of growth between t and t +  n. Notice that when n = 1, equation (1.26) is the 
same as equation (1.24). Equation (1.26) effectively characterises the yield curve: the plot of
that if agents in period t expect growth in period to be significantly lower (higher) than growth 
in period t -f 1, then the yield curve will be downward (upward) sloping. This can be deduced
his analysis in a context in which growth is expected to be similar across periods. The shape
subsequent temporal balance between wealth effects and prudence effects.
in which the discount rate for CBA remains constant for all time. Secondly, when it is assumed
Risk Aversion (DRRA), the yield curve is downward sloping. Then the risk free rate is declining
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over time and thus the discount rate for CBA declines over the time horizon of the project. 
Lastly, when the prospect of recession is introduced the conditions for a declining yield curve 
become highly specialised. For example, if there is only a risk of recession in the long run, the 
yield curve is declining only if individuals display both DRRA and Increasing Absolute Prudence 
(IAP). This means that P' (c) > 0 (there are a number of additional necessary conditions for 
this to hold - for details see Gollier (2002b)). This represents a distinct class of utility functions 
with restrictions upon 4th derivatives. Furthermore, if the risk of recession is extended to 
all future periods, short-run and long run, a declining yield curve requires restrictions on the 
5th derivatives of the utility function. As Gollier himself states, there is little hope that such 
conditions can be tested in the near future.
The complexity of the analysis is dependent upon the assumptions concerning the probabil­
ity distribution of growth and the inter-temporal relationships. For the purpose of the analysis 
above Gollier (2002a, 2002b) assumes that the growth shocks are independently and identi­
cally distributed. Although this is unrealistic, it avoids the complications associated with the 
analysis of serially correlated shocks. In more recent work, Gollier (2004b) provides an analy­
sis of the long-term discount rate in which these assumptions concerning serial correlation axe 
relaxed. He finds that where there is positive correlation between the expected value of future 
growth and the short term growth rate, a downward sloping yield curve requires only that the 
representative agent is prudent, that is u'" (.) > 0. Clearly these conditions on preferences axe 
less restrictive than in the i.i.d case assumed above. A number of other results are presented 
for different assumptions concerning the serial correlation of growth rates. One interesting ex­
ample allows for a stochastic process which switches randomly between high and low growth 
regimes with Poission events. Another reflects the approach of Weitzman (2004) and includes 
Bayesian leaxning as the source of positive serial correlation. In both cases, DDRs emerge if 
the representative agent has CRRA preferences. Furthermore, the declining schedule is more 
rapid with positive serial correlation of growht rates than without.
Gollier’s analysis provides some potentially testable propositions, which draw directly from 
expected utility theory. The formal economic foundation for the determination of long-term 
discount rates avoids the ad hoc adjustments of the discount rate common in the literature. 
Furthermore, the explicit treatment of risk is potentially more general that the risk neutral 
environment of Weitzman (1998). This approach is indeed technical and complicated, and the 
preferences that lead to DDRs are frequently difficult to test, but as Gollier (2004a) notes:
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‘this is probably the cost to be paid to make policy recommendations that make 
economic sense’ (Gollier 2004a, p5)
Not only axe preferences of great importance here, the recent contributions to this area 
emphasise the importance of the assumptions concerning the distribution of random growth 
within and between periods. Moreover, we should remain open to the prospect that preferences 
and stochastic processes in society are such that the socially efficient discount rate could be 
decreasing, constant or increasing over time.
1.5 Intergenerational Equity and Sustainability
The foregoing has concerned itself with the analysis of the efficient discount rate and its behav­
iour over time without any real discussion about the implications for inter-generational equity 
and sustainability. In this Section we discuss the contributions which take sustainable growth 
and inter-generational equity as their departure point. The main focus of the discussion is 
on the important contributions of Chichilnisky (1996, 1997) and Li and Lofgren (2000), both 
of which explicitly introduce the notions of intergenerational equity and sustainability. Each 
paper models optimal sustainable economic growth and each is concerned with deriving the 
deriving the welfare effects of growth paths which are sustainable in the sense that they satisfy 
particular axioms with regard to intergenerational equity. The axioms employed imply social 
preferences which are ‘sustainable’ or ‘intertemporally equitable’. Welfare is measured in terms 
of the utility of a social planner and, with utility as their numeraire, the discussion of discount 
rates concerns the utility discount rate, p, rather than the social rate of time preference, S, 
or the social rate of return, r. Both contributions show that a declining utility discount rate 
is consistent with a rule whereby current (future) generations must always take into account 
the well-being of future (current) generations. That is, there must be no ‘dictatorship’ of one 
generation over another. In this way what Chichilnisky (1997) refers to as the ‘tyranny of the 
present over the future’ associated with constant rate discounting is overcome.
Chichilnisky (1997) introduces two axioms for sustainable development32. She also char­
acterises the preferences that satisfy these axioms. The axioms require that the ranking of 
alternative consumption paths is sensitive not only to what happens in the present and imme­
diate future, but also to what happens in the very long run. Sensitivity to the present means
32 A discussion of this model is also found in Heal (1998).
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that there is no date before which events are given zero weight. Sensitivity to the long-run 
future means that there is no date where changes after that date do not matter, in the sense 
of affecting the ranking. Chichilnisky’s criterion can be represented in the following objective 
function:
roo
max7r / u (c(t) , s (£)) exp (—pt) dt +  (1 — 7r) lim u (c(t) , q (t)) (1.
C ,S  J  Q t — >00
Instantaneous utility u (.) is a function of consumption (c) and the resource stock (s) at 
each time period (£), while exp (—pt) is the conventional exponential utility discount factor. 
u (.) is assumed to be the same for all dates so that generations are assumed to be the same in 
the way they rank alternatives.
Intuitively, the limit term reflects the sustainable utility level attained by a particular policy 
decision regarding c{t) and s(t). This can be interpreted as the well-being of generations in 
the far distant future. Chichilnisky’s approach is a mixture of the two approaches seen so far: 
a generalisation of the discounted utilitarian approach, mixed with an approach that ranks 
paths of consumption and natural resource use according to their long-run characteristics, or 
sustainable utility levels. This criterion can be applied under the two main axioms regarding 
the ranking of alternative utility paths. Notice that 7r G [0,1], can be interpreted as the weight 
that the decision maker applies to each component of the criterion, with 7r providing the weight 
given to the present generation, and (1 — 7r) representing the weight placed upon the future 
generation.
However, Dasgupta (2001) has criticized this approach on the basis that there is a way 
in which all generations can have their cake and eat it too . Suppose the current generation 
devises a plan that maximizes only the integral part of the maximand in equation (1.27). It 
simultaneously announces its intention to abandon that plan at some date in the distant future, 
at which point it will switch to a plan that then maximizes only the asymptotic part of the 
maximand. The farther this switching date is in the future, the more nearly the integral part 
will be maximized. But there will always be an infinite number of dates after the currently 
planned switching date, and hence it will always be possible to increase welfare by postponing 
the switching date.
In contrast to Chichilnisky (1997) who treats present and future generations as separate 
entities in the objective function of the decision maker, Li and Lofgren (2000) treat the future 
differently. Li and Lofgren assume society consists of two individuals, a utilitarian and a
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conservationist, each of which makes decisions over the inter-temporal allocation of resources. 
The utility functions of these two individuals are identical, and again have consumption and 
the resource stock as their arguments. The objective function employed by Li and Lofgren is:
max (1.28)
where
(1.29)
roo
U2 = lim I u(c(t) ,s (t)) exp (—pc t) dt (1.30)
P c ~ * °  Jo
where D (t) is the discount factor. The important difference between these two decision makers
is that they are assumed to discount future utilities at different rates. The utilitarian, who
wants to maximise the present value of his utility (U\), has a rate of time preference equal to 
Pij. The conservationist, who derives utility from conserving the stock of the natural resource, 
has a rate of time preference equal to pc  and maximises his utility. The overall societal objective 
is to maximise a weighted sum of wellbeing for both members of the society, given their different 
respective weights upon future generations. The effective utility discount rate in Li and Lofgren 
is given by33:
A time profile of discount rates can therefore be found by merely selecting the discount 
rates for the conservationist and the utilitarian, pc  and pv  respectively. For example, if the 
conservationist discounts the future at a rate of zero: p<j = 0, the discount factor becomes:
In the distant future when t is large, (1.32) has a minimum value of (1 — 7r), the weight 
attached to the conservationist, or future generations. It is in this way that the effective 
discount rate can be thought of as declining over time to zero. Thus, unlike the utilitarian
(1.31)
D (t) =  (1 -  7r) + 7r exp (-put) (1.32)
discount function, which tends to zero as time reaches towards infinity, the weighted discount
33It is interesting to note the mathematical equivalence of (1.31) with the average certainty equivalent rate 
defined in (1.16). i t  represents an intergenerational weight here rather than a probability in (1.16).
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function tends to the weight for the fax distant future. Hence Li and Lcjfgren’s model results 
in a positive welfare weight for the conservationist and there is no dictatorship of present over 
future generations. As the utilitarian’s welfare level is explicitly considered, there will also 
not be any dictatorship of the future over the present. Thus, the model explicitly considers 
intergenerational equity. Within this framework, the conservationist will dominate the far- 
distant future. Therefore the discount rate will be a declining function of the time horizon.
1.6 A rgum ents from Behavioural Econom ics
We have seen some of the normative and theoretical arguments for DDRs in the discussion 
above. In this Section we concern ourselves with the considerable empirical and experimental 
evidence of how individuals discount time.
1.6.1 Evidence of hyperbolic discounting
Over the last couple of decades, increasing evidence from experiments conducted by economists 
and psychologists in the lab and the field suggests that people use a declining discount rate 
in making intertemporal choices. Researchers typically ask subjects to choose between a set 
of delayed rewards, and construct the shape of the discount function from their responses. 
Harris and Laibson (2001) note that a large number of such experiments has been conducted, 
with a variety of rewards such as money, durable goods, sweets, relief from noise and so on34. 
The results from these experiments suggest quite strongly that the discount rate applying to 
consumption trade-offs in the present is higher than that applying to trade-offs in the future. 
In other words, individuals are more sensitive to a given time delay if it occurs closer to the 
present than if it occurs farther in the future.
There are some dissenting voices, however. Read (2001) and Rubinstein (2003) offer other 
interpretations of the empirical evidence. Rubinstein (2003) presents his own experimental 
evidence that is not consistent with either constant or hyperbolic discounting, but is consistent 
with a decision-making procedure based on similarity relations35. This procedure assumes 
that individuals ignore small differences and focus on large differences when comparing two 
alternatives. Read (2001) argues that the so-called evidence of hyperbolic discounting is in
34See, for instance, Thaler (1981), Cropper et al. (1994), Kirby (1997) and the review by Ainslie (1992).
35 Preliminary results from unfinished work by Benhabib et al. (2004) is also suggestive of alternative expla­
nations.
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fact evidence of sub-additive discounting, where discounting over a given period is greater when 
the period is divided into subintervals than when it is left undivided. This implies an inverse 
relationship between the discount rate and the size of the delay. In other words, Read (2001) 
argues that the discount rate is not a function of relative location in time, as proponents of 
hyperbolic discounting suggest, but is rather a function of the size of the time delay. Finally, 
Mulligan (1996) argues against hyperbolic discounting on the basis that hyperbolic discounters 
leave themselves open to exploitation on the markets by ‘Dutch books’. People with that 
tendency, he argues, would rapidly learn to correct their ways. While this logic might hold on 
futures markets, we would doubt that hyperbolic discounting at an individual day-to-day level 
would be damaging enough for people to modify their behaviour.
So although the jury is still out on the precise explanation for the empirical evidence, we 
would argue that there is scope for all three interpretations — hyperbolic discounting, similarity 
relations and sub-additive discounting — to play a role in different circumstances. Given the 
empirical evidence, the support for hyperbolic discounting is relatively strong.
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) proposed that hyperbolic preferences could be modelled by 
a generalised hyperbolic discount function of the form:
D(t,r) = (1 +  w(t — t))~^w forG7,£>0 (1.33)
where the coefficient w  determines the extent of departure from exponential discounting. As 
w  —> 0 we obtain standard exponential discounting. When w  is large, D(t) approximates a step 
function. Note that in the literature, ‘hyperbolic discounting’ has increasingly been employed 
to refer to any declining discount rate, not just discount functions that follow a hyperbola.
Variations on the hyperbolic theme have discount rates which are non-zero in the long 
run. For instance, Barro (1999) uses a discount function which is equivalent to D(t,r) = 
e-\s(t-T)+(j>(t,T)\^  where 0'(t, t )  =  (6 — <5) e_x^_T). This discount function is shown in Figure 
1.1. The corresponding discount rate is given by 6 -I- (<5 — 6)e~x^~T\  The discount rate starts 
at 6 when t = r  and falls exponentially at rate x  to 6 in the long run, as t approaches infinity.
In discrete time, the hyperbolic function can be approximated by a quasi-hyperbolic func­
tion, used originally by Phelps and Poliak (1968), later by Akerlof (1991) and popularised by 
Laibson (1997). It can be represented as a series of discount factors {l,/?£,/?£2,/?£3, ...}, plot­
ted in Figure l . l 36. Like the specification in Barro (1999), the implicit long-run discount rate
36For comparison, standard discounting in discrete time is represented by the discount factors {1, C C2j C3> ■ • •}
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Figure 1.1: Hyperbolic discount functions.
is non-zero. Moreover, the quasi-hyperbolic function retains the qualitative properties of the 
hyperbolic function and is significantly more tractable.
1.6.2 Implications of hyperbolic discounting
Because hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting imply a time-varying discount rate, they 
can result in time-inconsistent preferences37. Consider a quasi-hyperbolic discounter with dis­
count factors {1, /?£, /?£2 , /?£3, ...}. From the perspective of self t, the discount factor between 
t +1 and t-1- 2 is However, from the perspective of self t + 1 the discount factor between t + 1 
and t + 2 is /3(. This time inconsistency implies that plans made today will not be carried out 
tomorrow unless a mechanism to commit the later self can be planned.
Because of this feature, Akerlof (1991) suggested that hyperbolic discounting might have 
useful applications to model procrastination, drug addiction, undersaving, and organisational 
failure, inter alia. In the last five years, more detailed hyperbolic models have emerged and have 
been applied to an enormously large range of economic phenomena. Laibson (1994, 1997), and 
Laibson et al. (1998) have considered the problem of undersaving in depth. Harris and Laibson 
(2001, 2003) extend this work to model buffer-stock saving. Retirement timing is considered by 
Diamond and Koszegi (1998). Drug addiction is examined by Gruber and Koszegi (2001), while
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b) and Benabou and Tirole (2000) have examined procrastina­
where C ~  e~s , the continuous-time analogue.
37A formal statement of this proposition, including specification of the features of the discount function that
generate time inconsistency, is provided by Hepburn (2004).
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tion. Barro (1999) shows that, under certain circumstances, optimal growth trajectories under 
hyperbolic discounting are observationally equivalent to those under exponential discounting. 
In the environmental sphere, Cropper and Laibson (1999) consider the effect of hyperbolic dis­
counting in project evaluation and qualitatively consider the arguments for applying a lower 
discount rate to environmental projects.
1.7 P ractical Im plications for C B A
1.7.1 A brief summary so far
The preceding Sections have provided several rationales for DDRs. In a deterministic world 
DDRs can arise as a result of known changes in the growth rate, changes in consumption smooth­
ing/risk aversion, increasing expenditures on the environment in the presence of environmental 
externalities, or increases in marginal WTP for the environment. Clearly each rationale has 
its strengths and weaknesses. Additional motivations emerge once uncertainty is considered. 
Uncertainty of the discount rate itself provides a simple and intuitive approach in a risk neu­
tral environment. In the presence of uncertain growth Gollier shows that DDRs depend upon 
preferences for risk and prudence, and higher order moments of the utility function. Regardless 
of whether it is the discount rate or the growth rate that is uncertain, DDRs depend upon the 
nature of the underlying probability distribution. DDRs also emerge from the specification of a 
‘sustainable’ welfare function £ la Chichilnisky (1997) and Li and Lofgren (2000). Lastly, there 
is considerable empirical and experimental evidence to show that indivuduals are frequently 
hyperbolic discounters.
In sum, the practitioner is left with a confusing array of rationales for DDRs and little 
guidance as to the implications of employing them nor how to construct a workable schedule. 
In the following Sections we address these points directly.
1.7.2 Parameter identification
In answer to the first issue raised in this paper -  whether DDRs can be justified - Sections 
2-5 provided a variety of rationales for the use of declining discount rates. Once a rationale 
has been subscribed to, implementation requires the practitioner to identify a particular set of 
parameters, i.e. an answer to the second question raised: what trajectory a DDR should follow? 
The required parameters for determining the time invariant discount rate in the deterministic
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case have been discussed extensively elsewhere (see, for example, Pearce and Ulph, 1999) and 
are well understood. Here we focus upon the application of the more recent contributions.
Horowitz (2002) reduces the discussion of the discount rate to a valuation problem: valuing 
future preferences. This requires analysis of the effects on WTP of changes in income and envi­
ronmental quality. However, we noted that there are strong arguments for keeping ‘the’ discount 
rate separate from valuation of goods and services. Weitzman’s deterministic model (Weitzman 
1994) requires information on the trend of the proportion of income spent on environmental 
goods (environmental protection), and the effectiveness of this expenditure in maintaining envi­
ronmental standards in order to derive a DDR. These can be thought of as aggregate statistics 
in his model, and the theory is perhaps easily applied in this sense. However, the mechanism 
by which discount rates are affected, although intuitive, is quite particular.
In order to implement the approach suggested by Weitzman (1998), it is necessary to charac­
terise the uncertainty of the interest rate. In general terms this amounts to defining a probability 
distribution for the future discount rate, and its behaviour over time. In this sense there are 
2 ways in which we can interpret the example in Table 1.1. Firstly, it could represent the 
thought experiment of Weitzman (1998), in which we are currently uncertain about interest 
rates, and yet the interest rates will persist indefinitely ex post realisation. In this sense we 
have a probability distribution for the current uncertainty, which assumes that interest rates of 
2 and 5% are equally likely, and we employ this distribution for all future periods. Uncertainty 
is therefore regarded as existing from day one, and all that is required is the current probability 
distribution of the discount rate.
In a further article, Weitzman (2001) takes precisely this approach. In order to establish 
the probability distribution for the socially optimal discount rate he undertakes a survey of over 
2000 academic economists, and a so-called ‘blue ribbon’ selection of 50, as to their opinion on 
the constant rate of discount to use for CBA. The responses were distributed with a gamma 
distribution with mean 4%, and standard deviation 3%, providing an ad hoc working assump­
tion to determine the schedule of DDRs. The assumption implicit in the use of the gamma 
distribution is that there is there is uncertainty in the present about the interest rate in the 
future and that when uncertainty is resolved the realised interest rate will persist forever.
Newell and Pizer (2003) take an alternative view. Rather than assuming uncertainty in the 
discount rate represents a current lack of consensus about the discount rate, they consider the 
interest rate as a stochastic process, that is there is uncertainty in the future about interest
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rates. N&P characterise this uncertainty using time series econometric modelling of the auto­
correlation process of interest rates. The estimated model is used to forecast future rates based 
upon their behaviour in the past. Prom these forecasts they derive numerical solutions for the 
CER. In doing so they are also able to provide a test of another assumption important to the 
Weitzman (1998) result, namely the presence of persistence of discount rates over time. They 
compare the discount rates modelled as a mean reversion process to a random walk model, and 
find support for the latter. The practical implications of implementing the declining discount 
rates that result are significant. When applied to global warming damages, the present value of 
damages from carbon emissions increases by 82%, compared with the same damages evaluated 
at the constant treasury rate of 4%. In monetary terms this translates into an increase in the 
benefits of carbon mitigation from $5.7/ton of carbon, to $10.4/ton of carbon. In the following 
Section we provide an application of this method to UK data, which indicates the importance 
of persistence.
In addition to determining the probability distribution, it is necessary to make some as­
sumption concerning the point in time at which uncertainty concerning the discount rate be­
gins. Weitzman (1998) suggests employing the declining discount rate at some period T, beyond 
which uncertainty is said to begin, but gives no particular guidance as to how to identify this. 
It seems reasonable to suggest that the limits of financial markets define a useful starting point 
for uncertainty. Government bonds generally have the longest maturity dates and reflect the 
market evaluation of future discount rates up to around 30 years in general. Hence T = 30 
could be the point beyond which the certainty equivalent analysis should begin (e.g. as ar­
gued in OXERA 2002). Newell and Pizer (2003) implicitly assume that the uncertainty begins 
immediately, although, with high levels of persistence, the forecast remains relatively constant 
over the short-term.
The rationale for declining discount rates provided by Gollier (2002a, 2002b) is perhaps the 
most theoretically rigorous of all the contributions, given the apparent indeterminacy surround­
ing Weitzman (1998). But determination of the trajectory requires very specific information 
concerning the preferences of current generations at the very least, and, in the long-run, the 
preferences of future generations38. These parameters include the aversion to consumption
38With the infinitely lived representative agent approach there is effectively only one agent, and thus one 
generation. The reference to current and future generations is therefore an intuitive interpretation of the long- 
run.
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fluctuations over time, the pure time preference rate, and the degree of relative risk aversion. 
With i.i.d. growth shocks with growth almost surely positive, restrictions on the 4th and 5th 
derivatives of the utility function become necessary. In addition, the nature of the certainty sur­
rounding growth needs to be characterised in some way. Clearly, the informational requirements 
of the Gollier approach could be daunting.
Implementation of the Li and Lofgren and Chichilnisky approaches requires the identifi­
cation of several other parameters, including specification of the utility discount rate for the 
‘utilitarian’, and perhaps more importantly, the relative weight to be assigned between ‘conser­
vationist’ and ‘utilitarian’ preferences. Although the selection of this weighting might appear to 
be relatively arbitrary, it makes the trade-off between present and future generations explicit, 
and could possibly be determined by an appropriate political process.
1.7.3 Time inconsistency
Dynamic inconsistency, or ‘time inconsistency’, arises when a plan determined to be optimal 
at a particular point in time is not optimal when considered at a later point in time. In this 
case, if the planner is unable to somehow commit future planners to the original plan, the plan 
will eventually be abandoned. It has been clear since Strotz (1956) that the myopic use of non­
exponential discounting results in time-inconsistent plans. Indeed, as described in Section 1.6, 
hyperbolic discounting has had success in the behavioural economics literature precisely because 
its concomitant time inconsistent behaviour helps to explain phenomena such as procrastination 
and addiction. Generally, well-being is not maximised in such situations.
Faced with this potential for dynamic inconsistency, a government without a commitment 
mechanism can formulate policy in a ‘naive’ or ‘sophisticated’ manner. Neither situation is 
satisfactory. The sophisticated government takes into account the fact that future governments 
will have an incentive to deviate from its optimal (committed) policy. The situation may be 
modelled as an intertemporal game played with its successors. In the Nash equilibrium, the 
government makes policy as the best response to successive government’s best responses. It 
therefore manages to retain credibility and, as Barro (1999) and Karp (2003) illustrate, time- 
consistency. However, the Nash equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. Interestingly, under certain 
conditions discussed in Barro (1999) this Nash equilibrium policy ends up being equivalent to a 
policy that would have been constructed using a conventional exponentially declining discount 
rate. In contrast, the ‘na'ive’ government presses ahead regardless with dynamically inconsistent
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policy, ignoring the fact that future governments will find its policies to be sub-optimal. This is 
also clearly sub optimal, as from the perspective of the current ‘naive’ government, its optimal 
policy will not be adhered to.
Some writers do not see this to be a problem. For instance, Henderson and Bateman 
(1995) argue that the process of changing the discount rate as time moves on as legitimate. 
They assert that people see themselves living in relative, rather than absolute, time. Revising 
and re-evaluating plans as time moves on is not only consistent with behavioural studies, but 
with the value judgement that what ought to be done by way of discounting should reflect 
what people actually do. However, for others, ourselves included, it is not clear that empirical 
evidence of individual preferences is entirely relevant to the social discount rate. A Humean 
would contend that simply because people do discount the future hyperbolically does not mean 
that they should, nor does it imply that this is advisable practice for government. On the 
other hand, one might argue that if people’s preferences count, and if people employ hyperbolic 
discounting, those preferences must be integrated into social policy formulation. The utilitarian 
leaps effortlessly from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ statements because of the assumption that behaviour 
reflects preferences.
Nevertheless, this assumption has been questioned not only by philosophers but also by 
economists such as Feldstein (1964). Indeed, more recently, a literature on ‘optimal paternal­
ism’ is developing which suggests, amongst other things, that governments may be justified in 
intervening not only to correct externalities, but also to correct ‘internalities’; behaviour that 
is damaging to the actor. Recent work on sin taxes by O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) provides 
an example of this type of approach. Whether or not one supports a paternalistic role for 
government, however, the wisdom of adopting a discount function that explains procrastination 
and addiction for social policy is questionable. Our overall conclusion is that although the evi­
dence that individuals employ hyperbolic discounting is strong, the argument that governments 
should do likewise is weak. We conclude that this Section undoubtedly puts forward the least 
persuasive of the arguments for declining social discount rates.
Heal (1998) takes a different tack in arguing that time consistency is not significant. He 
notes that at an individual level, individuals at different stages of life might appropriately be 
thought of as different people, so that requiring time consistency is somewhat stringent. We 
know from the theory of preference aggregation that societies generally satisfy weaker rationality 
conditions than their composite individuals, so from a social choice perspective time consistency
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is a ‘most unnatural requirement’. While this is correct, the consequences of time inconsistency 
at a social level, just as the individual level, can be particularly severe. Hepburn (2003), for 
instance, shows that a naive government employing a hyperbolic (declining) discount rate in 
the management of a renewable resource can unwittingly manage the resource into extinction.
Newell and Pizer (2003) argue that they are able to ‘circumvent’ the time inconsistency 
problem. In their model, the decline in future discount rates follows from uncertainty about 
future events rather than an underlying preference for a deterministically declining discount 
rate. But it is not clear that this circumvents the problem at all. Irrespective of the theoretical 
or empirical basis for the use of declining discount rates, if they are used naively a time incon­
sistent policy will result. As Hepburn (2003) notes, building awareness of the problem, thereby 
encouraging the use of declining rates in a sophisticated or committed manner, is surely better 
than assuming it away.
There is no easy resolution of the time-inconsistency problem. Incongruence, or dynamic 
inconsistency, results in consumption and savings plans that are sub-optimal for all generations. 
Heal (1998) proves that almost all types of declining discount rates are time inconsistent, so 
the extent of the problem is certainly significant. As a practical matter, however, the dynamic 
inconsistency inherent in declining discount rates may not be any more troubling than policy 
inconsistencies and changes that are prompted by external shocks or political shifts. More work 
is needed in this area.
1.8 Im plications o f D eclining D iscount Rates: Som e U K  case 
studies
In this Section we investigate the implications of DDRs for policy. We employ some of the 
methodologies described above to two issues: climate change and nuclear power. This involves 
an application of the Weitzman/Newell and Pizer (2003) approach to UK interest rate data.
1.8.1 Uncertainty of UK interest rates in the future
In this Section we describe a declining discount rate schedule derived from the application of 
the estimation procedure used by Newell and Pizer (2003) (N&P) to UK interest rate data. In 
short, interest rates are forecasted over a period of 400 years using the results of an estimated 
reduced form random walk model. The schedule of certainty equivalent discount rates is derived
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from the simulation of up to 100,000 interest rate forecasts and use of Weitzman’s definition of 
the certainty equivalent discount rate (CER). The details of the econometric models used axe 
shown in Chapter 339.
One interesting difference in the application of N&P’s method to UK data is that, contrary 
to the US case, we fail to establish the existence of persistence. Hence the mean reverting model 
is more appropriate than the random walk model in the UK case. The presence of persistence 
is of considerable importance where uncertainty in the discount rate itself drives DDRs.
1.8.2 Social cost of carbon
The social cost of carbon is an estimate of the present monetary value of damage done by 
anthropogenic carbon-dioxide emissions. The UK has an ‘official’ value of this shadow price 
(Clarkson and Deyes 2002) at £70 per tC, although the validity of the number is disputed 
(Pearce 2003) and the official value is under review at the time of writing. Self-evidently, 
higher values of the social cost of carbon imply that investment in climate change mitigation 
is more attractive. The discounting framework employed has a significant impact upon such 
estimates. It is obvious, for instance, that a lower (constant) discount rate will increase the 
present value of the marginal damage from emissions. For example, the marginal damage values 
from the Fund 1.6 model (Tol 1999) increase from $20/tC to $42/tC to $109/tC, as the discount 
rate declines from rates of 5% to 3% to 1% respectively.
In order to illustrate the difference between the various discounting frameworks on the social 
cost of carbon, we start with an approximate profile of the economic damage done by one tonne 
of carbon emissions in 2000, shown in Figure 1.2. This is the profile of damages generated by the 
DICE model of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). Applying the various discounting regimes to this 
damage profile over the next 400 years results in estimates of the social cost of carbon presented 
in Figure 1.3. For the 200-year period, the estimates vary from approximately £2.50/tC at a 
6% flat discount rate, to about £20.50/tC under a discounting regime based on the Li and 
Lofgren approach.
Increasing the time horizon from 200 to 400 years makes no difference when constant dis­
count rates are employed, because the discount factor approaches zero well before the 200 
year mark. In contrast, marginal damage estimates under declining discount rate regimes are
39The simulation method is explained in more detail in Chapter 3 in which the issue of model selection is taken 
up.
62
damages ($1989Aon)
0.(
2400 2450 25002150 2200 2250 2300 23502000 2050 2100
year
Figure 1.2: The profile of carbon damages from the DICE model.
noticeably larger when the time horizon is extended to 400 years.
Furthermore, the application of N&P’s methodology to UK data increases the 400 year 
estimates of marginal damage costs by a mere 4.3% compared to the constant discounting 
regime. This contrasts with N&P’s finding of an 84% increase. This reflects the lower level of 
persistence found in the UK case compared to the US, resulting in the mean reverting model 
being more appropriate than the random walk model of N&P. This highlights another practical 
issue concerning selection of the appropriate model for the interest rate40.
This illustration suggests that estimates of the social cost of carbon are likely to at least 
double if declining discount rates are employed. This would have formidable implications for 
policy in several areas. For example, a higher social cost of carbon would make it more likely 
that commitments to Kyoto targets would pass a cost-benefit test (Pearce, 2003).
1.8.3 Nuclear power
New nuclear build in the UK is still being considered as an option to ensure security of energy
supply and meeting lonr run climate change targets. In 1998, the House of Commons Trade
and Industry Committee recommended that: ‘A formal presumption be made now, for purposes
of long-term planning, that new nuclear plant may be required in the course of the next two
40This is the subject of Chapter 3.
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Figure 1.3: The discounted values of the damange from a ton of carbon
decades.’ This recommendation has been supported by a joint working group of the Royal 
Society, and the Royal Academy of Engineering. More recently, the Performance and Innovation 
Unit (Performance and Innovation Unit, 2002a) recommended that the nuclear option should 
be kept open.
These recommendations are based upon conventional assessments of the economics of new 
nuclear build, which are ‘relatively insensitive to back end costs.’(Performance and Innovation 
Unit, 2002b). In other words, the present-value of decommissioning costs is insignificant using 
conventional discounting. However, the present-value costs of decommissioning approximately 
double if declining discount rates are employed. From PIU (2002b) we assume a construction 
cost of £2,250/kW in 2000, and a load factor of 0.85. Employing submissions from the NUCG 
to the 1995 White Paper on The Prospects for Nuclear Power in the UK, we assume variable 
operating and maintenance cost of 0.6p/kWh, and fuel cost of 0.4p/kWh, in 1993 money. We 
assume fixed operating costs of 1.5% of construction cost. Construction occurs over six years, 
the reactor lifetime of 40 years, and decommissioning and waste management occurs over the 
following 70 years. PIU (2002b) state that ‘it is impossible to estimate waste management
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Revenues and Costs 6% flat 
rate
3.5% flat 
rate
N&P UK Gamma Li and 
Lofgren
Revenues 2527 4062 4210 4343 3853
Carbon Credit 90 228 255 528 1110
Capex 2054 2173 2181 2152 2116
Opex 1453 2336 2421 2497 2216
Decomm 90 427 497 939 1192
Net Present Value -980 -646 -634 -717 -560
Table 1.2: Effects of DDRs on present values of nuclear power costs and revenues
costs in any useful way at present’ due to immense uncertainty. For illustration purposes, we 
assume combined decommissioning and waste costs of £40/kW per year over the 70 year period, 
implying total decommissioning costs of £2,800/kW (undiscounted).
As table 1.2 illustrates, our calculations suggest that decommissioning costs would increase 
from approximately £90/kW, with a flat 6% discount rate, to £l,190/kW applying the approach 
of Li and Lofgren. At this level, decommissioning and waste costs are a major determinant of 
the economic viability of nuclear power and can no longer be relegated to the realm of politics.
But there are two further countervailing effects. Firstly, a declining discount rate increases 
the present-value of the generation revenue earned over the 40-year lifetime of the reactor. In 
other words, declining discount rates reduce the weight on the initial front-end costs and increase 
the relative weighting on revenue earned in the future. Secondly, if an emissions tax based upon 
the social cost of carbon were imposed upon conventional generators, declining discount rates 
would improve the relative economics of nuclear generation by raising the social cost of carbon. 
The size of these effects, based upon the assumptions employed above, is presented in Table 1.2 
below.
1.9 Conclusions
The realisation that actions taken today can have long term consequences presents a challenge to 
decision makers in assessing the desirability of policies and projects. The use of the classical net 
present value (NPV) rule to assess the economic efficiency of policies with costs and benefits 
that accrue in the long term is felt by many to be particularly problematic. The welfare of
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future generations barely influences the outcome of such a rule when constant socially efficient 
discount rates are used for all time. The deleterious effects of exponential discounting ensure 
that projects that benefit generations in the far distant future at the cost of those in the present 
are less likely to be seen as efficient, even if the benefits are substantial in future value terms. In 
this respect it appears that the present wields a dictatorship over the future. The idea of using 
Declining Social Discount Rates (DDRs) has emerged largely in response to these awkward 
implications and recently DDRs have even been entertained at an official level in the UK (HM 
Treasury 2003).
This paper critically reviews the theoretical justifications for DDRs and discusses the prac­
tical implications of determining a schedule of DDRs for use in CBA. We take the familiar 
Ramsey growth model as our starting point and discuss the recent contributions to the liter­
ature on DDRs for social cost benefit analysis (CBA). Where possible we have related these 
contributions to this model and the benchmark definition of the socially efficient discount rate 
when consumption is the numeraire, reflected by the familiar Ramsey rule. The Utilitarian 
principles that underpin the Ramsey model and conventional CBA also underpin many of the 
theoretical arguments for DDRs accordingly hinge upon the behaviour of optimising individu­
als. That said, the rationales presented here are manifold and various, some are deterministic 
in nature while others deal with uncertainty, some consider efficient discount rates while others 
are concerned more with intergenerational equity and sustainability.
Dasgupta et al. (1999) and Dasgupta (2001) remind us to be aware of the assumptions 
underlying the Ramsey rule and the use of a constant discount rate. The implied partial 
equilibrium commonly assumed in CBA certainly does not hold in the calamitous scenarios 
often used to exemplify the effects of constant discounting. In such scenarios the efficient 
discount rate will be declining with income, and more weight will automatically be placed on 
the future.
Gollier (2002a, 2002b, 2004b) and Weitzman (1998) are also concerned with determining the 
socially efficient discount rate, but under uncertainty with regard to growth and the discount 
rate respectively. They provide the conditions under which the social discount rate is declining. 
Naturally, the presence of uncertainty introduces a number of complications. Firstly, as the 
contributions make clear (e.g. Weitzman 1998, Newell and Pizer 2003, Gollier 2004b), the 
nature of uncertainty; the probability distribution and its behaviour over time, are important 
determinants of the schedule of discount rates. Existing attempts to determine the nature of
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uncertainty have been more exploratory than rigorous (e.g. Weitzman 2001). Of particular 
importance is the presence of persistence in the random variable of interest and there exist 
several empirical tests for this in the literature (Newell and Pizer 2003).
A second complication introduced by the presence of uncertainty is the nature of individual 
preferences for risk. Weitzman’s analysis (Weitzman 1998) circumvents this issue to some 
extent by assuming risk neutrality. However, according to Gollier (2004a) this only raises 
another question: who should bear the risk of investments, the present or the future? In the 
absence of risk preferences any decision is arbitrary but the outcome is starkly different in each 
case: if we think that future generations should bear the risk associated with discount rates, 
the socially efficient discount rate is increasing over time rather than decreasing! Under risk 
neutrality however, economics can contribute little to this choice.
Gollier shows that when growth is uncertain preferences for risk are a fundamental deter­
minant of the schedule of discount rates (Gollier 2002a, 2002b, 2004b). In particular, for the 
socially efficient discount rate to be declining requires such preferences to take very particular 
form: where growth risk is i.i.d. DDRs depend upon the sign of the 4th or 5th derivatives of the 
utility function. Although the preferences become less restrictive once more realistic assump­
tions are introduced with respect to growth risks, whether DDRs emerge remains a relatively 
complicated empirical question.
The question of how individuals actually discount time has been the focus of much economic 
and psychological research. It is commonly found that individuals employ hyperbolical discount 
rates. Although some commentators have suggested that such preferences should be reflected in 
social choice mechanisms such as CBA (Henderson and Bateman 1995), very much reflecting the 
ethical underpinnings of this methodology, we express reservations about adopting a rationale 
for DDRs which has had success in explaining apparently irrational behaviour such as drug 
addiction and procrastination. In short, like Hume, we disagree that ‘is’ statements should lead 
directly to ‘ought’ statements in this case.
Further justification for DDRs is provided by Chichilnisky (1997) and Li and Lofgren (2000) 
who move away from the strict Utilitarian Ramsey framework and address the issue of inter­
generational equity and sustainability head-on. They provide an axiomatic justification for the 
use of declining utility discount rates, as opposed to the consumption discount rates that axe 
the focus in the previous contributions. In these cases DDRs ensure that a non-dictatorship 
axiom is satisfied: the present does not act as a dictator over the future nor vice versa. In the
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Li Lofgren model, this decline is determined by the choice of weights applied to the Utilitarian 
and the Conservationist components of the objective function.
The approaches reviewed here are predominantly theoretical contributions to an inherently 
practical issue. Ultimately, the practitioner is faced with a potentially confusing array of ra­
tionales and a sense that almost any discount rate can be applied. Moreover, it is important 
that the practitioner is aware that the implications of employing declining discount rates are 
of considerable moment. Firstly, as our case studies show, there is the potential to reverse the 
recommendations of social cost benefit analysis in the long-term policy arena. This is especially 
important given the nature of this policy arena and the considerable changes that might be 
required in order to prevent the impact of global warming. Secondly, declining discount rates 
introduce time- inconsistency to the decision making process. This is likely to be problematic 
for the practitioner, and in some cases can lead to problems of resource exhaustion (Hepburn 
2003). The stakes are potentially very high in this arena and, to the extent that economic 
analysis is used on both sides of the argument in international policy-making, the analysis must 
be robust and well conceived.
That social discount rates should be declining is still not clear, despite the sometimes com­
pelling contributions described above. In many cases only the conditions under which DDRs 
are said to exist have been defined. Whether or not these conditions prevail is another ques­
tion altogether. Indeed, the use of DDRs may put us in danger of placing more weight upon 
potentially far richer individuals in the far distant future that we place on present, or even 
near future generations. What is more widely agreed is the limited extent to which discount 
rates can be manipulated to simultaneously reflect the numerous underlying issues that have 
motivated their investigation, namely inter-generational equity, sustainability and efficiency. 
Practitioners would be wise to note this as well as the potentially fundamental limitations of 
CBA in dealing with long -term investments (Lind 1995).
1.10 R em aining Issues and Puzzles
Section 1.4 presented the most recent contributions to the literature on declining interest rates 
all of which were based upon uncertainty of some description. This author believes that these 
contributions not only provide the most compelling reasons for using DDRs in project appraisal 
but also present fertile ground for future research. Indeed, a number of complications and gaps
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in the analysis of declining discount rates were highlighted in the foregoing, some practical and 
others theoretical. Of these, the most interesting were those concerned with the arguments for 
DDRs under uncertainty. In an uncertain world the gaps in the literature and the associated 
complications can be placed into 2 broad groups:
1. preferences for risk and other moments and;
2. the characterisation of uncertainty.
In the following 2 chapters we address two outstanding issues, one from each of the broad 
groups above.
In Chapter 2 we focus on an issue from group (i). We address the puzzle highlighted by 
Gollier (2004a) described in Section 1.4. To recap, Gollier noted a problem associated with 
Weitzman’s certainty equivalent rate (Weitzman 1998), namely that the schedule of efficient 
discount rates differs depending upon whether we choose to maximise the Expected Net Present 
Value (ENPV) or Expected Net Future Value (ENFV) of investments. Under certainty there 
is no difference between these two criteria, however once uncertainty in the discount rate is 
introduced the schedule of efficient discount rates is declining when maximising ENPV and 
increasing when maximising ENFV. In resolving this puzzle Gollier argues that the practitioner 
must make some arbitrary decision concerning the inter-temporal allocation of risk. Chapter 2 
resolves this puzzle and describes the implications for CBA that emerge from this resolution.
In Chapter 3 we refine existing methodologies for characterising the uncertainty surrounding 
the discount rate. In this way we provide practical recommendations for determining the 
schedule of discount rates using Weitzman’s definition of the certainty equivalent rate. There 
has been two attempts in the environmental literature to characterise the uncertainty that 
drives DDRs, each of which has interpreted uncertainty in a different way and both of which 
have been exploratory rather than rigourous. Weitzman (2001) established the distribution of 
current opinions with regard to the discount rate to be used for CBA. In this way the theory of 
Weitzman (1998) could be operationalized. Newell and Pizer (2003) took an alternative view 
of the nature of uncertainty in estimating the certainty equivalent discount rate, characterising 
the discount rate as a random variable and estimating the schedule via time-series econometrics. 
As will become clear, Chapter 3 shows that Newell and Pizer (2003) do not provide a complete 
answer to the question of how to determine the schedule of certainty equivalent discount rates
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when the discount rate is characterised as a stochastic variable. A more precise methodology 
is proposed and empirically tested.
1.11 References
Akerlof, G. A. 1991. Procrastination and Obedience. American Economic Review, 81(2), 1.
Arrow K.J., 1966. Discounting and Public Investment Criteria, in Kneese A.V. and Smith 
S.C. (eds) Water Research, Baltimore.
Arrow, K., Cline, W., Maler, K-G., Munasinghe, M., Squitieri, R. and Stiglitz, J. 1995. 
Intertemporal equity, discounting and economic efficiency, in Bruce J.P., Lee, H., and Haites, 
E. (eds), pl28-144. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Atkinson, G., Dubourg, R., Hamilton, K., Munasinghe, M., Pearce, D.W and Young, 
C. 1997. Measuring Sustainable Development: Macroeconomics and the Environment, Chel­
tenham: Edward Elgar.
Azfar, O. 1999. Rationalizing hyperbolic discounting. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, vol. 38(2), p245-252.
Barrett, S., Dasgupta, P., and Maler, K.-G., 1999. ’’Intergenerational Equity, Social Dis­
count Rates, and Global Warming”, in P.R. Portney and J.P. Weyant, eds., Discounting and 
Intergenerational Equity (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future), 1999, p 51-78.
Barro, R. J., 1999. Ramsey Meets Laibson in the Neoclassical Growth Model. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 114(4), pi 125-1152.
Barro, R. J. and King, R.G. 1984. Time Separable Preferences and Intertemporal-substitution 
models of business cycles. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 99(4), p817-839.
Baumol, W.J. 1968. On the social rate of discount. American Economic Review, 57, p788- 
802.
Benabou, R. and J. Tirole 2000. Willpower and personal rules, mimeo.
Benhabib, J., A. Bisin, and A. Schotter 2004. Hyperbolic discounting and self-control: An 
experimental analysis, mimeo.
Bradford D.F., 1999. On the Uses of Benefit-Cost Reasoning in Choosing Policy toward 
Global Climate Change. Chapter 5 in Portney, P and Weyant, J. (eds). 1999. Discounting and 
Intergenerational Equity, Washington DC: Resources for the Future.
Brock, W.A. 1977. A polluted golden age. In Smith, V. (ed), Economics of natural and
70
environmental resources, New York, Gordan and Breach.
Broome, J. 1992. Counting the Cost of Global Warming. Cambridge: White Horse Press.
Chichilnisky, G., 1996. An axiomatic approach to sustainable development. Social Choice 
and Welfare, 13, p231-257.
Chichilnisky, G., 1997. What is sustainable development? Land Economics, 73, p467-491.
Chichilnisky, G., and Heal, G., 1997. Social choice with infinite populations: construction 
of a rule and impossibility results. Social Choice and Welfare, 14(2): p303-319.
Clarkson, R and Deyes, K., 2002. Estimating the Social Cost of Carbon Emission, Gov­
ernment Economic Service Working Paper 140, London, HM Treasury, February. Available at 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/taxation work and welfare/taxation and the environment.
Cowell, F A and Gardiner, K. 1999. Welfare Weights, STICERD, London School of Eco­
nomics, Research Paper 20, August.
Cropper, M. and D. Laibson 1999. The Implications of Hyperbolic Discounting for Project 
Evaluation. In Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, Resources for the Future, pl63-172.
Cropper, M. L., S. K. Ayded, and P. R. Portney 1994. Preferences for Life Saving Programs: 
How the Public Discounts Time and Age, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 8, p243-265.
Dasgupta, P. 2001. Discounting: How and Why?, mimeo. Beijer Institute.
Dasgupta, P. and Maskin, E. 2002. Uncertainty, waiting costs and hyperbolic discounting. 
Beijer Institute discussion paper no 158.
Diamond, P. and B. Koszegi 1998: Hyperbolic discounting and retirement, mimeo.
Dickey D.A. and Fuller W.A. 1979. Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time 
Series with a Unit Root. Journal of the American Statistical Association 74, (1979), 427-431.
Dybvig, P. and Ingersoll, J. and Ross, S. 1996. Long Forward and Zero-Coupon Rates Can 
Never Fall. 69:1 Journal of Business 1-25.
Elliott G., Rothenberg, T.J. and Stock J H. 1996. Efficient Tests for an Autoregressive Unit 
Root. Econometrica 64, 813-836.
Feldstein, M. S. 1964. The social time preference discount rate in cost benefit analysis. 
Economic Journal, 74(294), p360-379.
Fisher and Krutilla 1975. Resource Conservation, Environmental Preservation, and the 
Rate of Discount. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89(3) p358-70.
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G. and O’Donoghue, T. 2002, Time discounting and time pref­
erence: a critical review, Journal of Economic Literature, XL, p351-401.
71
Gollier, C., 2001. The Economics of Risk and Time. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gollier, C., 2002a. Time Horizon and the Discount Rate. Journal of Economic Theory, 
107(2): p463-73.
Gollier, C., 2002b. Discounting an uncertain future, Journal of Public Economics, 85, 149- 
166.
Gollier, C., 2004a. Maximizing the Expected Net Future Value as an Alternative Strategy 
to Gamma Discounting. Finance Research Letters, vol. 1, n. 2, June 2004, p. 85-89.
Gollier., C 2004b. The Consumption based determinants of the discount rate. LERNA 
working paper #  04.20.157.
Gravelle H and Smith D 2000. Discounting for Health Effects in Cost Benefit and Cost 
Effectiveness Analysis. Centre for Health Economics Technical Paper Series 20. University of 
York.
Gray F.S. 1996. Modeling the Conditional Distribution of Interest Rates as a Regime- 
Switching process. Journal of Financial Economics 42, 27-62.
Groom, B., Koundouri, P., Panopoulou, K., and Pantelides, T. 2004. Model Selection in 
discounting the distant future. Department of Economics, University College London Discussion 
paper 04/02.
Gruber, J. and B. Koszegi 2001. Is Addiction Rational? Theory and Evidence. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 116(4), pl261-1305.
Harris, C. and D. Laibson 2001. Dynamic choices of hyperbolic consumers. Econometrica, 
69(4), p935-957.
Harris, C. and D. Laibson 2003. Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption. In Advances in 
Economics and Econometrics: Volume 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p258-297.
Harvey. A.C. 2003. Long memory in stochastic volatility, mimeo, London School of Eco­
nomics.
Haveman, R.H., 1969. The opportunity cost of displaced private spending and the social 
discount rate. Water Resources Research 5(5), p252-277.
Heal, G., 1998. Valuing the Future: Economic Theory and Sustainability, New York: 
Columbia University Press.
Henderson, N and Bateman, I., 1995. Empirical and public choice evidence for hyperbolic 
social discount rates and the implications for intergenerational discounting, Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 5, 413-423.
72
Hepburn, C. 2004. Concerning the future: declining discount rates and intergenerational 
equity. Oxford University DPhil Thesis.
Hepburn, C., 2003. Hyperbolic discounting and resource collapse, Oxford University De­
partment of Economics, Working Paper 159.
HM Treasury, 2003. The Green Book: Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government: 
London: HM Treasury.
Horowitz, J., 2002. Preferences in the Future. Environmental and Resource Economics 21, 
241-59.
Johannesson, M and Johansson, P-O. 1996. To be or not to be. That is the question: an 
empirical study of the WTP for an increased life expectancy at an advanced age. Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty. 13, 2. pl63-174.
Kimball, M.S., 1990. Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large’, Econometrica, 
58, 53-73.
Kirby, K. N. 1997. Bidding on the Future: Evidence Against Normative Discounting of 
Delayed Rewards. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 126, p54-70.
Koopmans, T.C. 1965. On the concept of optimal economic growth, Pontificae Academiae 
Scientiarum Scripta Varia, 28, 225-300.
Koopmans. T.C. 1960. Stationary ordinal utility and impatience. Econometrica 28(2).
Krutilla, J and Fisher, A.C. 1975. The Economics of Natural Environments. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kwiatkowski, D. , Phillips, P.C.B., Schmidt, P and Shin Y. 1992. Testing the null hypothesis 
of stationarity against the alternative of a unit root: How sure axe we that economic time series 
have a unit root? Journal of Econometrics 54, 159-178.
Kydland, F., and E.P. Prescott, 1977. Rules rather than discretion: the inconsistency of 
optimal plan, Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473-492.
Laibson, D. 1997. Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics, 112, p443-477.
Laibson, D. I. 1994: Self-control and savings, Cambridge, MA: MIT Ph.D Thesis.
Laibson, D. I., A. Repetto, and J. Tobacman 1998. Self-Control and Saving for Retirement. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, p91-196.
Li, C. Z., and Lofgren, K. G., 2000. Renewable Resources and Economic Sustainability: A 
Dynamic Analysis with Heterogeneous Time Preferences’ Journal of Environmental Economics
73
and Management, 40, 236-250.
Lind, R., 1982. A Primer on the Major Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for Evaluating 
National Energy Options’, in Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, edited by R. 
Lind. Washington, Resources for the Future, p21-114.
Loewenstein, G and Prelec, D., 1992. Anomalies in intertemporal choice: evidence and an 
interpretation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, p573-597.
Lucas, R.E. 1978. Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy. Econometrica 46, pl429-1445.
Maddison, A. 2001. The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Paris: Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Manne, A.S., 1995. The rate of time preference: implications for the greenhouse debate. 
Energy Policy 23(4/5) p391-394.
Mulligan, C. B. 1996. A Logical Economist’s Argument Against Hyperbolic Discounting. 
University of Chicago, mimeo.
Newell, R and Pizer, W., 2001. Discounting the Benefits of Climate Change Mitigation: 
How Much do Uncertain Rates Increase Valuations? Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 
Economics - Technical Series, Arlington, VA. Available at www.pewclimate.org.
Newell, R. and Pizer, W. 2003. ‘Discounting the benefits of climate change mitigation: 
how much do uncertain rates increase valuations?’ Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, Vol. 46(1), p 52-71.
Ng, S. and P. Perron, 2001. Lag Length Selection and the Construction of Unit Root Tests 
with Good Size and Power. Econometrica 69(6), 1519-1554.
Nordhaus, W.D. and Boyer, J., 2000. Warming the world: Economic Models of Global 
Warming, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin 1999a: Doing It Now or Later. American Economic Review, 
89(1), pl03-124.
O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin 1999b. Incentives for procrastinators. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 114(3), p769-816.
O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin 2003. Studying optimal paternalism, illustrated by a model 
of sin taxes. American Economic Review, 93(2), pl86-191.
Olson , M and Bailey, M 1981. Positive time preference. Journal of Political Economy, 
89(1), ppl-25.
OXERA, 2002. A Social Time Preference Rate for Use in Long-term Discounting. London:
74
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
and Department for Transport.
Pearce, D, Groom, B., Hepburn, C and Koundouri, P. Valuing the Future: Recent Advances 
in Social Discounting. World Economics, 4(2) (2003), 121-141.
Pearce, D.W. and Ulph. D., 1999. A social discount rate for the United Kingdom, in 
Peaxce, D.W., Environmental Economics: Essays in Ecological Economics and Sustainable 
Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p268-285.
Pearce, D.W., 2003. ‘The social cost of carbon and its policy implications’. Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, 19(3), pp.362-384.
Phelps, E. S. and R. A. Poliak 1968. On Second-Best National Saving and Game- Equilib­
rium Growth. Review of Economic Studies, 35(2), pl85-199.
Phillips P.C.B. and Perron P 1988. Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression. 
Biometrika 75, 335-346.
Pigou, A. 1932. The Economics of Welfare. 4th edition, Macmillan, London.
PIU Performance and Innovation Unit 2002. The Energy Review -February.
Portney, P and Weyant, J. (eds). 1999. Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, Wash­
ington DC: Resources for the Future
Pratt, J., 1964. Risk Aversion in the small and the large, Econometrica, 32, 122-136.
Rabl, A., 1996, Discounting of long term costs: What would future generations prefer us to 
do? Ecological Economics, 17, 137-145.
Ramsey, F.P., 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal, 38, 543-59.
Read, D. 2001. Is time-discounting hyperbolic or subadditive?. Journal of Risk and Uncer­
tainty, 23(1), p5-32.
Rubinstein, A. 2003. Is it ‘economics and psychology’?: The case of hyperbolic discounting. 
International Economic Review, 44(4), pl207-1216.
Samuelson, P.A., 1965. Principles of Efficiency: Discussion. American Journal of Eco­
nomics, proceedings, 54, p93-96.
Schwarz, G. 1978. Estimating the Dimension of a Model. Annals of Statistics 6, 461-464.
Stephane, G., Muller-Furstenburger, G. and Predivoli, P., 1997. Overlapping generations 
or infinitely lived agents. Environmental and Resource Economics, 10, p27-40.
Strotz, R. 1956. Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximisation, Review of 
Economic Studies, 23, 165-180
75
Thaler, R. H. 1981. Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency. Economic Letters, 
8, p201-207.
Tol, R.S.J., 1999. The marginal costs of climate change: towards more comprehensive 
calculations. Energy Journal, 20 (1), 61-81.
Tol, R.S.J., 2003. On dual-rate discounting. Economic Modelling 21, p95-98.
T6th F.L., 2000. Intergenerational Equity and Discounting. Integrated Assessment, 1, 
pl27-136.
Traeger C.P., 2004. Marginal Utility Propogation, Prices and the Rate of Discount: should 
environmental goods be discounted hyperbolically?. Paper presented at the annual European 
Association of Environment and Resource Economists conference, Budapest June 2004.
Weitzman, M. 1994. On the ‘environmental’ discount rate. Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, 26(1), p200-9
Weitzman, M., 1998. Why the far distant future should be discounted at its lowest possible 
rate, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 36, 201-208.
Weitzman, M., 1999. ‘Just keep on discounting, bu t... In P.Portney and J.Weyant (eds), 
Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, Washington DC, Resources for the Future, 23-30.
Weitzman, M., 2001. Gamma Discounting, American Economic Review, 91, 1, March, 
261-271.
Weitzman, M.L., 2004. Statistical discounting of an uncertain distant future, mimeo, Har­
vard University.
1.12 A ppendices
1.12.1 Appendix 1. The proof that lim^oo r%ER — rmin :
A rough sketch of the proof is as follows: r^ER can be thought of as the certainty equivalent 
of a random pay-off, f, for an agent with a constant degree of absolute risk aversion t. In 
particular preferences axe reflected by E[u(r)\ = E  [— exp (—rt)} = — exp (—rEERt) . As risk 
aversion increases, i.e. t increases, it is well known that the certainty equivalent will decrease 
(Pratt 1964). Furthermore, as t —»• oo, r%ER will tend to the lower bound of r : rmin-
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1.12.2 Appendix 2. Explicit example of W eitzman’s Certainty Equivalent 
Discount Rate:
Suppose that there are two potential realisations of the discount rate (ri, 7"2) with associated 
probabilities (pi,P2) • Using the definitions (2.1) and (1.17) we obtain the certainty equivalent 
discount factor and rate at time t:
A (t) =  pi exp (—r\t) + p2 exp ( - r 2t) =  pifli (t) +  p2a2 (t) =  W
CER r iPiai (t) + r2p2U2 (t) ,.s . ,.s
r ™ = ~ W )  =  p1a1 ( f )+  p2a ^ j -  =  ^  W ri +  W r2 =  ^  ^  W ^
where w\ (t ) = p\ai/  (piai + P 2fl2) and w2 (t) = P2U2/  (pi^i + P 2^ )  and EWj (t ) =  1. This 
formula is used for r£,ER in Table 1.1. The formula for rEER is:
raER = -  j  In [pi exp ( - n t )  + p2 exp (~r2t)]
Using (1.19) and the fact that:
m  -  Pjaj W ZriPiOj (t) _  T-jPjOj (t) , . ,  CER _  ,
Epjflj (t) ' Hpidi (t) EpjUj (t) 3
the derivative of rEEER with respect to time then becomes:
Jt r™ER = ~ N  (rmER ~ n )  n  + w2 (rgER -  r2) r2] = -  (t) (r°ER -  r j f
1.12.3 A p p en d ix  3. T h e  Lucas Tree m odel:
Gollier (2001, p250) explains concisely the approach taken. The maximisation problem is a 
dynamic programme in which the equilibrium value function for individuals is:
vt (y, b) = max {u (ct) + /3Evt+i (y (1 + gt+1), (1 + rt)(ct + b -  y)) [u (yT) \yt = y]}
Ct
where y is income (size of crop from trees) and b is repayment of debt (borrowed fruit). 
Commodities are assumed to perishable and borrowing and lending occurs across time measured 
by the quantity ct + b — y. Income y is exogenous but grows at the uncertain rate gt, which is 
assumed to be i.i.d across time. The first order conditions for maximisation are:
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u' (ct) = -(3Ev't+1 (y (1 + gt+i), (1 + n)  (c* + b -  y)) (1.34)
Since all individuals are identical, the equilibrium in this economy is autarkic such that at 
time t the individual pays back any debt, 6, and consumes such that c = y — b. There is no 
borrowing, hence ct + b — y = 0. This means that the equilibrium value function at time t is:
vt {y, b) = max i u (q) + V ] /3T-1E [u (yT) \yt = y}>
c t I T = t + 1  J
Hence the derivative of the value function with respect to the state variable,b, is v't = 
—u' (y — b), v[+l = —u' (y (1 + <fe+i)). Using these and rearranging (1.34) we obtain:
i  . /  \  u 'fa)1 +  r (ct) = /3E [<u' (ct (1 + 9t+1))]
Equation (1.25) can be found by first defining the precautionary equivalent growth rate cjt+\ 
as the certain growth rate that yields the same interest rate as in equation (1.24), that is:
gt+i : E [u' (y (1 + gt+i))] = u' {y (1 +  ^ + i))
Taking second order Taylor series expansions of both sides yields:
1 u'"9t+1 = Egt+1 -  -var (gt+1) — y
Z XL
Inserting this into the Ramsey rule: r = p + 0gt+1 gives us (1.25).
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Chapter 2
Time is the Healer: A resolution of 
the Gollier-Weitzman rift, or, just 
keep on discounting at a declining 
rate but.......
Abstract1
The recent research described in Chapter 1 suggests that the long-term future should be 
discounted with a declining discount rate. One oft cited contribution to this literature is 
Weitzman (1998) who shows that when the discount rate is uncertain the socially efficient 
certainty equivalent rate is declining with the time horizon. As described in Chapter 1, 
Gollier (2004a) puts forward a puzzle that casts some doubt on the validity of this conclu­
sion. He asserts that the using a Expected Net Future Value (ENFV) criterion rather than 
the conventional Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) criterion, implies that the certainty 
equivalent discount rate is in fact increasing over time. The presence of uncertainty in the 
discount rate makes the ENPV and ENFV criteria diverge in their prescription and the only 
way in which one can decide between these two criteria, Gollier argues, is by making a deci­
sion about whether present or future generations ought to bear the risk of the investment.
Of course in a risk neutral environment this decision is always arbitrary.
This chapter resolves the apparent puzzle with a simple model which encompasses both 
Weitzman (1998) and Gollier (2004a). The model reveals that the mathematical result 
found by Gollier (2004a) is misinterpreted. Gollier (2004a) has in fact proved that as the 
evaluation date moves further into the future the discount rate at any particular point in 
time will increase. However, given a particular evaluation date, the schedule of discount 
rates for CBA is declining. The choice of either ENFV or ENPV as an evaluation criterion 
simply represents the choice of particular evaluation dates. The fact that this choice may 
lead to different assessments of the same project is simply another manifestation of time 
inconsistency described in Chapter 1. Given this the resolution of this puzzle generates 
some simple initial rules for CBA under uncertainty and in the face of time inconsistency.
^ h is  chapter is an extended version of a working paper entitled ‘Gamma Discounting and Expected Net 
Future Value’ which is joint work with Cameron Hepburn at St Hugh’s College, Oxford..
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2.1 Introduction
Section 1.4.2 of Chapter 1 described a puzzle within the literature on declining discount rates 
(DDRs) posed by Gollier (2004a) which has emerged from discussion of the work of Weitzman 
(1998, 2001). Weitzman (1998) provided a seemingly powerful argument for the use of declining 
discount rates based upon the uncertainty surrounding the discount rate itself: uncertainty in 
the discount rate itself leads to an arbitrage in which the socially efficient certainty equivalent 
discount rate is a declining function of time. The appeal of the argument has been such that 
subsequent work has endeavoured to operationalise the theory by determining the nature of the 
uncertainty surrounding the discount rate (Weitzman 2001, Newell and Pizer 2003). Indeed, 
the case for DDRs based on uncertainty has recently been accepted by the UK Government 
and is now incorporated into the Treasury Green book (HM Treasury 2003).
In a recent paper, Gollier (2004a) provides a simple argument which casts doubt on the 
validity of Weitzman’s argument under uncertainty. Gollier argues that whether or not the 
certainty equivalent discount rate is declining or, by contrast, increasing depends entirely upon 
the evaluation criterion that one applies to a particular investment decision. While Weitz­
man (1998) considers the an Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) criterion when deriving the 
declining certainty equivalent rate, Gollier shows that if one maximises an Expected Net Future 
Value (ENFV) criterion, the resulting certainty equivalent rate is in fact increasing. In short the 
presence of uncertainty in the discount rate generates a divergence between the prescriptions 
of these two evaluation criteria, which does not exist under certainty.
Gollier’s arguments leave the practitioner with a perplexing choice between his ENFV cri­
terion and Weitzman’s ENPV criterion, each of which polar to the other in its prescription for 
the schedule of social discount rates and, frequently, investment decisions. This leads Gollier 
(2004a) to state:
‘we cannot both be right.’
Gollier goes on to argue that choosing between the two criteria is akin to choosing the 
location in time of the risk associated with the investment: as we shall see below it is argued 
that the ENFV criterion places the risk with the future generations since the outcome of the 
compounding process is uncertain, while the ENPV criterion places the risk with the present
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generation since the required level of investment is uncertain. Naturally, in the risk neutral 
environment of Weitzman, we cannot rely on economic arguments to guide us in this choice 
and ultimately, any decision is arbitrary. Gollier concludes:
‘In fact, to tell you the truth, I believe that we are both wrong’ (Gollier 2004a)
This paper argues to the contrary and shows that the ‘puzzle’ put forward by Gollier has a 
straightforward resolution which shows that there is a clear sense in which Weitzman (1998) and 
Gollier (2004a) can both be right. We demonstrate that the model in Gollier (2004a) does not 
prove that the discount rate increases with the passage of time. On the contrary, the socially 
efficient discount rate is declining irrespective of the criteria employed in CBA. However, we 
demonstrate that Gollier is correct in saying that the discount rate is increasing with one time 
variable. We prove that as the evaluation date, that is the numeraire date employed for assessing 
the investment, moves further into the future, the discount rate at a particular point in time 
increases. The latter is the insight discovered by Gollier (2004) and it is in this sense that both 
Gollier and Weitzman are both right.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the puzzle proposed by Gollier 
and present his argument that the certainty equivalent discount rate is increasing under the 
ENFV criterion. In Section 2.3 we discuss his explanation for the puzzle which is based upon 
the intertemporal allocation of risk and show in Section 2.4 that this interpretation is in fact 
incorrect. In Section 2.5 we explain that the puzzle arises simply from confusion as to the role 
of the evaluation date. In Section 2.6, we move beyond Gollier (2004a) and investigate the 
impact of the evaluation date upon the assessment of project viability. Having proven that the 
discount rate is a declining function of continuous time it is no surprise to find that decisions 
can be time inconsistent. That is, projects which are viable at one evaluation date may not 
be viable at later evaluation dates purely as a result of the passage of time. We develop some 
simple ‘intergenerational efficiency’ rules to determine how far into the future a given project 
would pass a CBA.
In Section 2.7 and 2.8 we investigate the importance of the nature of the probability distri­
bution of discount rates for the schedule of discount rates and, more importantly the intergen­
erational efficiency criteria described in the previous Sections. This serves as an introduction 
to the work undertaken in Chapter 3. Section 2.9 concludes.
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2.2 The P uzzle Once M ore
Gollier (2004a) describes the puzzle in terms of a simple project whose net benefits at time t, 
B (t) , accrue within the time period t G [0, T ] . The project requires an investment of £1 at time 
t = 0 in order to reap a certain return £ Z  at time t = T. Following Weitzman (1998) the social 
opportunity cost of investment is assumed to be the random variable, f , which has cumulative 
distribution function F (r) , probability density function /  (r), and support r € [rmin, rmax] . 
This leads to Definition 1:
Definition 1 (A Gollier Project):
A ‘Gollier project’ is one which has a the flow of net benefits given by the step function2:
B ( t ) = {
0 for t < 0
—1 for 0 < t < T
Z for t > T
The initial discussion looks at a Gollier project, although later more general projects and 
investments are considered.
2.2.1 Expected net present value (ENPV)
The ENPV of an investment is found by converting all cash flows into common units at t = 0. 
This entails multiplying the net benefits flows, B (t), by the certainty equivalent discount factor 
as defined in Chapter 1. We reproduce this definition here for the case where f  (r) is not 
dependent on time:
r r  m ax
A (t) = E exp (—ft) =  / exp (—ft) f  (r) dr (2.1)
d  T’min
Therefore E N P V  can be defined as3:
prm ax pT pT
E N P V  =  / / exp (—ft) dB (t) f ( r ) d r =  / A(t )dB( t )  (2.2)
d r  m in  J ]0  J o
21 thank my examiners for alerting me to this approach which circumvents the fact that without this definition 
the integral of the project values over time is undefined. This approach means that the expected net present value 
of a Gollier project becomes: E N P V  =  Jrrmax / Qr exp (—ft)  dB  (t) f { r ) d r  =  / QT A  (t) dB (t) =  E ( — exp (rr) +  
exp(r(T — t )) .Z  as desired.
3 Given definition 1 we choose this definition as opposed to: N P V  =  f^max / QT B  (t) exp (—ft) dt f ( r ) d r  =  
f 0T B  (t) A  (t ) dt, which is also valid except for instantaneous costs and benefits like those of the Gollier project.
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Weitzman’s certainty equivalent rate defines the discount rate that should be used when 
the objective is to maximise the Expected Net Present Value (ENPV) of investments given 
uncertainty in the interest rate4. Applying definition 1 to (2.2) means that we are comparing 
the return to an investment of £1 with fixed future benefit of £ Z  in year T, to an alternative 
investment with a random rate of return, f . The planner will rank these alternatives by calcu­
lating the ENPV. In the case of definition 1, and following Gollier (2004a) the ENPV rule can 
be represented by:
E N P V  : ZE  [exp {-rT)\ -  1 > 0 (2.3)
If this condition holds, then the agent should proceed with the project. Given that max­
imising ENPV is the objective, and using (2.1), the (average) certainty equivalent per period
discount rate in this environment can be defined as rpv :
exp (—rpv t) — E [exp (—ft)] (2.4)
=4> rpv = — i  In [E [exp (—ft)]] (2.5)
This is simply a restatement of equation (1.20) in Chapter 1. This leads to proposition 1:
Proposition 1 (EN PV  leads to  declining discount rate) : The average certainty equiv­
alent rate under ENPV rule, rPV, is declining starting from an initial point E f and converging 
to the lower bound rmin as t tends to infinity.
Proof. (Gollier 2004a) rPV defined in (2.4) can be seen as the certainty equivalent of the 
random payoff f  for an agent with a constant absolute risk aversion measured by t where the 
utility function is -e~rPVt. An increase in the value of t can therefore be interpreted as a increase 
in the degree of risk aversion. In this context it is well known (see e.g. Pratt 1964) that rPV 
tends to the lower bound of the support of f , that is, rmin. L’Hopital’s rule, taking limit of rPV 
as t —► 0, can be used to show that the schedule begins at E f . ■
2.2.2 Expected Net Future Value (ENFV)
Alternatively, imagine that we want to maximise the expected net future value (ENFV), i.e.
we wish to rank our projects on the basis of maximising the value of assets that accumulate
4Here we are referring to the average certainty equivalent rate as described in equation (16) in chapter 1. 
This is not important for the analysis that follows.
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to future generations. This is done by converting all future cash flows into common units at a 
future point in time, usually the project end date; t = T. This conversion is done by multiplying 
cash flows as and when they occur by a suitably adjusted certainty equivalent discount factor 
defined as:
/'T’max
A (£, T) = E exp ( - f  (t - T ) ) =  / exp ( - f  (t -  T )) /  (r) dr (2.6)
r m in
The ENFV rule can be thought of as:
f T  m ax p T  , p T
E N F V  = /  /  exp ( - r ( t - T ) ) d B ( t )  f ( r ) d r =  /  A(t ,T)dB( t )  (2.7)
•'T 'm in •'O
and applying definition 1 we get the E N F V  criteria:
EN FV : Z -  IE  [exp (fT)] > 0 (2.8)
In this case the certainty equivalent per period interest rate, rFV, that produces the same 
outcome as the random interest rate is that which satisfies:
exp (rFVt) = E  [exp (ft)] (2.9)
=4> rFV = In [E [exp (ft)]] (2-10)
That is, maximising the ENFV criteria is equivalent to assessing the ENPV using rFV as the 
discount rate. A comparison of (2.4) and (2.10) shows clearly that, rpv  ^  rFV. Furthermore, 
it is easy to show that rFV is increasing over time. This leads to Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 (ENFV leads to increasing discount rate) ; Gollier’s certainty equiva­
lent average discount rate under ENFV, rFV is increasing over time starting at E f at t = 0 
and converging to the upper bound, rmaX; as t tends to infinity.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is the dual of the proof of proposition 1. All that
is required is a change in the interpretation of the parameters. In this case we define rFV as
the certainty equivalent of a random payoff f  for an agent with constant absolute risk aversion 
measured by —t. As risk aversion decreases, that is as £ increases, the certainty equivalent rFV 
tends to the maximum value on the support of f . That the schedule starts at Ef is again given 
by L’Hopital’s rule. ■
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So, confusingly, although the two decision criteria ought to be equivalent, as is the case under 
certainty, once uncertainty regarding the discount rate is introduced the appropriate discount 
rate for use in CBA depends upon the choice of ENPV or ENFV as our decision criterion. In 
the former case discount rates are declining and correspond to Weitzman (1998), and in the 
latter they are rising through time. Clearly, each criteria is likely to provide radically different 
prescriptions for any given project. It is therefore important that we gain some understanding 
as to which of these criteria is preferable and what we are trading off when we choose one 
method over the other. We now examine the solution provided by Gollier (2004a).
2.3 G ollier’s Explanation: Risk allocation
Gollier (2004a) explains that choosing between the two criteria implies different and arbitrary 
allocations of investment risk. He states:
‘taking the expected future value is equivalent to assuming that all risks are 
borne by the future generation...Using the expected present value implicitly means 
it is the current generation that bears the risk. Because the two approaches lead to 
radically different recommendations, we see that, to solve the problem we cannot 
escape the discussion of who should bear the risk.’
On the face of it, the logic behind this statement is as follows. Using the ENPV criteria 
appears to locate investment risk with the current generation (strictly, t =  0) since, once the 
discount rate is realised the NPV may or may not be positive. Since the payoff in the future (Z ) 
is certain, any residual losses appear to be borne by the present generation. In effect the current 
generation debates whether or not to secure a certain payoff for future generations at the cost 
of a random payment in the present (Gollier 2002a). For example, if the ENPV equalled zero, 
but the realised discount rate, say R, is greater than the certainty equivalent rate: R > rPV, 
the project is not viable ex post, and investors must internalise any opportunity cost. The 
symmetric argument to this is the case where ENPV is negative and the realisation of R  is such 
that the ex post NPV is in fact positive.
On the other hand, that using ENFV implies that future generations bear the risk appears 
to follow from the fact that the current generation makes a certain contribution to the project 
(Tl), but the rate at which funds accumulate on the market is uncertain before the realisation 
of the discount rate. Any shortfall appears to be borne by the future.
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Consequently, so the argument goes, choosing between these two decision criteria under 
uncertainty appears to be solely a question of the temporal allocation of risk. Gollier argues 
further that, given the risk neutral environment, we cannot appeal to economic arguments to 
make this decision: with risk neutrality the optimal temporal allocation of risk is undefined 
and hence any decision is arbitrary. He asserts that in order to make this judgement one must 
undertake an explicit treatment of risk preferences, such as that developed in Gollier (2002a, 
2002b, 2004b) as described in Section 1.4.3 of Chapter 1.
2.4 T he Critique of Gollier (2004a)
Despite this puzzling conclusion, Gollier’s explanation has some intuitive appeal given the 
apparent logic outlined above. That is, until one looks a little closer. Gollier appears to 
conclude that in a risk-neutral environment the allocation of risk is pivotal to our definition 
of the socially efficient discount rate for CBA. That is, assumptions concerning risk can alter 
the decisions of a risk-neutral investor. The more one thinks about this state of affairs the less 
intuitive the conclusion sounds.
Not only does this trouble our intuition, the idea that different decision criteria imply 
entirely different temporal allocations of risk is patently false. In short, the logic described 
above is incomplete. To see this imagine the following two thought experiments.
Example 1: (Risk for future generations) Suppose one has £1 to invest and one 
must choose between 2 options (1) a safe deposit with a certain return, r, yielding a payoff 
of erT after T years; or (2) the market, with a stochastic return of f, with expected payoff at 
time T  of Eexp (fT ). If the safe deposit yields 3% the payoff is £400 in T — 200 years. If the 
market is equally likely to return 0% or 5%, the payoff is either £1 or £22,000 respectively in 
200 years. A risk-neutral investor employing the ENFV criterion would clearly choose the risky 
investment: the market, while the same investor would choose the safe investment: the safe 
deposit, when employing the ENPV criterion. This can be seen by comparing the numerical
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values of each investment under each criterion. Firstly consider the ENPV criteria:
± --(0*200) , ± p—(.05*200) 
2 + 2EN P V Dep08it «  - £ l  + £400 
S3 £199
E N P V M a r k e t  ~  - £ l  +  i . £ l e “ <°*200) +  £ 2 2 ,o o o i .e - f -05*200*z z
«  £0
Now consider the ENFV criteria used to evaluate the same project:
ENFVoeposit ~ —£1
«  -£10,600 
E N F V M a r k e t  ~  ~  £1  +  £1  *  
«  £ 11,000
1  0*200 , 1-05*200
2 2
+ 400
1_0*200 , 1-.05*200 
2 2
In this example it should be clear that the uncertainty surrounding the investment is borne by 
the future generations irrespective of the decision criteria employed.
Example 2: (Risk for current generation) Suppose it is desired to have a certain 
payoff of Z  = erTat time T  and one can choose between two options: (1) invest £1 in a safe 
deposit yielding a certain payoff of £ Z  — erT after T  years; or (2) purchase a bond on the 
market which pays £ Z  for certain with maturity in T  years. The current price of the bond 
depends upon the market interest rate, r, and we suppose that bond is purchased before the 
interest rate is known. The expected bond price is therefore £ZEe^~rT  ^ and with the same 
numbers as above is equally likely to be £400 or £0.02: approximately £200. As before a risk 
neutral investor employing the ENPV criterion would invest in the safe deposit whereas the 
same investor would choose the market if employing the ENFV criterion. Once more this can 
be seen by considering the numerical example explicitly:
Firstly consider the ENPV criteria:
E N P V o e p o s i t
E N P V M a r k e t
—£1 + £400 
£199 
-£400*
1  -(0*200) , 1  -(.05*200)
2 2
+£400
£0
1--(0*200) , 1  -(.05*200) 
2 2
i--(0«200) , 1 -(.05*200)
2 2
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Table 2.1: Two thought experiments on decision criteria and risk allocation.
C riterion Future bears risk Present bears risk
ENPV Safe deposit Safe deposit
ENFV Market Market
Now consider the ENFV criteria used to evaluate the same project:
E N F V o e p o s i t  =  — £ 1
i e0*200 i e .05*200
2 2 
-£10600
+ 400
E N  FVjrfarket — —£400* 
«  £200
1  -(0*200) , 1  -(.05*200)
2 2
+ 400
In this example it should be clear that the uncertainty surrounding the investment is borne by 
the current generation irrespective of the decision criteria employed.
These two thought experiments, the outcome of which is summarised in Table 2.1 show 
that Golliers explanation is not entirely correct. Example 1 imposes investment risk on future 
generations since the outcome of the market investment is inherently risky yet the required 
investment is certain. Example 2 imposes investment risk upon the current generation, since 
although the outcome of the investment is certain, the contribution required in the market is 
uncertain.
Both evaluation criteria were applied in example 1 and 2 and it is clear that the allocation 
of risk did not change the outcome, only the selection of the criterion itself is of any moment. 
These thought experiments serve to disentangle the allocation of investment risk from the 
decision criteria. They show that the temporal allocation of risk is a feature of the investment 
or project itself, not of the criteria by which it is evaluated. In sum, using the ENFV criterion 
the decision maker will always prefer the risky market options, while using an ENPV criterion 
will lead the decision maker to prefer the certain safe deposit option. More generally, the ENFV 
criterion leads to higher risk investments being chosen in the case of Gollier projects. This is 
the case no matter which generation bears the risk.
As a result it becomes clear that Gollier’s explanation for the divergent outcomes of ENFV 
and ENPV decision criteria based on the allocation of risk does not solve the puzzle concerning
how to choose among decision criteria. In what follows we show that consideration of the 
evaluation date is more fruitful.
2.5 A n A lternative Explanation: Evaluation date
Up until this point we have considered either ENPV or ENFV criteria. The former effectively 
evaluates the project from the perspective of a decision maker at t = 0 while the latter evaluates 
from the perspective of a decision maker at time t = T. From hereon we say that the ‘evaluation 
date’ for ENPV and ENFV criteria is 0 and T  respectively. Moreover, we generalise the analysis 
to take explicit account of any potential evaluation date, r, by defining the ‘Expected Net Value’ 
at evaluation date r  as E N V  (r) :
E N V  (r) =  E / T exp ( - f  (t -  r)) dB (t) (2.11)
Jo
Note that the E N V  (r) criterion incorporates both the ENPV and ENFV criteria. We obtain
the former by setting r  =  0 and the latter by setting r  = T. This can be seen by reference to
(2.2) and (2.7). E N V  (r) is completely general in this sense.
Analogously to the definition of the certainty equivalent discount functions defined in equa­
tion (2.1) and (2.6) we can define the certainty equivalent discount function associated with 
this evaluation criterion:
A (t,r) = Eexp (—r (t
The discount function is normalised to unity at time t - 
equivalent average discount rate:
exp (—rNV (t, r) (t — r)) =  E exp (—r (t — r))
= ^ r NV(t,T) = - ^ \ n ( A { t , r ) )  (2.13)
This leads to the following proposition:
5 Other normalisations are also valid but the results that follow do not depend upon the particular normali­
sation. Thanks to Christian Gollier for alerting us to this point.
- r ) )  (2.12)
= r 5. From this we obtain the certainty
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Proposition 3 The certainty equivalent average discount rate, rNV (t , r ) , declines with the 
passage of time, t, to limj-xx, rNV (t , r) =  rmin, but is increasing with the evaluation date, t , 
to linir-^oo rNV (t , t ) = rmax. Furthermore, linif_>r =  Ef.
Proof. It was proved in proposition 1 that the certainty equivalent average rate, rp v , is 
declining with t and this proof is sufficient for rNV (t , r ) . The proof that rNV (t , r) is increasing 
in the evaluation date r  follows simply from the fact that dr^  = — - ^  - . That lim^,- rNV = E f 
follows from talcing limits and using L’Hopital’s rule. ■
Proposition 2 immediately suggests where Gollier may have erred. Although the discount 
rate is declining with t it is increasing in the evaluation date, r. Gollier appears to have confused 
these two different time variables. To make this concrete let is reconsider Gollier’s the certainty 
equivalent average discount rate defined in equation (2.10). The generalised expression for the 
discount rate shown in (2.13) above shows that when r  = T, that is, when we consider an ENFV 
criterion, cash flows at time t must be discounted using the discount function Eexp (—f (t — T)), 
and the certainty equivalent average discount rate is given by:
rNV (t , T ) =  lnE exp(—f (t -  T)) (2.14)
This equation should be identical to (2.10), but clearly this is not the case. Gollier’s specification 
of the certainty equivalent average discount rate is incomplete. This is most easily seen when 
evaluating (2.14) at t — 0 :
rNV (0, T) =  i  In (EefT) (2.15)
which is almost identical to equation (2.10) save for one thing. The evaluation date t = T  in
(2.15) has been replaced by the passage of time t in Gollier’s expression in (2.10).
It is in this sense that both Weitzman and Gollier can be right. Firstly, the certainty
equivalent discount rate is declining with the passage of time in a manner virtually identical 
to that described by Weitzman (1998). Secondly, Gollier is correct to say that the certainty 
equivalent discount rate is increasing in one time variable, it is simply that he has the wrong 
time variable. The discount rate is an increasing function of the evaluation date, not the passage 
of time.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the crux of the issue. For a given evaluation date, r, the certainty 
equivalent discount rate declines as time t increases. However, the schedule of certainty equiv-
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Figure 2.1: Discount rate schedules for three evaluation dates.
alent average discount rates shifts upwards as the evaluation date r  moves further into the 
future. This is, in fact, the result proved by Gollier (2004) and his expression for rFV effec­
tively describes how the discount rate at a particular point in time increases with the evaluation 
date r. In conclusion therefore we have proved that the certainty equivalent discount rate is 
declining with the passage of time regardless of whether decision-makers employ ENFV, ENPV 
or ENV(t) as their evaluation criterion.
2.6 P roject Efficiency and the Evaluation D ate
Recall that the original puzzle highlighted by Gollier (2004a) stemmed from the fact that the 
viability of an investment would depend upon the evaluation criterion employed. For example, 
a project that passed a cost benefit analysis using the ENPV criterion may fail when using 
the ENFV criterion. Given the foregoing this puzzle can now be translated into the following 
statement: why is it that, when the discount rate is uncertain, the viability of a project will 
differ depending upon the evaluation date r?
The answer to this is well known in the literature and has been discussed in Section 1.7.3 of 
Chapter 1. Using declining discount rates can lead to time inconsistency, that is, decisions made 
at one point in time may be reversed when evaluated at some later date for no other reason than 
the passage of time6. Where the discount rate is declining through time as described above, the
6See section 1.7.3 of Chapter 1 for a discussion of these issues.
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rate of discount applied at any point in time will depend upon the evaluation date r 7. Thus a 
project that passes a cost benefit analysis from the perspective of a planner at evaluation date 
r \  may fail a test from the perspective of a planner at evaluation date T2 - Consequently, the 
puzzle posed by Gollier (2004a) is not a puzzle at all, it is simply another manifestation of time 
inconsistency arising from the use of declining discount rates in CBA.
Having said this, the time inconsistency that we find in this case is of a different nature 
to that usually seen in the literature. Usually time inconsistancy arises due to non-constant 
utility discount rate. Time consistent planning, a constant utility discount rate and a time 
varying consumption discount rate can and do frequently coexist. In the Weitzman model, 
however, there is no underlying optimisation model to determine the consumption discount 
rate, it is taken as given, and so time inconsistency is unavoidable even if there is a constant 
utility discount rate. Furthermore, time inconsistency usually involves a planner arriving at a 
particular point in time in the future and finding that a ascribed-to plan is no longer optimal 
purely because of the passage of time8. In the case in hand we are considering a planner 
conducting a thought experiment today concerning how some future planner would behave 
today given the same investment opportunities. In our case time inconsistency occurs when 
the current planners view of the efficiency of an investment today differs from the current 
planners projection of the future planner’s view of the efficiency of the investment today, given 
the different schedule of discount rates applied by the future planner (at the future evaluation 
date). That is, time inconsistency occurs when the an investment today is found to be efficient 
from the perspective of one evaluation date and inefficient from the perspective of another.
With the puzzle solved and with some understanding of economic theory behind the results 
in Gollier (2004a) it remains to address some of the practical issues surrounding time inconsis­
7Heal (1998) describes the exceptions.
8Newell and Pizer (2003) discuss this issue at some length and claim that where uncertainty is driving the 
decline in discount rates, erring from the previously optimal plan upon the arrival of new information does not 
represent time inconsistent behaviour, but merely changing behaviour in light of the best available information. 
Of course, naively using the fixed/deterministic schedule of certainty equivalent discount rates that emerges from 
their analysis and that of Weitzman’s may still result in time inconsistency. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear 
that arrival of new information concerning the discount rate will always alter the Newell and Pizer’s certainty 
equivalent rate schedule, although the passage of time may induce changes in behaviour where the same discount 
schedule is used. It is therefore debatable, in the authors opinion, whether their suggestion that time inconsistency 
is entirely avoided in the presence of uncertainty always holds true.
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tency9. The following questions arise: How can decision makers deal with time-inconsistency
when conducting CBA under uncertainty? Is it possible to develop some recommendations for 
CBA that take into account the presence of time inconsistency? The following Section takes 
up these questions.
2.6.1 Time inconsistency and critical evaluation dates
would fail the same test when using a later evaluation date, should we invest in this project? Or, 
more generally, how do we overcome the conflicting results of CBA undertaken using different 
evaluation dates? Which date is more important?
In this Section we propose an answer to these questions. We begin by defining the internal
(NV(r,r)). Define the NV(r,r) and internal rate of return of a project B  (£) as follows: 
Definition 2. (N et Value (N V (r,r))):
For a Gollier project (see definition 1) NV(r,r) = erT [Ze rT — l] .
Definition 3. (In ternal R ate  of R eturn: r*): The internal rate of return of a project
is r* = {r : N V  (r, r) = 0} . For a Gollier project (Z, T) = (400,200), r* = ^  InZ. = 3%.
In addition, the following definition is useful:
Definition 4. (C ritical Evaluation Date: r*): The critical evaluation date of a project
is r* = { t  : E N V  (r) = 0}. For the Gollier project described in example 1 and 2 above for which
If a project designed for the benefit of future generations passes a cost benefit analysis now, but
rate of return of the project as the constant certain rate of return that yields a zero Net Value
(2.16)
9The time inconsistency here is slightly unusual however. Usually, time inconsistency involves a planner at a 
future date finding it optimal to deviate from an earlier plan. That is the planner today and the future planner 
disagree about the optimal future action. Here, however, the planner today and the future planner disagree 
about the optimal action today. That is there is a divergence between what the future planner would like the 
current planner to do and what the current planner considers to be optimal.
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Furthermore, since the efficiency of a project is assessed differently from the perspective of 
different evaluation dates, r, we shall say that a project is t - efficient if it passes a CBA at 
evaluation date t .  Armed with these definitions we can make the following proposition:
Proposition  4 (Future efficiency implies present efficiency) : For the set of projects 
with cov (r , N V  (r , r )) < 0, if the project is t ' — ef f icient then it is also r  — efficient for 
r' > r.
Proof. Differentiating equation (2.11) with respect to the evaluation date we see that:
dEN V  (t) =  E f f T B ( t ) e x p ( - f ( t - r ) ) d t
dT Jo
= E [r.NV ( t ,  r ) ]
= E f . EN V  (r) + cov (f, N V  (r, r)) (2.17)
It is reasonable to assume, as in the numerical examples, that Er  > 0. Indeed this holds 
whenever an investment has a positive opportunity cost. It follows from (2.17) that ENV(r) < 
0 = >  gJENV(t) fdr < 0, so if ENV(r) =  0, then ENV(t') < 0 for all r' > r. The corollary of 
this is that if ENV(r/) =  0, then ENV(r) > 0 for all r  < t ' . ■
Note that Proposition 2 implies that to investments with cov(r ,NV (r,r)) < 0, that is, 
where a higher discount rate produces a lower net value10. Most investments fit into this 
category because an ‘investment’ by definition involves costs now in return for benefits in the 
future. However, some investments also have costs which accrue after an initial inestment and 
a long stream of benefits, such as nuclear power plants. The net value of such projects is 
increasing in f  over some range of and hence cov (r, N V  (r, r)) may in fact be positive. In these 
cases the internal rate of return (IRR) of the project is not necessarily unique. Appendix 1 
provides some illustrative examples of the possibilities here. Despite this possibility, proposition 
2 holds for a larger set of projects than those with a unique internal rate of return and NV(r, r) 
monotonically decreasing in r. This is because cov (f, NV (r,r)) may be negative even if the 
NV(r, r) is increasing over a subset of the domain.
10 As such, proposition 2 holds for all Gollier projects assuming there exists a r  : E N V  (r) =  0, and NV(t) <  0 
when evaluated at f .
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Figure 2.2: Relative weight on early cash flows increases with evaluation date r.
This result effectively generalises the finding in Section 2.4, summarised in Table 2.1, in 
which it was shown that the ENPV criterion consistently preferred the certain investment 
whereas the ENFV criteria consistently preferred the risky market investment. Proposition 4 
shows that if the future generation finds a safe investment to be efficient, relative to the risky 
market alternative, then the present generation will also judge the safe investment efficient. 
However, the converse is not true: even if the present generation finds the safe investment to 
be efficient, the future generations may judge the risky investment to be efficient. Moreover, 
given definition 4, proposition 4 tells us that a project is efficient for all r  < r*.
Mathematically this result arises since, as the evaluation date moves further into the future, 
the weight placed upon costs and benefits that accrue earlier in time. Given the nature of the 
investment project that we have considered so far, that is, costs are incurred in the first instance 
and the benefits accrue later, the reversal of the judgement of efficiency comes about because 
of the ever increasing weight attached to the initial investment costs. Figure 2.2 shows that as 
r  — t increases in value, the investment costs are compounded forward quicker than the benefits 
and ENV(r) is diminished11.
11 It should be noted that the normalisation of the discount function is not important in this regard since it 
does not change the relative weights between costs and benefits accruing in different time periods.
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2.6.2 Intergenerational rules for Cost Benefit Analysis
Clearly, the value of r* is of interest to the decision-maker since it tells her the extent to which 
projects will remain efficient once evaluated from the perspective of future generations12. In 
essence it says something about the extent to which there will be an intergenerational consensus 
with regard to a project. In this way, the decision maker can make an initial assessment as to 
the extent to which time inconsistency is likely to be a problem. It follows from this that we can 
determine the conditions under which a project will be (1) efficient for all evaluation dates, that 
is r* is unbounded; (2) efficient for all evaluation dates up to the end of the project (the payoff 
date T), that is, r* > T; (3) efficient at the current date, that is r* > 0; and, for completeness; 
(4) unanimously inefficient, that is never efficient not even for dates in the past, (as r* tends 
to negative infinity). Cases (1) and (4) imply an absence of intergenerational conflict. We first 
do this by looking at Gollier projects.
With a certain discount rate, definition 1 implies that the ENV(r) of any flow of benefits 
B  (t) the same as the flow of benefits given by:
—1 for t = 0
er*T for t =  T  
0 otherwise
where r* is the internal rate of return. Under uncertainty, the expected net value of the set of 
Gollier projects that yield Z = er*T becomes:
ENV ( r )  = E efT (e{r*~f)T -  l )  (2.18)
Since e~rT > 0, it follows that for all Gollier projects13 if r* exceeds rmax then e^ r*~r T^ > 1 
for all realisations of r, and hence E N V  (r) is certainly greater than zero for all r. In other 
words, if the internal rate of return of the project exceeds the upper bound of the support of 
the discount rate then all generations are unanimous in their judgement of the efficiency of the 
project. We shall say that a project for which r* > rmax is unanimously efficient. Of course, 
this is entirely intuitive: if the certain project has a payoff that is exceeding the best possible 
outcome on the markets, all generations will prefer the certain project.
12 In undertaking this evaluation we are asking the current generation to imagine how the future generation
would evaluate the project were it able to make the decision in the present.
13Indeed, for all investment projects with a unique internal rate of return.
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In the foregoing we have highlighted the possibility of time inconsistency in the presence 
of declining discount rates. That is, projects are likely to exist for which the judgement will 
be less that unanimous across generations. Naturally it is possible to define weaker efficiency 
rules in such situations. For example, we may be interested in determining whether or not a 
project is considered efficient over its time horizon [0, T ]. Given proposition 4 this effectively 
means assessing whether or not E N V  (T) > 0. If this is so then let us call this time horizon 
efficient. Similarly, we may want to apply the test of whether or not E N V  (0) > 0, that is, is 
the project at least efficient from the perspective of the present day. If so then let us call this 
project currently viable.
Finally, we can observe from (2.18) that if r* < rmin then E N V  (r) < 0 for all r. Again this 
is intuitive: if the rate of return from the certain project is lower than the lowest possible return 
from the market then the project is unanimously inefficient. In sum, this discussion leads to 
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Intergenerational Efficiency Rules) : A Gollier project with internal rate 
of return r* is said to be:
unanimously efficient
time horizon efficient
for <
currently efficient 
unanimously inefficient
T  >  f 'm a x
r* > r NV (0 ,T) 
r* > r NV (T, 0) 
r* < rmin
Proof. The unanimously efficient and time horizon efficient cases were proved in relation 
to (2.18) above. For the other two cases consider a Gollier project with payoff Z  at time T. 
The project is T-efficient if Z > Z  where Z  is the payoff that implies that ENV(r) = 0, that is:
= (2-19)
For the project to be time horizon efficient, that is for the project to be T-efficient, equation 
(2.19) requires that the payoff Z  must exceed Z  (t) = EeVT. The internal rate of return of 
a T-efficient project is given by ^  \nZ  = In EerT = rNV (0,T). Thus any project with an 
internal rate of return r* > rNV (0, T) is time horizon efficient.
For a project to be currently efficient requires that Z  exceeds Z  (0) =  1 /Ee~rT. The 
internal rate of return for the marginal project is — ^  In Ee~rT — rNV (T, 0). Thus a project 
with internal rate of return r* > rNV (T, 0) is currently efficient and has ENPV> 0. ■
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The intergenerational efficiency rules in proposition (5) represent a first step towards dealing 
with the intergenerational conflict arising from declining discount rates. Clearly, policy-makers 
can invest with confidence in a project that is unanimously efficient, and they would probably 
be comfortable investing in projects that are time-horizon efficient. For short-term projects, 
the simple requirement of current efficiency might be enough. With the recent policy focus on 
ensuring ‘sustainability’, however, perhaps this sets the bar too low, but ultimately, this is for 
governments to decide.
2.7 P roject Efficiency and D iscount R ate U ncertainty
The previous Section demonstrated that once the evaluation date, r , moves past the critical 
evaluation date, r*, a safe investment will no longer be considered efficient (when compared to 
a risky market numeraire). The time inconsistency created by declining discount rates implies 
that (risk-neutral) future generations would assess a safe project less favourably than (risk- 
neutral) current generations.
This Section asks whether an increase in the level of background uncertainty in economy 
— represented by discount rate uncertainty — changes the critical evaluation date for the safe 
project. Given the results above, we might expect that greater uncertainty in the economy will 
make the certain project less attractive to future generations, moving the critical evaluation 
date earlier in time.
To determine the impact of discount rate uncertainty on t *, we suppose that the discount 
rate is drawn from a gamma distribution with density function:
m  =  j (2.20)
For a Gamma distribution, the mean is /z =  a//? and the variance is a2 = a/(52. Using 
this fact, it is straightforward to show, as per Sozou (1998) and Weitzman (2001), that the 
certainty-equivalent discount function is:
Dc(f,r) = {l + ^ ^ y r (2.21)
where the condition r  < t + n/cr2 ensures that the discount function is nonnegative. This 
restriction implies that as the variance in the discount rate becomes large, the domain of 
permissible evaluation dates becomes increasingly small. The certainty-equivalent marginal
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discount rate is:
r Cm ( t , T ) -  ( t - T ) a ^ (2 .22)
And the certainty-equivalent average discount rate is:
r“ (t’T) = ^ 5(fr7)log ( 1 + L^ 7 ^ )  ( 2 ' 2 3 )
When the discount rate follows a gamma distribution, setting ENV(r) =  0 for a Gollier project
yields the critical evaluation date to be:
f  =  4  + ------ ——tt- 2 (2.24)o 1 — Z aVm2 v 7
Proposition 6 (P ro ject efficiency and discount ra te  uncertainty) The critical evalua­
tion date f  can be increasing or declining in the variance of the discount rate when it follows a 
gamma distribution.
Proof. Differentiating equation (2.24) with respect to the variance of the discount rate, we 
see that:
d f u Z<t2/m2
T -2 =  - t 4 ^  +  — :— 7 7 1  - j . T l n Z  (2.25)d o2 (a2)2 fj2 _  l ) 2
Clearly the sign of equation 2.25 is ambiguous given that Z > 1. The sign depends upon the
relative magnitudes of the first and second terms of equation 2.25. ■
Proposition 6 reveals once more that the characterisation of the uncertainty underlying
the discount rate is important not only from the perspective of the schedule of discount rates,
but also from the perspective of the critical evaluation date. However, it is interesting to ask
whether or not this result is driven by the presence of a lower bound in the support of r. We
have already seen in Chapter 1 how important this assumption was for the work of Gollier
(2002a,b) and it is likely to be of considerable moment here.
2.8 R esu lts w ith  N egative Interest R ates
The gamma distribution proved to be a tractable way of investigating the impact of a mean- 
preserving spread on the critical evaluation date. However, it suffers from the problem that it 
rules out the possibility of negative market returns (and hence also negative discount rates). 
To allow for negative discount rates, we employ an extremely basic probability distribution,
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Figure 2.3: The effect of discount rate uncertainty on the critical evaluation date.
defining r as a lottery with realisations {rmin, rmax} and corresponding probabilities 1 — p and 
p respectively. The mean discount rate is p = (1 — p)rmin + prmax and the variance is:
a2 =  E r2 -  p? = (1 -  p)r^in +  pr2mBX -  ((1 -  p)rmin +  prmax)2 (2.26)
Now, taking a Gollier project and determining the critical evaluation date gives:
1T = log (2.27)
(^max ^ min)
It is possible to determine from this equation, and again it is of ambiguous sign — increased 
uncertainty can either decrease or increase the number of generations who find the sure project 
to be efficient14, and again this derivative depends uopn the specific features of the project 
also. In some cases the impact of increases in the spread of the discount rate has a monotonic 
impact on the critical evaluation date, in other cases this is not so. Figure 2.3 illustrates two 
such cases.
The dependence of the critical evaluation date on the standard deviation of the discount 
rate is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The ‘bounded below’ function describes the case where we fix 
rmin > 0 and obtain increases in a2 by increasing rmax and adjusting probabilities to preserve 
the mean. It is a quasi-concave function. In contrast, the ‘bounded above’ function fixes
14If we use (2.26) and the equation for the mean for the Upper Bound case we can substitute for rmi„ and p  
using p  =  and rmin =  ^~1lf>r”ft3t . From this we note that 4 ^  >  0 and that 41 is of ambiguousa  t ' m a x i —p a<r~ ap  «
sign, hence is of ambiguous sign. Analogous expressions exist for the Lower Bound case.
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f'max > 0 and reduces rmin as the spread increases, so that eventually rmjn < 0. Note that 
in this instance, as the spread increases the critical evaluation date asymptotes to the time 
horizon, T15. In the latter case, more generations prefer the safe investment since increased 
variance implies the possibility of ever greater negative outcomes on the risky market. In the 
former case ever greater positive outcomes become possible as a result of increased spread, so 
the overriding effect is similar to in the previous Section.
2.9 C onclusion
In a recent paper Gollier (2004a) revisited work by Weitzman (Weitzman 1998, 2001). In doing 
so he concludes that, under uncertainty, the prescribed schedule of the discount rates differs 
depending upon whether one employs an expected net present value (ENPV) or an expected 
net future value (ENFV) criterion in cost benefit analysis. Weitzman (1998) uses the former 
criterion which leads to discount that rates are declining over time. Gollier (2004a) proposes 
the latter criterion by way of counter-example and finds that the schedule of discount rates is 
increasing over time. Hence, he argues, these criteria are likely to yield starkly different assess­
ments of project efficiency. Gollier also concludes that since the choice between these evaluation 
criteria implies imposing the investment risk upon either the present or future generations, any 
such decision is entirely arbitrary in the risk neutral environment in which Weitzman (1998) is 
cast. Gollier (2004a) summarises this apparent puzzle by saying that he and Weitzman ‘cannot 
both be right...and in fact...I think we are both wrong’.
The primary conclusion of this paper is that there is a clear sense in which Weitzman and 
Gollier are both right. Firstly, we show that the location of risk in time is a feature of the 
investment in question rather than of the chosen appraisal criterion. Thus Gollier’s explanation 
of the puzzle: that the choice between criteria is a question of inter-generational risk allocation, 
is not completely satisfactory. In fact, we show that the choice between ENPV or ENFV 
represents the choice across time of a specific evaluation date, that is, the numeraire date for 
CBA and as such these two criteria as presented by Gollier are special cases in a continuum of 
potential evaluation criteria.
Secondly, and contrary to the claim made by Gollier (2004a), we show that the schedule of
15 {T,  Z, rmin,T ,n }  =  {120,15,0%, 40,2.5%} in this lower bound case, while {T,  Z,  rmax, t ,  /x} =
{120,15,5%, 40, 2.5%} in the upper bound case.
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certainty-equivalent discount rates declines with the passage of time no matter which evaluation 
date is employed. It is in this sense that Weitzman is right. However, as the evaluation date is 
moved further into the future, the schedule of certainty-equivalent discount rates is shifted up. 
In short, Gollier was correct in suggesting that discount rates axe increasing in one time variable, 
however this variable is the evaluation date, not the passage of time. So, it is in this sense that 
Gollier is right. In short, Weitzman’s and Gollier’s arguments can coexist and proponents of 
declining discount rates and institutions employing them — such as the UK Government — can 
take solace from this paper that their approach has not been invalidated by Gollier (2004a).
Thirdly, our resolution of the puzzle exposes problems of time inconsistency, that is, projects 
efficient from the perspective of one evaluation date may not be considered efficent at an­
other and consequently optimal investment depends upon the evaluation date in the Weitzman 
framework. Hence, the main thrust of Gollier (2004a), that the choice of evaluation criteria 
is effectively arbitrary, still holds. Gollier (2002a, 2002b, 2004b) provides a deeper analysis, 
described in the previous Chapter in which the utility discount rate is assumed to remain con­
stant, thereby avoiding problems of time inconsistency, and the importance of risk preferences 
in determining optimal investments is described. A third contribution of this Chapter, how­
ever, was to provide an alternative approach to the evaluation of projects by outlining a set 
of intergenerational efficiency rules to employed in these circumstances. Proposition 4 makes 
a small start at providing such guidance by demonstrating what is required for a project to 
be judged (1) unanimously efficient (for all generations), (2) efficient over its time horizon, 
(3) efficient from the perspective of the present, or (4) never efficient. Clearly, policy-makers 
can have complete confidence in a project that is deemed unanimously efficient by an accurate 
cost benefit analysis. However, insisting upon unanimous efficiency is probably too restrictive 
and therefore inappropriate. More appropriate perhaps is, if the current generation makes an 
investment for the benefit of generation r, it is arguable that the frame of reference of the 
beneficiaries should be employed, and the project should be at least T-efficient. These rules do 
not solve the problem of time inconsistency but they provide at least some guidance to policy 
makers in this area.
Finally, a caveat on these results is required. The original critique by Gollier (2004a) 
implicitly assumes a very high degree of persistence in the social discount rate. In other words, 
it is assumed that as soon as the investment choice is made, the discount rate uncertainty is 
resolved and the discount rate is constant from that moment onwards. This is obviously an
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unrealistically high degree of persistence, but it serves as an approximation to more realistic 
econometric models, such as the random walk model of Newell and Pizer (2003) which indicate 
that the discount rate shows a moderate degree of persistence. Given this the approximation 
is perhaps not inappropriate. We employed this assumption, like Weitzman (1998, 2001) and 
Gollier (2004a), because any questions about empirical validity are more than compensated 
for by analytical tractability and economic insight. Nevertheless, given that we have shown 
the importance of various features of the distribution of discount rates upon the schedule of 
certainty equivalents and critical evaluation dates, it is worth noting that a further area of 
research in this area would be to reduce the assumed persistence and consider the impacts of 
uncertainty in an alternative model. It is to the empirical elements of this task that we turn in 
the following Chapter.
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2.11 A ppendices
2.11.1 Appendix 1: Caveats concerning c o v ( r ,N V  (r)) and Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 is not true for all projects B (t ), but it is true for the so-called ‘Gollier projects’.
In particular, the assumption that cov (r, N V  (r)) < 0 is certainly not true for all projects. We
know that there are some projects which look more appealing with a higher discount rate and
in general they are those which have costs which appear in the long term, after an initial stream
of benefits. One example might be nuclear decommission. We shall call these ’liability projects’
as a reference to the long-term liability.
These are projects for which the prospect exists that the internal rate of return is not unique
and hence along some range of f, cov (r, N V  (r)) > 016. This may also apply to projects which
require sequential investments: ‘sequential projects’, for which the relation between N V  (r) and
r is not necessarily monotonic but for which the IRR is generally unique. For completeness we
16 Recall the definition of the internal rate of return (IRR) as r* :
r* =  { r :  N V  (r)  =  0} (2.28)
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illustrate each of these cases.
P ro jec t 1: Gollier P ro jec t To make this concrete imagine firstly a Gollier project which 
for (Z , T, r) =  (400,200,0). N V  ( r ) , i.e. the present value for evaluation date r  with certain 
discount rate r is:
N V  (r) — Z  exp (—rT) — 1
In this case N V  (r) is monotonically declining in r  as shown in Figure 2.4, with limr_+00 N V  (r) |T=o = 
-1  and limr_voo -^N V  (t) |t=0 = 0:
300
200
100
Figure 2.4: How N V  (r) varies with r in a Gollier project
Notice that the IRR is unique in this case, and approximately equal to 3%. Clearly in this 
case the assertion that cov (r, N V  (r)) < 0 holds and Proposition 4 will be true. This is not 
dependent upon r  particularly17.
P ro jec t 2: Liability P ro jec t Now, imagine a liability project which requires a £1 at 
t = 0, yields a return of Z  at time T\ but incurs a cost of C at time T2 > T\. In this case 
N V  (r) defined as:
N P V  = Z  exp (—rTi) — C exp (—7T 2) — 1
For (Ti, T2 , r, Z, C) =  (200,400,0,400,600) we have N V  (r) which varies as follows:
17We have assumed that r =  0 in the example. Imagine if r > 0, then:
NV  (r) =  Z  exp (—r (t — r) )  — exp (rr)
It is easy to see that limr—00 NV  (r) =  —00. Again the decline is monotonic.
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Figure 2.5: How N V  (r) varies with r for a Liability project
Given that N V  (r) is not a monotonic function of r we cannot be certain that cov (f , N V  (r)) < 
0 for projects with long-term liabilities. If we define rmax as follows:
rmax = j r  : max iW  (r) J (2.29)
then in the interval f  G [0, rmax] we can see that cov(r ,N V  (r)) > 0. Furthermore, the IRR 
for liability projects is not unique in this case, there being 2 positive real roots. There is a low 
IRR, r/, and a high IRR, :
^ - S o ta(5  + 5 ^ ) - ° - »
 ^= -25o,nG - ^ ) “30%
There is a broad and deeply fascinating literature specifically devoted to this point18. The 
issue of uniqueness hinges partly upon the number of times the accumulated net cash flow 
sequence, J  B  (t) dt, changes sign over time.
Furthermore, the value of r  becomes important here. When r  =  0 it is easy to see that 
lim^oo N V  (r) = — 1, i.e. the initial outlay. When r  > 0 however, limr_>0O N V  (r) = —oo. This 
introduces another region of N V  (r) in which co v(r ,N V  (r)) < 0. Our problems are perhaps 
not solved in this regard simply by looking at projects which have a unique IRR however. This 
can be seen by considering the following example.
18Examples include Norstrom (1972) and Bernhard (1980).
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P ro jec t 3: A sequential project A sequential project is one for which two separate 
investments need to be made in order to reap the returns. For example it requires a £1 
investment at t = 0, yields a return of Z  at time T\ but incurs a cost of C at time T2 < T\. In 
this case N V  (r) defined as:
N P V  = Z  exp (—rT\) — C exp (—rT^) — 1 
For (Ti,T2 , t ,  Z, C) =  (200,100,0,400,200) we have N V  (r) which varies as follows:
150
100
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Figure 2.6: How N V  (r) varies with r for a Sequential Project
In this case the IRR is unique, but there is still a portion of the function N V  (r) which is 
rising with r.
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Figure 2.7: N V  (r) when r  > 0.
Ultimately, however, cov (r, N V  (r)) may still be negative even if there is a region of NV(r, r) 
in which it is increasing in r. It is in this sense that Proposition 2 is applicable more generally
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than simply to Gollier projects.
Chapter 3
Characterising uncertainty in the 
discount rate: Does model selection  
affect the certainty equivalent 
discount rate?
Abstract1
In the previous chapters we have been introduced to the various arguments for 
declining discount rates and the practical problems that emerge in employing DDRs 
in CBA. Chapter 1 introduced the importance of persistence in the discount rate 
in the results of Weitzman (1998) and Newell and Pizer (2003). Chapter 2 saw a 
resolution of one of the puzzles that has arisen from those arguments for DDRs 
based on uncertainty of the discount rate itself. In addition to introducing some 
simple ideas for decision making in the face of the time inconsistency associated 
with DDRs we also described how the discount function, the assessment of projects 
and critical evaluation dates, are affected in important ways by the features of the 
probability distribution of the discount rate.
In this chapter we discuss in more depth the characterisation of the uncertainty 
surrounding the discount rate and build upon an interpretation of uncertainty found 
in a recent paper by Newell and Pizer (2003) (N&P). They build upon Weitzman 
(1998, 2001) and show how uncertainty about future interest rates leads to ‘certainty 
equivalent’ forward rates (CER) that decline with the time horizon. Here we discuss 
the determination of the empirical schedule of discount rates for use in CBA using 
time series econometrics. We discuss the implications of model selection for the 
schedule and the policy implications by reference to two case studies in the long 
term policy arena: climate change and nuclear build.
xThis paper is an extended version of a Department of Economics Discussion Paper number 04/02 entitled 
‘Model Selection for the Certainty Equivalent Discount Rate’ by Ben Groom, Phoebe Koundouri of the University 
of Reading, and Ekaterini Panopoulos and Teo Pantelidis of the University of Piraeus, Greece.
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3.1 Introduction
The dramatic effects of conventional exponential discounting on present values of costs and 
benefits that accrue in the distant future along with the issues of intergenerational equity that 
arise are well documented (see e.g. Portney and Weyant 1999, Pearce et. al. 2003). The 
emergence of a long-term policy arena containing issues as diverse as climate change, nuclear 
build and decommission, biodiversity conservation, groundwater pollution, and the use of social 
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) to guide decision-makers in this arena has brought the discussion 
of long-run discounting to the fore. Discount rates that decline with the time horizon (Declining 
Discount Rates or DDRs) have often been touted as an appropriate resolution to what Pigou 
(1932) described as the ‘defective telescopic faculty’ of conventional discounting, and there has 
been much discussion about the moral and theoretical justification for such a strategy (see 
e.g. Dybvig et al. 1996, Sozou 1998, Portney and Weyant 1999, Weitzman 1998, 2001, Gollier 
2 0 0 2 a). Of particular interest are the declining yet socially efficient discount rates resulting 
from the analysis of Weitzman (1998, 2004) and Gollier (2002a,b, 2004) both of which appear 
to offer a theoretical path through the ‘dark jungles of the second best’ (Baumol 1968) and the 
intergenerational equity-efficiency trade-off contained therein.
If these theoretical solutions offer even a partial resolution of the problems of conventional 
discounting then it is clearly important that they can be operationalised and a schedule of DDRs 
can be determined. In the case of Gollier (2002a) and Weitzman (1998) it is uncertainty that 
drives DDRs, with regard to future growth of consumption and the discount rate respectively, 
thus the question of implementation is one of characterizing the uncertainty of these primals in 
some coherent way. However, of these two approaches it is Weitzman (1998) that has proven to 
be more amenable to implementation mainly because the informational requirements stop at the 
characterisation of uncertainty, and do not extend to specific attributes of future generations’ 
risk preferences as would be unavoidable in the case of Gollier (2002a, 2002b) . 2
Weitzman’s Certainty Equivalent Discount Rate (CER) is derived from the expected dis­
count factor and is therefore a summary statistic of the distribution of the discount rate. The 
level and behaviour over time of this statistic is clearly dependent upon the manner in which
uncertainty is characterised and the two applications that exist have taken different approaches
2Weitzman (1998) assumes risk neutral agents for exposition, but this represents a special case of his general 
point. For realistic scenarios, determination of DDRs a la Gollier (2002a, 2002b) requires knowledge of the 4th 
and 5th derivatives of utility functions, something that he admits is very far from being accomplished.
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stemming from different interpretations of uncertainty. Weitzman (2001) defines uncertainty 
by the current lack of consensus on the appropriate discount rate for the very long term. His 
survey of professional economists results in a gamma probability distribution for the discount 
rate which leads to the so-called ‘gamma discounting’ approach, a version of which can also be 
seen in Sozou (1998). Apart from uncertainty his model has persistence in-built, the assumption 
being that each individual discounts the future at their preferred constant rate, that is each of 
the responses that make up the probability distribution remain constant over time.
More recently, Newell and Pizer (2003) (N&P, henceforth) suggest that while we are rel­
atively certain about the current level of discount rates, there is considerable uncertainty in 
future. From this standpoint they assume that the past is informative about the future and 
characterise interest rate uncertainty by the parameter uncertainty typically found in any econo­
metric model. They choose to describe the behaviour of the US long-term real interest rate 
with a reduced-form model. Their model is the direct analogue of the Vasicek (1977) model for 
the term structure of interest rates in the sense that only the mean equation is specified and the 
conditional variance is held constant. In this respect, the authors get a working definition of 
the CER based upon an econometric model and estimation of the CER schedule comes from a 
forecasting simulation. Weitzman (2004) goes one step further and builds a “statistical optimal 
growth model” by combining a neoclassical economic model of optimal growth under uncer­
tainty with a fully integrated Bayesian statistical model of estimating, updating and predicting 
the outcome of this uncertainty. His model is able to produce persistent uncertainty in the inter­
est rate and as a result DDRs stemming mainly from the uncertainty over future technological 
progress. From a different point of view, mainly driven by the existing finance literature on 
the term structure of interest rates, Gollier (2004) reaches similar conclusions. He, specifically, 
finds that a positively correlated growth process leads to a decreasing yield curve in the case 
of a prudent representative agent due to increased uncertainty for the distant future. He also 
links his model with second order stochastic correlation and as a result to the Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross model (1985) (CIR, henceforth) of the finance literature, introducing the analogue 
of heteroscedasticity in his process for the interest rate. In two simulation experiments, one 
including discrete jumps in the growth of consumption and the other parameter uncertainty, 
he provides evidence of DDRs and suggests that the discount rate should be as low as 1% for 
periods exceeding 400 years.
The aforementioned studies bring to light some interesting issues concerning the character­
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isation of the future path of interest rates. It is mainly persistence combined with uncertainty 
that leads to declines in discount rates over time. In the theoretical studies of Gollier and 
Weitzman, persistence is generated by the economy itself, while in N&P, the existence of per­
sistence is an empirical question and it is the degree of persistence in the series that determines 
the rate of decline of the CER. In particular, N&;P specify a simple AR(p) model of interest rate 
uncertainty, which limits the characterisation of uncertainty to a process in which the distrib­
ution of the permanent and temporary stochastic components is constant for all time. Such a 
process guarantees declining CERs, but it takes into account only the evolution of the mean of 
the process. As already mentioned their model is a discrete time version of the Vasicek (1977) 
continuous-time model in which the drift of the process is linear and mean-reverting, while 
the diffusion function is held constant. Since the seminal contribution of Vasicek (1977), an 
immense literature on the term structure of interest rates has produced interesting insights as 
to what drives efficient discount rates. The basic extensions mainly come from the specification 
of the variance of the process, namely the diffusion function. For example, CIR (1985) model 
the diffusion function as a linear function of the level of the interest rate, while Chan et al. 
(1992) allow the diffusion function to be any power function of the level of the interest rate. 
However, the aforementioned one-factor models display time-homogeneity, i.e. their parame­
ters remain constant over time. It is reasonable to expect that the instantaneous return and 
volatility slowly evolve over time. In this respect, various efforts have been made to produce 
time-dependent models, such those of Ho and Lee (1986), Black, Derman and Toy (1990), Hull 
and White (1990) and Black and Karasinski (1991). These models specify both the drift and 
the diffusion process of the instantaneous stochastic rate via time-varying functions of the level 
of interest rates.
The empirical issues stemming from the environmental literature on declining discount rates 
along with the development of an econometric model, versatile enough to reproduce the empir­
ical regularities typically encountered in interest rate data axe the main concern of this paper 
and we build upon the following points. Firstly it is clear that, if we believe that the past is 
informative about the future, it is important to characterise the past as accurately as possible. 
Indeed, the selection of the econometric model is of considerable moment in operationalising 
a theory of DDRs that depends upon uncertainty and defines the CER in statistical terms. 
Each specification differs in the assumptions made concerning the time series process, hence 
the forecasts of the interest rate and the attributes of the resulting schedule of CER will differ
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accordingly. Secondly, the prescription of CBA will differ markedly depending upon the empir­
ical schedule of discount rates employed, particularly for projects with a long time horizon such 
as climate change prevention. Hence it is clear that we need some clear methodology for select­
ing among econometric models. This leads to our third point: selection among these models 
is also an empirical question. Typical misspecification testing and comparisons among various 
econometric models based upon their out-of-sample forecasting performance should guide model 
selection for the practitioner.
This chapter revisits these issues for US and UK interest rate data and shows that mis­
specification testing generates a natural progression away from the simple AR(p) specification 
towards models which account for second-order dependence and explicitly consider changes in 
the time series process over time. We employ, for comparison purposes, the same data set of 
the US interest rates as N&P and show the policy implications of interest rate uncertainty and 
model selection in the same policy issue, namely the value of carbon damages or sequestration. 
With regard to the UK we analyse the the value of carbon reductions and the implications 
for nuclear build taking consideration of the implications for carbon emissions that this would
3.2 From T heory to  Practice
3.2.1 The Certainty Equivalent Discount Factor (CEDR) and Rate (CER)
Discounting future consequences in period t back to the present is typically calculated using
the discount factor Pt, where Pt = exp(— Y lri)' When r is stochastic, the expected discounted
i=l
value of a dollar delivered after t years is:
Following Weitzman (1998) we define (3.1) as the certainty equivalent discount factor, and the
have.
(3.1)
corresponding certainty-equivalent forward rate for discounting between adjacent periods at 
time t as equal to the rate of change of the expected discount factor:
E(Pt+1)
(3.2)
where r* is the forward rate from period t to period t +  1 at time t in the future, or the
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marginal discount rate .3 Gollier (2002a) shows that the certainty equivalent rate is the socially 
efficient discount rate in a risk neutral world — risk neutral agents are only concerned with the 
expected value of the discount factor rather than higher order moments — by showing that an 
arbitrage exists if this is not the case.4 In effect this represents the economic theory underlying 
Weitzman’s definition, however the behaviour of rt over time is dependent upon the nature 
of the uncertainty surrounding the discount rate. Weitzman (1998) and N&;P show that it is 
a declining function of time provided there is sufficient persistence in the series over time.5 
This makes it clear that operationalising this theory is an empirical question, requiring the 
determination of the stochastic nature of rt.
3.2.2 Parameterisation of real interest rates
N&P employed a simulation method to forecast discount rates in the distant future, which 
was properly designed to account for uncertainty in the future path of interest rates and was 
mainly based on the estimation results of two econometric models, namely an autoregressive 
Mean-Reverting (MR) model and a Random Walk (RW) model. They estimated the following 
AR(p) model for rp.
n  = V + et (3.3)
p
et =  's^ \ Liet-i +
2=1
V V
where £t ~  iV(0, crj), rj ~  N  (rj, of) and Y^cti < 1 for the MR model, while Y ai — 1 f°r the RW
i=l i=l
model. The authors prove that in the case of an AR(1) model, the CER takes the following 
form:
rt = r j - t a \ -  a \ f  (a, t) (3.4)
where rj is the unconditional mean discount rate, p is the autoregressive coefficient, /  (a, t) =
3 This is different to the average discount rate rate which is the rate which if applied in every period until
period t would give the discount factor E [Pt].
4 Strictly, Gollier deals with the average certainty equivalent rate, however the same arguments hold as t —> oo.
His proof follows Dybvig et al (1996).
5 Weitzman (1998) gives a proof for a general but time invariant distribution function of r t . Weitzman (2001)
estimates this distribution empirically as a Gamma distribution. Chapter 1 section 1.4.1 provided a numerical 
example of the decline of the certainty equivalent discount rate for a uniform distribution.
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—-—2^ (1^ a Q—  ^ for MR and /  (a,t) = ^ (1  +  6 t + 6 t2) for RW. It is straightforward 
to see that (3.4) is a declining function of t (See N&;P for details).
This model, although simple, is successful in capturing the basic features of the underlying 
Data Generation Process (DGP) of the data which lead to DDRs, namely persistence and 
uncertainty. However, given the abundance of models already designed to capture the dynamics 
of the interest rate data either in discrete time or continuous time, it is hard to believe that 
simply modelling the mean of such a process is an adequate parameterisation of reality. As 
early as 1985, CIR introduced second-order dependence in the stochastic process of the interest 
rate by letting the conditional variance vary with the level of the interest rate .6 The simpler 
discretised diffusion model motivated by the CIR (1985) model is the GARCH (1 ,1 ) model, in 
which the conditional variance depends on its own lag as well as the lag of squared innovations. 
However, when fitting a GARCH model to interest rates, one often finds that the parameter 
estimates imply that the conditional variance process is not covariance-stationary. Engle et al. 
(1987, 1990), Hong (1988), Harvey (1993) and Kees et al. (1997) document such a behaviour 
mainly for the US short term interest rates. In such cases, proper statistical testing usually 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the conditional variance of the process follows an integrated 
GARCH process (IGARCH).
For these reasons, we employ the AR(p) - GARCH (I, m) model to account for both mean 
and volatility effects in the US interest rate process. Specifically our model is as follows:
n  = r) + et
p
6t —  ^  'ajet-j +
i= i
it =  hl/2zt (3.5)
m I
h i =  C +  Y ^ P £ 2t - i  +
7=1  7=1
where ht is the conditional volatility of (given all available information at time t — 1 ) and
771 I
zt ~  IID N (0,1). In the case that Pi + Z)7i = we ^ave an AR(p) - IGARCH(l, m) model.
7=1  7=1
Both the AR{p) and AR{p) - GARCH (I, m ) models assume that the parameters driving the 
stochastic process are constant over the sample period, i.e. they are time-homogenous. This is 
likely to be an unrealistic assumption for a period of 2 0 0  years and certainly for forecasting the 
CER over the long-term policy horizon in hand which, following N&P, extends for 400 years.
6Chan et al. (1992) extend the CIR model to include any power function for the diffusion function.
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For example, the behaviour of interest rates is strongly affected by the economic cycles as well 
as shocks destabilising them, i.e. periods of economic crisis. In the US, during the period 1979 
through 1982, the Federal Reserve Bank (FED) stopped its usual practice of targeting interest 
rates and decided to use non-borrowed reserves (NBRs) as a target instrument for monetary 
policy. As a result, the volatility of interest rates increased dramatically during that period. 
Other periods of high volatility of the US interest rates were the OPEC oil crisis (1973-1975), 
the October 1987 stock market crash and wars involving the US. Such turbulent periods are 
likely to induce persistence in volatility, which is often an artifact of the changes in the economic 
mechanism generating the interest rate (see Gray, 1996). Lamourex and Lastrapes (1990) show 
that any structural shift in the unconditional variance is likely to lead to unreliable estimates 
of the GARCH parameters such that they imply too much persistence in volatility. In this 
sense, regime shifts are mistaken for periods of volatility clustering. Consequently, studies 
in the term structure literature have modelled discrete regime shifts in the spot interest rate 
process (Hamilton 1988, Das, 1994, Gray 1996 and Naik and Lee 1997). These models typically 
posit a spot interest rate process that can shift randomly between two or more regimes (for 
example a low-mean and a high-mean regime). The diffusion and drift functions are kept the 
same but the specific parameter values are different in each regime. This makes the process 
time-heterogeneous. Each regime incorporates a different speed of mean-reversion to a different 
long-run mean and a different unconditional variance. Specifically, in our study we consider the 
following Regime-Switching (RS) model with two states:
n  = Vk + et (3.6)
v
e t =  ^ 2 a i e t - i  +  £* 
i= 1
where ~  IID N(0, cr|), k = 1,2 for the first and second regime, respectively. At any particular 
point in time there is uncertainty as to which regime we axe in. The probability of being in 
each regime at time t is specified as a Markov 1 process, i.e. it depends only on the regime at
time t — 1. We define the probability that the process remains at the first regime as P, while the
probability that the process remains at the second regime is Q. The matrix of the transition
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probabilities is assumed to be constant.7
The parameterisation of a regime switching model allows us to define a finite number of 
states that the economy goes through, which consequently affect the interest rate. However, 
it does not allow for cases that both the level and the variance of the process slowly evolve 
over time. Such an evolution can be captured by models with time-dependent parameters. In 
the continuous time literature, various models have been proposed in an effort to capture this 
dependence of parameters in time. These include the models of Ho and Lee (1986), Black et al. 
(1990), Hull and White (1990) and Black and Karasinski (1991). Fan et. al. (2003) compare 
various specifications of both time-dependent and time-independent models and propose a time- 
varying coefficient model which captures better the time-variation of short-term dynamics of 
the interest rate. This finding along with a similar conclusion of Ait-Sahalia (1996) who finds 
strong non-linearity of the drift for the US interest rate leads us to introduce a time varying 
parameter model. We model the interest rate as a State Space (SS) process. More in detail, we 
specify an AR( 1 ) process with an AR(p) coefficient as follows:
rt = rj + atrt- i  + et (3.7)
p
a t =  + ut
2=1
where et and ut are serially independent, zero-mean normal disturbances such that:
(3.8)
This specification is able to capture non-linearities in the mean of the interest rate and
accommodates changes in the conditional variance of the series under consideration. Tsay
(1987) shows that the ARCH models can be regarded as special cases of Random Coefficient
Autoregressive models (RCA), which are nested in the class of the AR{ 1) model with an AR{jp)
7We define the following matrix of transition probabilities:
Prob(l?t =  1 | R t _! =  1) =  P
Pr ob(i?t =  2 | R t - i  =  2) — Q
Prob(R t =  2 | R t-1 =  1) =  1 -  P
Prob(Rt =  1 | R t-1 =  2) =  1 -  Q
where Rt refers to the regime at time t.
J 0 o\ 0I ~  N  I
Ut )  { 0
0  .
117
coefficient. A simple RCA model allows for the conditional variance to evolve with previous 
observations, accommodating in this way the high volatility observed in periods of high interest 
rates. With the addition of an AR(p) structure to the coefficient of our model, we are able to 
capture both the volatility dynamics and the observed non-linearity in the drift of the interest 
rate process. This time-varying coefficient model can be thought of as an infinite regime- 
switching model which encompasses all the previous models as special cases, given a specific 
set of assumptions.
Given the abundance of econometric models, our aim is to select the model that captures 
the dynamics of the data generating process in order to achieve an adequate description of 
the series under scrutiny. In doing this our intention is to provide the best prediction of 
the schedule of certainty equivalent discount rates for use in the evaluation of projects with 
implications in the far distant future. The complexity of the model and the restrictions it 
imposes should correspond to the level of uncertainty of the true data generating process. 
Otherwise, inference can be misleading and the forecasting performance of the model may 
be very poor. Common misspecification tests, such as tests for stationarity, autocorrelation, 
heteroscedasticity or parameter instability, will provide a benchmark to our selection procedure 
in conjunction with an out-of-sample forecasting exercise.
3.3 Em pirical R esu lts for the US
3.3.1 Data
We use the US data used by N&P (2003) for comparison purposes. More specifically, we use 
annual US market interest rates for long-term government bonds for the period 1798 to 1999. 
Starting in 1955, the nominal interest rates are converted to real interest rates by subtracting a 
ten-year moving average of the expected inflation rate of the CPI, as measured by the Livingston 
Survey of professional economists. For the previous years, expected inflation is assumed to equal 
zero and thus nominal and real interest rates coincide. The real interest rates are then converted 
to their continuously compounded equivalents. Finally, the estimation is based on a three-year 
moving average of the real interest rates series to smooth any short-term fluctuations, since we 
focus on the long-term behaviour of the series.8 Following N&P, we estimate our models based
8We follow these procedures for comparability with N&P despite some of these transformations being ques­
tionable. For example, converting the data by using a three year moving average may introduce serial correlation.
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on the logs of the series. This logarithmic transformation precludes negative rates and makes 
interest rate volatility more sensitive to the level of interest rates.9
3.3.2 Estimation results
First of all, we test the stationarity of the US real interest rates. The results of a variety of 
unit-root tests are reported in Table 3.12 in Appendix l 10. These results generally favour the 
existence of a unit-root in the series, in line with the results of N&P. However, it is well-known 
that unit-root tests often lack the power to reject a false hypothesis of a unit-root for alternatives 
that lie in the neighbourhood of unity. Furthermore, mean shifts and non-linearities are often 
mistaken for unit-root behaviour (see, for example, Perron 1990 and Nelson et al. 2001). More 
importantly, it is difficult to believe that real interest rates become potentially unbounded 
with no economic forces at work to bring them back to some equilibrium, especially with two 
centuries of data. Albeit, for completeness, we estimate both a Random Walk (RW) and a 
Mean-Reverting (MR) model. Three lags are included in both models (p =  3) . 11 Our estimates 
are identical to N&P and we do not discuss them extensively, for brevity. The MR model 
suggests conversion to a long-run mean of 3.69% at a very low speed though, as the sum of 
the autoregressive coefficients is as high as 0.976. Furthermore, tests for serial correlation in 
the residuals of the regression model suggest that mean dependence is sufficiently captured by 
this AR(3) model. Not surprisingly though, this constant-vaxiance model does a poor job in 
modelling the conditional volatility of interest rates as there is remaining autocorrelation in the 
squared residuals. Specifically, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH) in the residuals rejects the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. 
In this respect, we estimate an AR(3) — GARCH (1,1) model. In line with other empirical
studies employing GARCH models to estimate the volatility of interest rates, we find that
More details about the data can be found in N&P (2003).
9See N&P (2003), footnote 15, pp.60 for a detailed discussion on this issue.
10We use the following unit root tests: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Dickey and Fuller 1979), the Dickey-
Fuller test with GLS detrending (Elliott et al. 1996), the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock Point Optimal test (Elliott et
al. 1996), the Phillips-Perron test (Phillips and Perron 1988), the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) and the
Ng-Perron test (Ng and Perron 2001).
11 Throughout this paper, we use the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) to select the lag-length of the
alternative models.
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Panel A: AR(3)-IGARCH(1,1) model
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-stat.
n 1.330 0.104 12.811
a i 1.951 0.085 23.033
02 -1.322 0.156 -8.472
0.355 0.080 4.441
c 0 .0 0 0 1 0.00003 3.236
P i 0.442 0.092 4.805
Panel B: Regime Switc ling model
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-stat.
ni 1.189 0.128 9.327
ai 1.589 0.078 20.36
a \ -0.660 0.086 -7.630
ri2 1.714 0.238 7.206
1.787 0.050 35.55
a \ -0.800 0.049 -16.395
° i 0.004 0 .0 0 1 5.651
to t
o
0 .0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 6.070
P 0.867 0.058 14.934
Q 0.917 0.035 25.976
Panel C: State Space model
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-stat.
n 0.510 0.082 6.185
n i 0.990 0 .0 0 2 494.9
l n ( a l ) -9.158 1.324 -6.917
l n { o 2u ) -6.730 0.144 -46.63
Table 3.1: Estimation Results for the US Models
Pi +  7 1  =  1.007, implying that the unconditional variance of the process is unbounded.12 
However, statistical tests indicate that Pi and sum up to unity, implying that the process 
of the conditional variance of the interest rate follows an in te g r a te d  GARCH process. In this 
respect, we estimate an AR(3) — IGARCH(l, 1) model. The estimation results are reported in 
panel A of Table 3.1 The estimates for the conditional mean remain the same in this setting, 
while the estimates for the conditional variance indicate that any shock is persistent in the 
sense that it remains important for future forecasts of all horizons.
However, as discussed above, this strong persistence in the volatility of the estimated 
GARCH model is an indication of a regime-switching mechanism in the generating process 
of the interest rate. In this mode, we estimate a two-regime model, where each regime is an 
12Engle et al. (1990) report /31 +  7 j =  1.0096 for a portfolio of US securities, Kees et al. (1997) report 
0 1 +  =  1.10 for the one-month T-bills and Hong (1988) reports (3t +  7 X =  1.073.
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AR(2) process. Panel B of Table 3.1 reports the estimates of this model. Both regimes are fairly 
persistent as indicated by the probabilities P  and Q of the transition matrix which approach or 
even exceed 0.9. However, these regimes are distinct, as they display different characteristics. 
The first regime can be characterised as a “low-mean” regime, while the second as a “high- 
mean” one. The unconditional means for the two regimes are 3.28% and 5.55%, respectively. 
Different degrees of mean reversion are implied by the two regimes, as well. The “low-mean” 
regime mean-reverts quicker than the “high-mean” one as indicated by the sum of the autore­
gressive coefficients. The respective figures are 0.929 and 0.987, implying that our process is 
stationary in each regime. Moreover, the estimated transition matrix in combination with the 
estimated coefficients satisfy the condition for global stationaxity of the process, which is a 
desirable property as far as modelling the real interest rate is concerned.13 Since such a type 
of model can just draw probabilistic assumptions about the state of the interest rate we are in, 
our estimates suggest that the probability (unconditional) of being in the “low-mean” regime is 
more than double the probability of being in the “high-mean” one (6 8 % as opposed to 32%).14 
As a result, the estimated duration of the regimes is 7.5 years and 1 2  years for the low-mean 
and the high-mean regime, respectively. Furthermore, the first regime is more volatile than the 
second as indicated by the higher variance of the error term. Specifically, the estimated variance 
of the “low-mean” regime is 10 times greater than the variance of the “high-mean” one. This 
finding along with the estimated duration of the regimes leads us to assume that these regimes 
incorporate a business cycle effect over this 2 0 0 -year period. As a result, periods with low real 
interest rates correspond to periods of slow growth or high inflation inducing uncertainty to the 
overall economy, while periods of high real interest rates correspond to periods of high growth 
and consequently confidence about the future state of the economy.
This business cycle effect or, more generally, the evolution of economic fundamentals might 
not be abrupt, switching from one state to the other. A gradual change in the evolution of 
the economy and interest rates as well might be captured better with a state space model. We 
specifically model the interest rate process as an AR( 1) process with an AR( 1) coefficient. The 
parameter estimates for this model are presented in panel C of Table 3.1. The constant in 
our model suggests a minimum for the real interest rate, rather than a mean value, which is
estimated at 1.67%. Furthermore, the autoregressive coefficient is strongly persistent.15 This
13See Francq and Zakoian (2001) for the stationarity conditions.
14 See Figure 1 for the estimated states over time.
15Stability conditions for this process have been derived by Weiss (1985). Specifically, for a univariate AR(1)
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finding cannot in itself suggest any degree of mean reversion for the process as a whole, since 
the degree of mean reversion of the process changes over time. At the end of our sample the 
process of the interest rate displays a relatively quick mean reversion as suggested by a value 
of 0.47 of the relevant coefficient.
So far, we have estimated five alternative models for the US interest rates. Among these 
models, the RW model is the only one that violates the second-order stationarity condition. This 
was the model preferred by N&;P. From an economic point of view, the existence of a unit root in 
the generating mechanism of real interest rates makes little sense, since it is really hard to believe 
that real interest rates can potentially become unbounded with no economic dynamics at work 
to bring them back to their mean. As far as the rest of the estimated models are concerned, 
each model makes different assumptions about the level of uncertainty in the behaviour of 
real interest rates. MR is the simpler model, since it assumes constant conditional variance 
and constant parameters. The AR-IGARCH model allows for a higher level of uncertainty 
compared to MR by assuming a time-varying conditional variance (heteroscedasticity). On the 
other hand, the RS model and the SS model further increase the degree of uncertainty, since 
they both allow for time-varying coefficients. However, our RS model describes a process that 
vacillates between two regimes, while SS allows for the higher level of uncertainty among the 
estimated models, since it allows the autoregressive coefficient to change in each period. Indeed, 
as explained there is a sense in which the other models are nested in the SS model.
3.3.3 Certainty-equivalent discount rates and discount factors: US
The purpose of characterising the uncertainty surrounding the interest rate was to estimate the 
term structure of the interest rate by forecasting the path of the interest rate and calculating its 
certainty equivalent. In this Section we do this by using the estimated parameters from each of
process with an AR(1) coefficient, i.e.
x t =  n +  p tx t- i + e t,
Pt =  4>Pt- 1  + Var(vt ) =  q 
Weiss (1985) provides the following condition:
R  +  S 2(oo) : = / i 2 +  — ^-2 (l  +  V  +  8/z2 lim E"-!1^— ^ ' )  +1 — 0 n —*oo J n
— (1 +  lim E <  1(1 — 0 ) n-*oo J n
This condition is satisfied for our process for all the sample sizes employed in this study.
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the models described and we subsequently compare the results. We follow N&P and undertake 
a numerical simulation of 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  possible future discount rate paths for each model starting 
in 2000 and extending 400 years into the future. For each model presented and estimated 
in the previous Section the simulations are based on the estimates presented in Table 3.1.16 
The initial value of the real interest rate is set at 4%, which as N&P argue reflects the best 
comparison with a constant rate. In Appendix 2, we briefly describe the simulation method 
for each estimated model. We then calculate the certainty-equivalent discount rate employing 
the discrete approximation of equation (3.2). The simulated expected discount factors and the 
corresponding CERs are reported in Table 3.2 and 3.3 respectively for the various models under 
consideration.
The first column of Table 3.2 displays the discount factors based on a constant 4% rate 
with the remaining columns corresponding to the rest of the estimated models. As expected, 
the models produce considerably different discount factors and the differences between them are 
evident even from the first 60 years. For example, for a 60 year horizon the SS model produces 
substantially higher valuations than the rest of the models (the difference is over 50 % in some 
cases). Overall, the higher valuations come from either the SS or the RW model. The present 
value of $ 1  delivered after 100 years is $0.05 and $0.08 according to RW and SS respectively. 
The corresponding value for the rest of the models is about $0.02. At the end of the period 
under examination, the RW model is the one that retains the higher value followed by the 
AR-IGARCH and the SS models.
Naturally, the differences among discount factor projections relevant to each model axe 
reflected in the projected schedule of CERs. All the models accommodate declining interest 
rates mainly stemming from the persistence and uncertainty built in them. They differ, however, 
at the path they follow and the terminal values they attain. For example, SS and RW produce 
the lower rates for the first 100 years, reaching a CER of around 2% (half the initial value). 
During the same period, the MR and the AR-IGARCH models follow similar paths yielding a 
reduction of just 50 basis points (b.p.). In the case of RS, the CER increases slightly due to 
some overshooting during the first 40 years. Except for this overshooting, the RS model regains 
its quick declining path for the rest of the period reaching a rate of 0.7% after 400 years. The 
highest terminal rate is produced by the SS model, which projects a rate of 1.6%, followed by 
MR at 1.4%.
16The reader is referred to N&P (2003) for the estimates of the RW and the MR models (Table 1, page 63).
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Model 4%
Constant
Mean
Reverting
Random
Walk
AR
IGARCH
Regime
Switching
State
SpaceYear
1 0.96154 0.96154 0.96154 0.96154 0.96154 0.96154
2 0 0.45639 0.45906 0.46177 0.45876 0.45390 0.56424
40 0.20829 0.21661 0.22917 0.21250 0.19576 0.33136
60 0.09506 0.10471 0.12480 0.10062 0.08458 0.20296
80 0.04338 0.05150 0.07777 0.04894 0.03700 0.12889
1 0 0 0.01980 0.02567 0.05082 0.02455 0.01647 0.08408
150 0.00279 0.00476 0.02333 0.00529 0.00238 0.03132
2 0 0 0.00039 0.00095 0.01830 0.00178 0.00041 0.01255
250 0.00006 0 .0 0 0 2 2 0.01119 0.00104 0 .0 0 0 1 0 0.00526
300 0 .0 0 0 0 1 0.00006 0.00890 0.00086 0.00003 0.00227
350 0.00000 0 .0 0 0 0 2 0.00715 0.00080 0 .0 0 0 0 2 0 .0 0 1 0 0
400 0.00000 0 .0 0 0 0 1 0.00669 0.00078 0 .0 0 0 0 1 0.00044
Table 3.2: Certainty Equivalent Discount Factors for the US
Model Mean
Reverting
Random
Walk
AR
IGARCH
Regime
Switching
State
SpaceYear
1 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
2 0 3.91 3.85 3.96 4.22 2.79
40 3.76 3.46 3.88 4.31 2.59
60 3.65 3.08 3.74 4.26 2.38
80 3.58 2.60 3.60 4.18 2.23
1 0 0 3.51 2.17 3.42 4.09 2 .1 0
150 3.36 1.39 2.75 3.79 1.91
2 0 0 3.16 0.94 1.62 3.31 1.79
250 2.87 0.75 0.65 2.46 1.72
300 2.43 0.56 0.23 1.83 1.67
350 1.87 0.43 0.09 0.95 1.64
400 1.41 0.34 0.04 0.70 1.61
Table 3.3: Certainty Equivalent Discount Rates for the US
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Model Mean
Reverting
Random
Walk
AR
IGARCH
Regime
Switching
State
SpaceCriterion
AMSFE 2.058 2.171 2 .102 2.323 1.832
AMSFE (B) 1.692 1.724 1.692 1.687 1.499
AMSFE (P) 1.725 1.746 1.720 1.683 1.426
AMSFE (QS) 0.842 0.870 0.848 0.879 0.760
AMSFE (TH) 1.769 1.797 1.765 1.738 1.550
Table 3.4: Average MSFEs for the US
In summary, the forecasts of the alternative models differ substantially. In this respect, we 
need to evaluate the models with respect to their predictive ability. Typical misspecification 
testing has shown that a constant coefficient model may not be able to fully capture the dynam­
ics of the US interest rates over the period examined. Along this line of reasoning, we suggested 
two time-varying coefficient models (RS and SS), one accommodating abrupt changes and the 
other allowing for a gradual change over time in the generating mechanism of the interest rates. 
These two models seem eminently preferable to the constant coefficient models. In the following 
subSection, we perform an out-of-sample forecast exercise to select among the various models.
3.3.4 Model selection
Evaluating the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the models under consideration for the
long run is impossible due to limitation of data, as forward rates exist for a maximum period
of 30 years. However, we attempt to discriminate between these models on the grounds of their
forecasting performance over a 30-year horizon using available real data. We specifically make
use of annual nominal forward rates suggested by the term structure of the inflation-indexed US
government bonds. Then, we calculate the commonly-used Mean Square Forecast Error (MSFE)
and judge the models by this criterion. Alternatively, we calculate four modified MSFE criteria
by incorporating four kernels17 which weigh observations by their relevant proximity to the
present. The results are presented in Table 3.4.
Interestingly, the various specifications of the MSFE criterion unanimously rank the SS
model first followed by the RS model in most of the cases. The AR-GARCH model ranks
17The Bartlett(B), the Parzen(P), the Quadratic-Spectral (QS) and the Tukey-Hanning (TK) kernels are the 
weighting functions used in our evaluation.
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Carbon Values 
($/tc)
Relative to 
Constant Rate
Relative to 
Mean Reverting
Relative to 
Random WalkModel
Regime- Switching 5.22 -9.0% -18.8% -49.4%
Constant (4.0%) 5.74 — -10.7% -44.4%
AR-IGARCH 6.37 11 .0% -0.9% -38.3%
Mean Reverting 6.43 12 .0% — -37.7%
Random Walk 10.32 79.8% 60.5% —
State Space 14.44 151.6% 124.6% 39.9%
Table 3.5: Value of Carbon Damages: US models
third followed by MR and then RW. In sum, if we select a model on the basis of its ability 
to characterise the past and its accuracy concerning forecasts of the future, we axe inclined to 
accept the SS model as the best model (among the estimated models) to describe the US real 
interest rates. Our second best choice would be the RS model.
3.4 P olicy  Im plications o f M odel Selection: U S
The foregoing has established the importance of model selection in determining a schedule of 
declining discount rates for use in CBA. The differences that arise from alternative specifications 
of the time series process have been revealed and a method for selecting one model over another 
has been proposed. In this Section we highlight the policy implications of declining discount 
rates and the impact of model misspecification by considering the same case study as N&P, that 
is, climate change and the value of carbon sequestration We establish the present values of the 
removal of 1 ton of carbon from the atmosphere, and hence the present value of the benefits of 
the avoidance of climate change damages for each of the specified models. To understand what 
follows it is important to be familiar with the profile of benefits resulting from the removal of 
1 ton of carbon from the atmosphere. We use the estimates taken from the DICE model of 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) shown in Section 8.2 of chapter 1.
Table 3.5 shows the present value per ton of carbon emissions when evaluated using the 
schedule of discount rates associated with each of the models described in Section 3.2.2. The 
RS model gives the lower valuations followed by the conventional 4% discounting. Interestingly, 
the SS model gives the higher valuation followed by the RW model. For example, the present
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value of carbon emissions reduction is over 150 % larger in the case of the SS model compared 
to the case of constant discounting at 4 %. On the other hand, the present value of the removal 
of 1 ton of carbon emissions from the atmosphere increases by only 12 % based on the MR’s 
forecasts compared to the constant rate discounting approach.
The preceding discussion has argued that the RS and SS models are to be preferred over the 
others since they allow for changes in the interest rate generating process and have desirable 
properties. From the policy perspective we have established that both these models provide well 
specified representations of the interest rate series. However, the RS model provides roughly 
equivalent values of carbon to the constant discounting rate values (there is a 9% difference), 
while the SS model produces values that are up to 150% higher than those of the constant 
rate measuring $14.4/tc compared to around $5/tc under constant discouting. Comparing the 
performance of our models to the RW model used by N&P, we find that RW produces larger 
values of carbon than all models, valuing carbon reductions at $10.32/tc, other than the SS 
model, which exceeds the RW model by about 40 %.
The disparity between the RS and the SS models, and the proximity of the carbon values 
generated by the former to those generated by conventional constant discounting represents a 
clear signal of the policy relevance of model selection in determining the CER. It is crucial from 
a policy perspective to make a clear judgment as to which of the two models is most appropriate 
to the case in hand. Our forecasting exercise reveals that the SS model is preferable to the 
RS model due to its lower MSFE for the 30-year horizon. Hence in the context of SS the 
carbon values are increased by 150% compared to conventional discounting and 40% compared 
to N&iP’s approach. In short, in the US context, the selection of econometric models on the 
basis of forecasting performance, and the preferred schedule of discount rates makes climate 
change prevention a more desirable investment.
Lastly, it is worth noting the importance of the profile of benefits being evaluated. There 
are likely to be alternative investments that would look more desirable when evaluated with 
the schedule of discount rates associated with models other than the SS model. Given that the 
RW model has the lowest long-run discount rate, this might be the case for investments with 
benefits which accrue solely in the very-long run. That is to say, although the SS model is the 
preferred model, this does not translate into uniformly higher present values for all potential 
projects and policies compared to other models.
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3.5 Em pirical R esu lts for th e U K
3.5.1 Data
To estimate the model of interest rate behavior, we compiled a series of real market interest rates 
over the two-century period 1800 to 2001. The nominal interest rate used is the United Kingdom 
2 1 / 2 % Consol Yield, while inflation is calculated by the annual change in the Consumer Price 
Index.18 Our choice of interest rate is limited by the availability of data as well as our desire 
for the longest time series available. Based on these nominal rates, we calculate real rates 
by subtracting the 1 0-year moving average inflation rate, so as to smooth short-term price 
fluctuations. However, even this technique leads to negative real rates for specific years due to 
mainly extreme events, such as oil crises or wars. In order to make our model invariant to these 
economic crises, which affect interest rates temporarily, we estimated the crisis-induced level of 
inflation by including a dummy in a small model for the inflation rate. The estimated extra­
level of inflation is then subtracted from the inflation in the periods of crises and our series of 
positive real rates is obtained. We then convert these rates to their continuously compounded 
equivalents. We estimate our models, employed in the simulation of the interest rate, using a 
3-year moving average of the real interest rate series to smooth very short-term fluctuations. 
Moreover, due to the fact that our models employed in the simulation of the interest rates do 
not rule out the possibility of persistent negative discount rates, we use the natural logarithms 
of the series in the estimation procedure.
3.5.2 Estimation results
A variety of unit root tests confirmed that the UK real interest rate is a stationary process (See 
Table 3.13 in Appendix 2 ). Panel A of Table 3.6 shows that the AR(4) model displays relatively 
rapid reversion to the implied unconditional mean of 3.32%. However, Panel B shows that our 
estimates for the RS model indicate the presence of two distinct regimes (modelled as AR(2 ) 
processes). The unconditional means of each are 2.14% and 3.70% and mean reversion is faster 
in the latter. The first regime has an estimated duration of 4 years, while the second one is more 
persistent with a duration of 15 years. Overall, the estimates of this model suggest that low 
interest rate periods are quickly mean-reverting, surrounded by greater uncertainty and transit 
more often to high interest rates periods which are more persistent and less uncertain. Turning
18Data provided by the Global Financial Data, Inc, available at http://www.globalfindata.com.
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to our SS model in panel C, the parameter estimates suggest that the state process is highly 
persistent, almost a random-walk process, as indicated by the estimate of the autoregressive 
coefficient. The constant of our model suggests a minimum of 1.31% for the interest rate 
process. Due to the poor performance of the GARCH model in the US case we only use the 
better performing models in the UK case.
3.5.3 Certainty-equivalent discount rates and discount factors: UK
Based on the estimates presented in Table 3.6, we simulate 100,000 possible future discount rate 
paths for each model starting in 2002 and extending 400 years into the future.19 The expected 
discount factors and CERs are calculated from equations (4.14) and (3.2) and are reported in 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8. We also comment on the empirical distribution of interest rates.
The SS model yields the highest discount factors followed by the RS and AR(4) model. 
These differences are more pronounced during the first half of the forecast horizon. Only SS 
sustains some value in the distant future (400 years). Naturally, the corresponding certainty- 
equivalent discount rates reveal largely the opposite picture. The A R {4) model yields the 
higher rates during the first half of the sample, while the RS model yields the higher rates in 
the second half. The SS model gives consistently lower CERs that fluctuate in the range of 
2.2% to 1.4%.
3.5.4 Model selection
For model selection we refer to a number of features of the models. Firstly, we describe the 
simulated distribution of discount factors. Our preferred method of model selection is the fore­
casting performance20. We use the same techniques as described in Section 3.3.4. Specifically, 
we make use of the term structure of the inflation-indexed UK government bonds and use the
19The process of picking parameters and shocks is available from the authors upon request. Initial values for 
any lags of the real interest rate necessary for the simulation are set at 3.5 per cent, the rate used for CBA by
the UK Treasury (HM Treasury 2003).
20 There are other comparisons available such as the coefficient of variation and the quantiles of the empirical
distribution. The model with the lowest coefficient of variation (i.e. the ratio of standard deviation over mean)
is SS, whereas the AR(4) model yields the highest coefficient. Alternatively, as a measure of uncertainty, we
employ the 5% and 95% empirical percentiles. This measure seems to favour the RS model, which has the tightest
confidence intervals, suggesting that uncertainty over the expected discount factor is considerably reduced. On
the other hand, the percentiles of the SS model are relatively wide. These results are not reported here but can
be found in Groom et al (2004).
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Panel A: AR(4) model
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-stat.
n 1.201 0.177 6.777
ai 1.054 0.058 18.165
0-2 -0.125 0.089 -1.392
G3 -0.443 0.070 6.308
0.4 0.368 0.035 10.452
0.064 0.005 13.733
Panel B: Regime Switching model
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-stat.
721 0.760 0.244 3.117
a\ 0.700 0.312 2.249
a\ -0.212 0.312 -0.679
n2 1.306 0.082 15.892
aj 1.397 0.079 20.573
4 -0.530 0.058 -9.094
° i 0.219 0.047 4.694
4 0.014 0 .0 0 2 8.106
p 0.767 0 .101 7.543
Q 0.933 0.033 28.617
Panel C: State Space model
Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t-stat.
72 0.266 0.044 6.091
721 0.991 0 .0 0 2 438.82
ln(al) -2.503 0.104 -24.049
ln{al) -6.462 0.594 -10.884
Table 3.6: Estimation results for UK models
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Model 3.5%
Constant
AR(4) Regime
Switching
State
SpaceYear
1 0.96618 0.96618 0.96618 0.96618
2 0 0.50257 0.48208 0.51472 0.61857
40 0.25257 0.23676 0.26746 0.40678
60 0.12693 0.11778 0.13981 0.27722
80 0.06379 0.05912 0.07354 0.19368
1 0 0 0.03206 0.02997 0.0389 0.13775
150 0.00574 0.00569 0.00813 0.06172
2 0 0 0.00103 0.00115 0.00177 0.02882
250 0.00018 0.00027 0.00041 0.01379
300 0.00003 0.00008 0 .0001 0.00669
350 0 .00001 0.00003 0.00003 0.00328
400 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 2 0 .00001 0.00161
Table 3.7: Certainty Equivalent Discount Factors for the UK
Year/ Model AR(4) Regime
Switching
State
Space
1 3.50 3.50 3.50
2 0 3.68 3.35 2 .22
40 3.58 3.31 2 .0 2
60 3.52 3.28 1.87
80 3.48 3.25 1.76
1 0 0 3.43 3.22 1 .68
150 3.33 3.14 1.57
2 0 0 3.13 3.05 1.51
250 2.77 2.93 1.47
300 2.17 2.75 1.45
350 1.12 2.45 1.43
400 0.39 2.14 1.44
Table 3.8: Certainty Equivalent Discount Rates for the UK
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Model AR(4) Regime
Switching
State
SpaceCriterion
AMSFE 2.330 1.486 0.195
AMSFE (B) 0.875 0.527 0.135
AMSFE (P) 0.562 0.332 0.132
AMSFE (QS) 0.659 0.407 0.071
AMSFE (TH) 0.818 0.480 0.137
Table 3.9: Average MSFEs for the UK
Mean Square Forecast Error (MSFE) as our selection criterion and again we calculate four 
modified MSFE criteria by incorporating four kernels21. The results are presented in Table 3.9. 
Interestingly, the various specifications of the MSFE criterion unanimously rank the SS model 
first followed by the RS model and then the AR(4) model. In sum, if we select the models on 
the basis of their ability to characterize the past and their accuracy concerning forecasts of the 
future we are inclined to prefer the SS model. Our second best choice would be the RS model22.
3.6 P olicy Im plications o f M odel Selection: U K
In this Section we highlight the policy implications of DDRs and model selection by looking at 
the long-term policy arena. Firstly we follow N&;P and consider the present value of carbon 
sequestration: the removal of 1 ton of carbon from the atmosphere. Secondly, we look at 
nuclear build in the UK. The two are directly related since nuclear power can benefit from 
carbon credits under a system of joint implementation and carbon trading (see Pearce et al. 
2003).
3.6.1 The value of carbon mitigation
Table 3.10 shows the present value per ton of carbon emissions for the UK with respect to the 
models described in Section 3.2.2. It is established that the present value of the removal of 1 
ton of carbon from the atmosphere, and hence the present value of the benefits of the avoidance
21 The Bartlett, the Parzen, the Quadratic-Spectral (QS) and the Tukey-Hanning (TK) kernels are the weighting
functions used in our evaluation.
22The weighting functions are as follows: Bartlett(B), Parzen(P), Quadratic-Spectral (QS) and Tukey-Hanning
(TH).
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Carbon Values Relative to
Model (£/tc) Constant Rate
Constant (3.5%) 5.35 —
AR(4) 5.78 7.9%
Regime Switching 6 .21 16.1%
State Space 16.73 2 1 2 .6 %
Table 3.10: Value of Carbon Damages: UK models
of climate change damages, differs widely for each of our models23. The results suggest that the 
lower valuation is given by the conventional 3.5% discounting, followed by the AR(4) model. 
Interestingly, when employing the SS model, the present value of carbon emissions reduction is 
over 2 0 0 % larger compared to the case of constant discounting.
3.6.2 The appraisal of investments in nuclear power
New nuclear build in the UK is still being considered as an option to ensure security of energy 
supply and adherence to Kyoto targets, and the Performance and Innovation Unit (Perfor­
mance and Innovation Unit, 2 0 0 2 ) recommended that the nuclear option should be kept open. 
Decommissioning represents a long-term implication of such investments, however the present- 
value of decommissioning costs is insignificant using conventional discounting. These costs are 
naturally sensitive to the use of declining discount rates. Following the same cost and price 
assumptions, and time horizons for construction, operation and decommissioning as in chapter 
1 Section 1.8.3, we compare the NPV of investment in a nuclear power station using the DDRs 
associated with the state space and regime switching models. Furthermore, following Pearce 
et al (2003), we investigate the impact of carbon credits given to the nuclear industry based 
upon the social cost of carbon reflecting the lower intensity of carbon production possible com­
pared to conventional energy. As we have seen above, the use of declining discount rates can 
improve the relative economics of nuclear generation by raising the social cost of carbon. The 
implications of these two countervailing effects, and the comparison to conventional constant 
discounting is presented in Table 3.11.
This casestudy highlights a sense in which DDRs are limited in accounting for intergenera-
tional equity. Table 3.11 compares the NPV of investment in a nuclear power station using our
23The same schedule of carbon damages is used here as for the US case.
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(£/KW) CAPEX OPEX DECOM Rev/es C C NPV Relative to 3.5%
3.5% 2173 2336 427 4062 228 -646 —
AR(4) 2167 2245 396 3904 215 -689 -6 .6 %
RS 2178 2401 479 4176 249 -633 8 .0%
SS 2196 2973 1126 5170 547 -577 8.9%
Table 3.11: The Costs and Benefits of Nuclear Build in the UK
estimated DDRs. The appraisal shows that although the SS model has significant consequences 
for the present value of revenues and carbon credits, the present value of decommissioning and 
operating costs is also increased considerably. In this respect, the NPV of nuclear build is 
affected only marginally when evaluated using DDRs, and remains negative, although the SS 
and the RS models increase the NPV of the project by more than 8 %.
So, there is a tension between benefits and costs that accrue in the far distant future and 
the use of DDRs raises both of these simultaneously: both carbon credits and decommission­
ing costs increase since to a large extent they accrue simultaneously. When appraising projects 
which have time profiles of costs and benefits of this nature, emphasis is perhaps better directed 
towards a more comprehensive understanding the trade-offs faced intra-temporally, by particu­
lar future generations, rather than the inter-temporal trade-off made by the current generation 
that DDRs address directly.24
3.7 Conclusions
In response to the need to appraise projects over ever longer time horizons a number of theo­
retical discussions have arisen concerning the appropriacy of discount rates that fall with the 
time horizon considered. Such Declining Discount Rates (DDRs) would add greater weight to 
the costs and benefits that accrue to future generations and thereby at least partially address 
the issue of inter-generational equity that so often besets the long term policy arena.
Weitzman’s (Weitzman 1998) theoretical justification for DDRs depends upon uncertainty 
of the discount rate and therefore the operationalisation of this theory is highly dependent upon 
the manner in which one interprets and characterizes uncertainty. Weitzman (2001) suggested 
that it was the lack of consensus current about the correct discount rate to employ in the fax
2 4 For more on this issue see Horowitz (2002)
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distant future that was the source of uncertainty and his estimated gamma distribution provided 
the means of operationalising this theory and determining the declining Certainty Equivalent 
Rate (CER). Newell and Pizer (2003) (N&P) took an alternative view, suggesting that the 
future is the source of uncertainty and this interpretation lead naturally to an econometric 
forecasting approach to the measurement of uncertainty and the determination of the CER.
This paper builds on N&Ps approach in determining DDRs and it makes the following 
points concerning the model selection and the use of DDRs in general. Firstly, N&;Ps approach 
is predicated upon the assumption that the past is informative about the future and therefore 
characterizing uncertainty in the past can assist us in forecasting the future and determining the 
path of CERs. We have argued that if one subscribes to this view it is important to characterize 
the past as well as possible by correctly specifying the model of the time series process. This 
is particularly so when dealing with lengthy time horizons where the accuracy of forecasts 
is important. Indeed the selection of the econometric model is of considerable moment in 
operationalising a theory of DDRs that depends upon uncertainty, because econometric models 
contain different assumptions concerning the probability distribution of the object of interest 
and hence their characterisiation of the underlying economy. We have shown for US and UK 
interest rate data that the econometric specification should allow the data generating process 
to change over time, and that State Space and Regime Switching models are likely to be 
appropriate. Secondly, selection between well specified models can and should be undertaken 
by reference to measures of efficiency such as coefficients of variation, confidence bounds and 
out-of-sample forecast MSEs.
Our estimations, simulations and case studies bear out this assertion. The path of the CER 
differs considerably from one model to another and therefore each places a different weight 
upon the future. The policy implications of these estimates is revealed in the estimation of 
the value of carbon emissions reduction, with values which are up to 2 0 0 % higher than when 
using constant discount rates in the UK, and up to 40% higher than the Random Walk model 
employed by N&P in the US.
The assessment of UK nuclear power reveals the limitations of DDRs in accounting for inter- 
generational equity. The fact that decommissioning costs and the benefits of carbon emissions 
reductions (for which we assume nuclear power receives credits) both accrue in the distant future 
means that the use of DDRs does not change the policy prescription: both values are increased 
by DDRs and the net present value remains negative. This example highlights the importance
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of the question of valuing static/intra generational as well as intertemporal/intergenerational 
costs and benefits.
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3.9 Appendices: U nit R oot Tests and Sim ulation M ethod
3.9.1 Appendix 1: Unit root tests
The following 2 Tables show the result of the various unit root tests undertaken for the UK 
and the US data25,26,27
Test Lags /Bandwidth t-stat. 5% critical value Decision
ADF 13 -2.314 -2.877 non-stationary
Phillips-Perron 12 -2.016 -2.876 non-stationary
DF-GLS 13 -0.473 -1.942 stationary
ERS Point-Optimal 12 19.733 3.170 non-stationary
Ng-Perron 12 -0.824 -8 .1 0 0 non-stationary
KPSS 15 1.158 0.463 non-stationary
Table 3.12: Unit Root Tests for US Interest Rates
TEST Lags /Bandwidth t-Stat. 5% crit. value Decision
ADF 3 -3.189 -2.876 stationary
Phillips-Perron 2 0 -4.070 -2.876 stationary
DF-GLS 3 -3.186 -1.942 stationary
ERS Point-Optimal 2 0 0.965 3.164 stationary
Ng-Perron 2 0 -27.945 -8 .1 0 0 stationary
KPSS 13 0.0421 0.463 stationary
Table 3.13: Unit Root Tests for UK interest rates
3.9.2 Appendix 2: Simulations
A R(p) Model: Regarding our first model (AR(p) model), we use the normal distribution to 
draw random values for the coefficients of (3.3) taking into account the estimated variance- 
25SIC is employed to determine the lag-length of the series. The kernel sum-of-covariances estimator with
Parzen weights is used, while the bandwidth is determined based on the Newey-West bandwidth selection method. 
26We use SIC to determine the number of lags of the dependent variable in the test specification.
2 7 The kernel sum-of covariances estimator with Parzen weights is used. The bandwidth is selected by using
the Newey-West bandwidth selection method.
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covariance matrix of the coefficients. Another draw from a normal distribution is employed for 
the estimated variance.
A R(p)- GARCH (l,m): The simulation methodology is similax to the AR(p) model, 
except from the fact that the multivariate normal distribution is used to generate random 
draws for the coefficient values of the GARCH model.
Regime Switching: The RS model offers the most computationally intensive simulation 
and is conducted as follows. First, we generate random values for the probabilities P  and Q 
from a Beta(k,j) distribution. The values of the parameters k and j  of the Beta distribution axe 
properly chosen in order to correspond to a Beta distribution with mean and standard deviation 
equal to the ones estimated. Specifically, for the US case the parameters k and j  are equal to 
28.8 and 4.42 for P, respectively. The corresponding values for Q axe 55.17 and 5, respectively. 
Using the values of P  and Q, we calculate the probability of being in each regime for each of 
the future 400 years, namely Pt and Qt. A univariate normal distribution is used to get random 
draws for o\ and o\ separately according to the estimates presented in Tables C.l and C.2 for 
the US and UK case respectively. Similarly to our previous simulations, the random values 
for the coefficient estimates, m, n2 , a} a\ aj and a\ are drawn from a multivariate normal 
distribution. Then, we simulate the future interest rate path 100.000 times on the grounds of 
the probabilities Pt and Qt and the random draws of the coefficients.
S ta te  Space: The simulation design for the SS model is straightforward as we randomly 
draw the coefficient values from univariate normal distributions according to the estimated 
values.
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Biodiversity and Deforestation: The 
Impacts of International Agreements 
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Chapter 4
North-South bargaining in joint 
production: The biodiversity 
bargaining problem
Abstract1
The need for a global cooperative solution to the problem of biodiversity conser­
vation has long been understood. International institutions, in particular those of 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the Biodiversity Conven­
tion (CBD), have since been created with a view to allowing the potential gains from 
the production and international exchange of biotechnological inputs and outputs to 
be realized. Contrary to the intended effects, the rate of degradation of biodiverse 
habitats in the South has -  by most estimates -  not decreased. Explanations for this 
observation range from government failure to speculation and corruption. This pa­
per pursues a different angle. Employing the tool of cooperative bargaining theory, 
it examines whether it is perhaps the very institutions designed to stimulate conser­
vation that actually create incentives for biodiverse lands to be degraded. Building 
on Nash’s idea of ‘rational threats’, we demonstrate that rather than removing the 
strategic incentives in the game of surplus division, current arrangements may in 
fact generate such incentives. This leads to two prescriptive results with a view to 
reconsidering the current institutional regime.
lrrhis chapter is joint work with Timo Goschl of the University of Heidelberg, Rupert Gatti of the University 
of Cambridge and Tim Swanson at University College London.
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4.1 Background
The issue of north-south (developed-developing countries) interaction and interdependence has 
received attention from a number of strands of the economic literature. The contributions from 
the trade, environmental economics and growth literature have generally focused the extent to 
which differences in endowments, institutions and other features of the economy that reflect the 
different stages of development, generate particular impacts on regional income distribution, 
natural resources and ultimately welfare and development. Interdependence with regard to 
trade, Research and Development (R&D) and willingness to pay for natural resources, for 
example, have been analysed in the context of institutions such as trade agreements, intellectual 
property rights (IPR) and international environmental agreements (IEA). Furthermore, due to 
the relative richness of biodiversity in the tropical and sub-tropical south, coupled with the 
relative richness of human capital in the north, much attention has been paid to north-south 
interdependence in the biotech sector, the value of biodiversity in biotechnological R&D and 
associated institutions: IPRs, genetic resource rights, property rights for traditional knowledge 
and farmers rights. Many of these contributions have highlighted the potential for fruitful north- 
south cooperation to collapse into conflict due to local, regional or global externalities arising 
from the presence of public and/or informational goods, or disagreement over the distribution 
of gains. It is the role of international institutions in facilitating north-south cooperation that 
is the subject of this Chapter and by way of background, and in order to place this contribution 
in the literature, this section provides a brief summary of the most important and relevant 
contributions.
4.1.1 North-south cooperation and conflict
4.1.1.1 IPRs and trade
A seminal contribution by Krugman (1979) looks at trade and endogenous growth and contrasts 
the north and the south in terms of their ability to grow through innovation. The north is 
characterised as endowed with the capacity to innovate while the south is able only to imitate. 
From a global perspective both innovation and imitation are beneficial in this model, the latter 
facilitating technology transfer. However, once these capacities axe separated into autonomous 
regions the potential for conflict arises because incentives are no longer aligned: the south 
could improve its own welfare if it were able to increase the rate of technology transfer, perhaps
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through lax enforcement of IPRs, and the north could counter the loss of intellectual property 
with pre-emptive protectionist properties. That is, north-south conflict can ensue. Indeed, lax 
enforcement is a common theoretical finding of subsequent literature (Deardorff 1992, Helpman 
1993, Lai and Qiu 2003). Similar punishment strategies have been noted in this context by 
Taylor (1993)2. Indeed, many models of strategic trade and endogenous growth have looked at 
the impact of IPRs and concerned themselves with modelling the extent and welfare impact of 
technology transfers (commonly from the north to the south) involving heterogeneous trading 
partners and IPRs as strategic trade instruments (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Chin and 
Grossman 1990)3 The possibility of a negative overall welfare effect of enforceable global patent 
protection is demonstrated by Deardorff (1992), who shows that the welfare losses incurred 
by the south outweigh the gains made by the north. These findings are partially refuted 
in 2igi6 (1998) who takes the intensity of deliberate technological spillovers as an indicator 
of the strength of IPR protection, and shows that mutual benefits may result from strong 
IPR protection. Furthermore, in a game with asymmetric information regarding the imitation 
capabilities of the south, Vishwasrao (1994) shows that rather than exporting its technology 
and incurring the risk of unintentional technological transfer, the innovating north may choose 
the costlier option of licensing a subsidiary in the foreign country, resulting in zero technology 
transfer. In a subsequent paper he finds that the form of licensing contract and distribution of 
gains from licensing affects the incentives of the south to protect patents (Vishwasrao 1997).
Above all however, one thing is clear in each of these settings: there are social benefits to 
be made provided the north and south can cooperate in joint production, use the resources 
that distinguish the regions to best effect and find an acceptable division of the gains. Lai and 
Qiu (2003) formalise this point in this context and conclude that both regions can gain from 
a cooperative agreement on the harmonisation of IPR regimes and liberalisation of northern 
goods markets.
2In Taylor’s (1993) duopoly model with no entry, the Southern firm benefits from less stringent domestic 
protection of international patent rights if the imitation of the Northern technology is possible. While this 
unintentional technology transfer increases global competition and the productivity of resources employed in the
South, the North is shown to react with defensive policies, leading to an overall pareto inferior outcome.
3 Chin and Grossman (1991) show that the degree to which the North is able to capture the rents from its
technological innovations within a north-south trading framework is determined by the extent to which the south 
implements the IPR regime.
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4.1.1.2 Environment and trade
Of course, another way in which the south differs from the north is with regard to its en­
dowments, particularly environmental resources. The presence of environmental rather than 
informational externalities is also a potential source of conflict between north and south. To 
a great extent global environmental problems such as climate change and biological diversity 
loss are rooted in such conflict. A common characterisation in this context is of a ‘natural 
resource rich’ south (biodiversity, e.g. plant genetic diversity, carbon store e.g. rainforest) and 
a ‘environmental value rich’ north. In the absence of a mechanism to transfer these values 
the south will enact policies or strategies that enhance private welfare and yet generate global 
externalities. For example, Chichilnisky (1994) shows that once again property rights can be 
the source of such conflict. In this case lax enforcement of resource rights in the south can 
motivate trade with the north and improve southern welfare and yet increase degradation. In­
deed, the impact of trade upon environmental resources such as forests and fisheries has been 
the subject a number of important papers each of which has focussed on separate facets of this 
interaction. Brander and Taylor (1998) provide a recent reference point and show that trade 
liberalisation can adversely affect open access harvesting of natural resources in resource rich 
countries compared to autarky. More recently Smulders et al (2004) refine the characterisation 
of natural resources making them habitat dependent. Cast in this light, they show that Brander 
and Taylor’s results depend critically on the dynamics of habitat such that tariffs, rather than 
liberalisation, could affect both welfare and environment adversely. In a similar vein, Polasky 
et al (2004) analyses the impact of north-south trade on land uses and biodiversity. In this 
case north-south heterogeneity is a key determinant of the effect of liberalisation. Where suffi­
cient heterogeneity exists biodiversity may increase, but once more, this is dependent upon the 
nature of the environmental resources, in this case the degree of endemism.
4.1.1.3 Biodiversity, IPRs and strategic trade
With rising concern about the continued decline in biodiversity, the focus of recent research 
has been on the question of whether and how the economic value of biodiversity can contribute 
towards its conservation (Barbier et al, 1994, Goeschl and Swanson 2002). These questions 
are usually put within the context of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, since 
the availability of genetic resources from areas of high biological diversity are crucial to the
145
success of the industries’ R&D efforts. Since the destruction of undisturbed natural habitats 
and the expansion of commercial land uses are taken to be the driving force behind the loss 
of biodiversity (Heywood, 1995) the modelling of the interaction between the biotechnology 
industry and biodiversity commonly centres around the factors determining land use decisions 
(Goeschl and Swanson 1998, 2001, 2002; Deke 2001, Weitzman 2000, Simpson et al., 1996). 
In addition, the fact that the biotechnology industry is predominantly based in industrialised 
countries in the north, coupled with the fact that biodiversity hotspots are predominantly found 
in less developed countries south of the equator, means that the analysis is naturally cast in a 
north-south model.
In 1995 these issues were partially recognized in Article 27(3)b of the Trade-Related Intel­
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the GATT, which allows for patent protection 
for all life forms, including biological and genetic resources. As a result of this there as been 
much interest in the extent to which such a legal framework provides an adequate share of 
the rents from innovations to the south to ensure the provision of genetic diversity. Again 
the study of IPR regimes within the context of north-south trade in biological and genetic re­
sources has focussed in part on strategic trade models. Ulph and Ulph (1996) study the effects 
of environmental policy on the competitive trade outcome in a world with imperfect markets. 
Furthermore, Droege and Soete (2001) use a three-stage game to study the effect of two IPR 
regimes: international patents and farmers rights, on the competitive trade positions and bi­
ological and cultural diversity protection. They find that welfare in the south is maximised if 
farmers’ rights are implemented and IPRs are rejected. The highest pay-off for the North arises 
if both IPR regimes are implemented, as the South’s cost advantage is partially captured by 
the North. The implementation of farmers’ rights leads to the highest degree of biodiversity 
conservation, whereas international patent rights as the sole legal mechanism results in total 
biodiversity loss (Droege and Soete, 2001). The issue of how to specify property rights to 
genetic resources contained in traditional landraces remains in interesting area of research.
4.1.1.4 The value of biodiversity
The valuation of biodiversity is also an important related issue that has been the focus of an­
other significant body of research. The value of biodiversity to private R&D firms has been 
modelled as a process of sequential search by individual firms in pursuit of commercial profits. 
In this framework the value of genetic resources reduces to the probability of winning the in­
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novation race, multiplied by the patent-based profits the firm might expect to receive by virtue 
of such a discovery (Craft and Simpson, 2001, Simpson and Sedjo 1996, Simpson et al. 1996; 
Rausser and Small 2000). The potential undervaluation of biodiversity in the market is a com­
monly found result (Brown and Swierzbinski, 1989; Barbier and Aylward, 1996). Contrasting 
the private valuation of biodiversity with that of a social planner in the context of an ongoing 
race against pest resistance and pathogen adaptation, Goeschl and Swanson (2 0 0 2 ) find that 
the patent regime is an inadequate measure to correct market failure in the valuation of biodi­
versity for R&D. This study uses the framework of creative destruction to represent the in-built 
incentive for continuing innovations that render previous innovations obsolete with the passage 
of time (Swanson and Goeschl, 1998, 2001; Aghion and Howitt 1992, Schumpeter 1942). In the 
case of Swanson and Goeschl (2 0 0 2 ), innovations become obsolete not only as a result of new 
innovations but also as a result of an ongoing problem of pathogen adaptation, e.g. resistance 
to pharmaceuticals.
4.1.1.5 International agreements
There is a broad literature with regard to the role of International Environmental Agreements 
in overcoming regional and global conflicts and reaching cooperative outcomes, the economic 
principles of which are discussed at length in Barrett (2002). Key to understanding the de­
terminants of the success of international agreements is the understanding of the incentives 
that regional or global environmental problems present to countries, whilst understanding the 
potential for strategy by each potential signatory and how this potential is affected by the 
features and rules of the agreement. The literature has asked the following questions in this 
regard: when are agreements self enforcing? (Barrett 1994), what is the best means of changing 
incentives? (Levy 1993), what should be the minimum participation level? (e.g. Carraro and 
Sinisalco 1993, Schelling 1978), To what extent are plausible treaties 2nd best? (Barrett 2002) 
and when should treaties and agreements be ‘broad and shallow’ rather than ‘narrow but deep’ 
(Barrett 2002a). These remain valid questions to ask in evaluating the success or otherwise of 
current international agreements.
The analysis undertaken in this Chapter draws from many areas of the literature described 
above with the objective of defining the fundamental underlying nature of north-south con­
flict. We couch our analysis in the biotechnology sector and develop a land use model which
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captures the stylized differences between the north and south with regard to endowments of 
technology and environmental resources. Cooperation generates the greatest global surplus 
and international agreements have arisen to encourage this. In particular, we focus on two such 
agreements: the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) of 1992 and the Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights agreement (TRIPS) of the GATT/WTO. The former emphasises financial and 
technological transfer as a means of internalising global externalities regarding national land 
use decisions (See Articles 16, 20 and 21 of the CBD), while emphasising the specific responsi­
bility of the North for ensuring these transfers. The latter focusses on the role of international 
property rights harmonisation as a means of capturing and distributing global values. In this 
Chapter we scrutinise the ability of these agreements to solve the underlying bargaining game 
of surplus division and assess some of the strategic incentives that each solution may invoke.
4.2 Introduction
The need for global cooperation for the conservation of biological diversity has long been un­
derstood (Barrett 1994, Swanson 1996). In stylized terms, developed countries of the North 
attribute significant values to biodiversity that exists predominantly in tropical and sub-tropical 
areas of the developing South. The global nature of the benefits from biodiversity makes it clear 
that the North and the South must engage one another in order to ensure that external costs 
are considered in arriving at the land-use decisions that ultimately determine the amount of 
biodiversity conserved. This requires that both regions determine not only the appropriate 
allocation of their individual physical resources, but also that they come to an agreement on a 
reasonable division of the global surplus that results from their respective allocation decisions.
The need for cooperation is particularly palpable in the biotechnology sector. Research and 
development (R&D) in the pharmaceutical and plant breeding industries in the North generate 
innovations from which both regions stand to gain. However, it is countries in the South that are 
endowed with the biological diversity required as inputs into biotechnological R&D. Exchange 
of biodiversity inputs and biotechnological outputs between North and South therefore offers 
scope for considerable welfare improvements and each region must cooperate in combining their 
jointly valuable endowments in order to realize these gains.
What complicates this mutual interdependence between North and South is that due to the 
informational nature of the goods exchanged, market prices, and therefore simply trade, cannot
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be relied upon to sufficiently coordinate the activities of the parties involved. A different set of 
institutions than market-based exchange is required to allow the potential gains from coopera­
tion to be realized. In response to this challenge and the ongoing loss of biodiversity over the 
last decades (Leaky and Lewin 1995), countries agreed in early 1990s to create international in­
stitutions in order to capture the externalities inherent in biodiversity inputs and R&D outputs 
and thus to incentivize their production and international exchange. The Convention on Bio­
logical Diversity (CBD) in 1992 and the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement in the context of the World Trade Organization in 1994, both of which make explicit 
reference to biological and genetic diversity, represent the international institutions intended 
to facilitate cooperation and distribute the global surplus in the biotechnology sector4. The 
expected result of their creation is increased investment into biotechnological R&D in the North 
as a result of rents earned on intellectual property; and increased transfers going into conser­
vation in the South as a result of payments under the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the 
financial vehicle created by the CBD. With the successful creation of these two institutions and 
implementation of their operation, the difficulty of cooperation appears to be solved.
One problem with the institutions thus designed is that by most estimates, the rate of 
degradation of biodiverse habitats in the South does not seem to have been affected by their 
introduction. Various explanations axe possible. Much of the literature discusses why despite 
these new institutions, conservation efforts are lacking. The reasons fall under various headings. 
One is government failure, such as perverse subsidies (Maxgulis 2004), dysfunctional property 
rights (Southgate 2000), lack of complementary farmers’ rights (Soete and Droege 2001), or 
insufficient pass-through of transfers from governments to local decision-makers in developing 
countries (Day-Rubinstein and Frisvold 2001). A second broad heading is land speculation in 
developing countries (Maxgulis 2004) and a third simply corruption (Smith et al. 2003). A less 
sophisticated explanation may be that ten years are not enough time for these institutions to 
truly impact on a process as complex as local land-use decisions.
The contribution of this paper is to ask a more fundamental question, namely whether it is 
perhaps the very institutions designed to stimulate conservation that actually create incentives 
for biodiverse lands to be degraded. The focal point of our analysis is therefore the precise
4 In Section 27(b) of the TRIPS agreement explicit reference is made to intellectual property rights being 
extended to lifeforms and genetic material, while developing countries are encouraged to develop sui generis 
property rights systems for traditional knowlege and indigenous flora and fauna.
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nature of the institutional response to the coordination problem inherent in global biodiversity 
management. In other words, our aim is to understand more about the specific solution to the 
biodiversity bargaining problem between North and South that gives this paper its title. To 
do this, we apply the tool of cooperative bargaining theory to derive propositions regarding 
two important aspects: The first is the determination of the bargaining frontier, from which 
a measure of efficiency of the institutions chosen can be derived. The second aspect is the set 
of feasible and individually rational strategies of the bargaining parties. A particular focus of 
this inquiry is whether -  in a manner similar to the idea of ‘rational threats’ posited by Nash 
(1953) -  the degradation of biodiversity is a bargaining option for the South.
We have five main results. The first is that the current institutional arrangements are 
an ‘extreme point contract’ that leaves the South indifferent between cooperation and non­
cooperation. From this follows our second result, namely that the current institutional arrange­
ments are not robust against the use of ‘rational threats’ by the South. In other words, continued 
degradation of biodiversity may very well be in the interest of the South even in the presence 
of conservation rewards paid through the GEF. Thirdly, even though the institutional arrange­
ments are globally and individually welfare-improving, they are generally second best. In sum, 
we demonstrate that rather than removing the strategic incentives in the game of surplus divi­
sion, current arrangements may induce such incentives. This leads to two prescriptive results 
with a view to reconsidering the current institutional regime: The first is that any institutional 
solution intended to avoid degradation of biodiversity requires payment for the stock of existing 
conservation as well as for any marginal increments. This is in marked contrast with the cur­
rent policy of the GEF which enshrines an incremental cost approach. The second is that if the 
policy choice is -  for some reason - between choosing to protect R&D outputs or R&D inputs, 
the South may prefer a regime that protects intellectual property rights (such as TRIPS) to an 
‘extreme point’ contract of conservation rewards such as the GEF.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the following section, we introduce a stylized model of 
the biotechnology and land use in a North-South world and go on to describe the biodiver­
sity bargaining problem between a ‘technology-rich’ North and a ‘gene-rich’ South in Section 
4.4. The conditions for the existence of rational threats and thus ‘strategic destruction’ are 
established and illustrated with an example. Section 4.5 investigates the current institutional 
arrangements in the light of the preceding analysis with respect to their relative efficiency and 
bargaining strategies. Section 4.5.1 discusses the Convention on Biodiversity and Section 4.5.2
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discusses intellectual property rights. We show that current institutions appear to place bar­
gaining power initially in the North, and yet strategic destruction remains a viable strategy for 
the South. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.3 The M odel: B iotechnology and Land U se
Here we develop a model to explore the interdependency between technological change, the 
distribution of gains between North and South, and land use decision making. This inter­
dependence is placed in the context of agricultural biotechnology in which genetic resources, 
emanating from in situ biological diversity found in a ‘Reserve’ sector, is the major input into a 
plant breeding sector. In this sense we model biodiversity as an explicitly productive resource. 
The plant breeding sector undertakes research and development of new innovations in the form 
of high yielding varieties of seeds (HYVs). These HYVs are intermediate goods and can be used 
by domestic intensive agricultural sectors in the North, or purchased by the South, for final 
good production. In order to focus upon the essential elements of the North-South interaction 
in this context, and in line with previous models in this area (e.g. Krugman 1979, Helpman 
1993, Droege and Soete 2001), we make a stylised distinction between North and South. The 
model builds upon the stylised fact that biodiversity is predominant in the South; the South 
is ‘gene rich’, whilst R&D is predominant in the North; the North is ‘technology rich’. For 
the purposes of the model it is assumed that the R&D sector exists solely in the North whilst 
the biological diversity exists solely in the South. It is also assumed that these stylised facts 
are inalterable, i.e. biodiversity loss is irreversible and technological innovation cannot occur 
in the South. In addition, the intensive and Reserve sectors in the South are assumed to be in 
competition with a ‘traditional’ agricultural sector which does not use HYVs from the North 
and thus is not augmented by technological innovations. The precise nature of these land-uses, 
North-South interaction, and the benefits of joint production is described in detail below.
4.3.1 The North
The Northern land endowment (T/v) represents land that has been formerly cleared of biological 
diversity and is allocated between two potential land uses: a relatively unproductive baseline 
agricultural sector and an intensive agricultural sector. In addition, the plant breeding sector is 
located in the North. The baseline and intensive sectors produce final output, whilst the plant
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breeding sector engages in R&D and produces intermediate seeds.
Baseline production in the North produces final output but is not augmented by the inno­
vations process and thereby the presence of Reserves in the South. It therefore represents a 
base-line technology. Final output from the baseline sector is represented by the net output 
function:
ytN =bl (4.1)
where I is the land devoted to this sector and b is a net productivity parameter5. We take final 
output as the numeraire.
We represent the intensive and plant breeding sectors parsimoniously by assuming that 
they are vertically integrated. Thus the intensive sector in the North produces final output, 
ylN, using seeds, n. We assume a fixed 1 to 1 relationship between seed and land, hence land 
used in intensive production is equal to n. Innovations (HYVs) arrive with a probability which 
is positively affected by the stock of biodiversity, the Reserve sector, R, in the South. These 
innovations are embodied in the seeds and effectively cause a land augmenting productivity 
increase in the intensive sector. This innovation process is represented in a stylized fashion by 
the function, 7r(R), which pre-multiplies the intensive sector production function.Thus, final 
intensive output captures the interdependent/joint nature of production as it is a function of 
HYVs from the North and Reserves in the South. Intensive production is represented by the 
net output function6:
Vn  — tt(R)n , (?r (0) =  6,7r; (R ) > 0, it' (0) =  oo, ir" (R ) < 0) (4.2)
The land constraint is Ln  = n + l and total output is therefore represented by:
Vn  = 7r (R) n + b (Ln  -  n) (4.3)
R&D and seed production for the intensive sector is undertaken by the plant breeding sector
at a cost c (.), where c (0) =  0, d  (.) > 0, d' (.) > 0. In addition to domestic production of seed,
5This represents the output net of costs valued in terms of output. This represents a constant returns to scale
production technology. The coefficient b can be thought of as a being equal to a value (e — d ) , where e represents
the productivity of land devoted to this sector and d represents the costs. Thus, setting b =  0 is the same as
assuming a zero profit condition for the baseline sector.
6 Where d  (.) is the first derivative of the function and d '  (.) is the second derivative with respect to its
argument. This notation holds for the remainder of the paper and for other functions.
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the North can also supply seed to the South (s). From Equations (4.1) and (4.2) it is clear 
that when R = 0 both the baseline and the intensive sectors are equally productive. However, 
when R > 0 the functional forms ensure that the intensive sector is preferred to the baseline 
sector over some range, and I is the residual use of land. Lastly, the North can make a transfer 
payment, T  to the South which may be dependent upon the levels n and s and other variables. 
Given the land constraint the utility function for North represents all sectors and payments and 
is given by:
UN = (tt ( R ) - b ) n - c ( n  + s ) - T  + bLN (4.4)
4.3.2 The South
The South is endowed with land, Lg. However, this land endowment represents unconverted 
‘Reserve’ land which is rich in genetic diversity. Southern land can be maintained as Reserves 
with area R, or converted by either a traditional sector, t, or the intensive agricultural sector 
using seed imported from the North, s. The South benefits from the presence of Reserves, R , 
in precisely the same way as the North in that the productivity of the intensive agricultural 
sector is augmented by the arrival of new HYV’s from the R&D sector. The joint nature of 
final output from the intensive sector is represented by an analogous production function:
ys = 7r (R) s (4.5)
The cost of seed imports to the South is captured in the transfer T. The traditional sector 
is unaffected by technological innovation and hence its productivity is not augmented by the 
presence of Reserves. Traditional production incurs a cost k (t): k (0) =  0, k' (t) > 0, k" (t) > 0. 
Southern utility is given by:
Us = tt(R)s + 1 -  k{t) + T, (4.6)
which is maximised with respect to t, s and the Southern land constraint: Ls = R + t + s, 
where R  is the residual land allocation.
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4.4 T he B iodiversity Bargaining Problem : N orth-South  Con­
flict and C ooperation
The North and South are characterised as interdependent: the South provides essential genetic 
materials as inputs to the North for the R&D process, whilst the North develops HYVs which 
outperform the domestic baseline sector and the traditional sector in the South. Both parties 
stand to gain from this interaction provided that they can facilitate the exchange of resources 
and adequately share the cooperative gains. This simple model represents to a large extent 
the fundamental facets of the North-South relationship in this industry. In this section we 
characterise the conflict point of this negotiation and the extent of the cooperative gains.
4.4.1 The conflict point: Autarky (s = 0,T = 0)
We define the conflict point as the outcome under Autarky. This provides the benchmark 
against which the solutions are measured. Autarky is characterised by two features: i) the 
absence of seed sales from North to South: s = 0 ii) the absence of transfers (T) that allow the 
social planner to achieve the optimal. Consequently the South fails to internalise the value of 
Reserves (R ) and an externality exists. Under these circumstances the problems of the North 
and South are as follows:
TH E SOUTH: The South maximises utility with respect to t.
max Us ~ t — k(t) (4.7)
s.t. : Ls = t + R  and 0 < t < Ls (4.8)
If k' (0 ) < 1 < k' (Ls) , the South’s optimal use of land under Autarky, i°, will be an interior 
solution and satisfy the first order condition:
1 -  k'(ta) = 0 (4.9)
Let Ra = Ls — ta be the South’s Reserves under Autarky.
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TH E NORTH: The North takes the behaviour of the South as given and maximises 
utility over its choice of n and I. The North’s problem is as follows:
maxUn  = (tt(-R) — b)n — c(n) +  bLn  (4-10)
n
s.t. : 0 < n < Ln  (4-11)
If d (0 ) = 0 and d (Lpj) > ir (Ls), the North’s optimal land use, na, will be an interior solution 
satisfying the first order condition:
7T (Ra) — b — d (n°) =  0 (4.12)
This Autarky problem shows how the South causes a production externality on the North 
when choosing its land allocation in that it ignores the productive value of Reserves in the 
North. The greater the size of the traditional sector in the South (ta) the lower is the marginal 
productivity of the North’s intensive sector (n).
As either region always has the opportunity of production in isolation, the Autarky solutions 
will constitute the Conflict Point in any bargaining game conducted between the two, and the 
corresponding payoffs will be referred to as the ‘Conflict payoffs’ from hereon7. Furthermore, 
we will refer to the Autarky solution as being an ‘interior solution’ whenever Ra, ta, la, n° > 08. 
In summary the conflict point/Autarky solution is characterised by the land allocations and 
payoffs (ta, Ra,la,na) and (Ug,U^ ) respectively.
4.4.2 First best (Social Planner) allocation
The social planner problem involves the maximisation of global surplus with respect to the land 
allocations n, s and t. The problem can be stated as follows:
max U = Us +  Un  = 7r(R)(n + s) — bn + 1 — c(n +  s) — k(t) +  bLpj (4-13)
n,s,t,D
s.t. R  = Ls — s — t and I = Lpj — n
7Welfare in the Sorth under autarky, Us,  is defined as C/J =  ta — k (ta) , and welfare in the North is defined
by Ufr =  (tt (Ra) - b ) n a - c  (na) +  bLN.
8 Sufficient conditions for the existence of an interior solution to the Autarky problem are that k' (0) <  1 <
k' ( L s ) , d  (0) =  0 and c' (L n ) >  ^ (Ls)  — b.
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and s ,n ,t ,l ,R  > 0 
Whenever R* > 0,the first order necessary conditions yield9:
s* > 0 : 7T (R) -  t t '  (R) (s* + n) -  c'(n +  s*) < 0 (4.14)
n* > 0 : 7T (R) -  b -  c'(n* + s) < 0 (4.15)
t* > 0 : 1 -  t t '  {R) (n + s) -  k' ( f )  < 0 (4.16)
where I* = Ln  — n* > 0 .
A complete characterisation of the solution is unnecessary for our purposes, however Lemma 
1 provides an analysis of the comparative statics of the optimal and Autarky solutions.
LEMMA 1: If the Autarky solution is interior, and the social planner wishes to keep Reserves 
(R* > 0) then:
a) intensive agricultural production will always be positive: (n* + s*) > 0 ;
b) optimal traditional production in the South will be less than under Autarky: t*  < t°;
c) whenever there is intensive production in the North: n* > 0, then the Reserve sector 
increases with global intensive agriculture. In short: R* > (<)Ra <==> n* + s* > (<) n°;
d) if b '= 0 , i.e. profits are equal to zero in the baseline sector, then s* > 0  only when
n* = Lj\f.
PROOF: a) From Equation (4.16) if (n* + s*) = 0 then t*  = t a and so R* = Ra. Comparing 
Equations (4.12) and (4.15) when R* — Ra, we have that (n* +  s*) = na > 0, which is a 
contradiction.
b) If t* = 0 then t* < ta by assumption. If t* > 0 then 1 — k' (t*) > 7r'(R*)(n* +  s*) > 0 = 
1 — kf (ta) , thus t* < ta as k" (.) > 0 .
c) Comparing Equations (4.12) and (4.15), ifn* > 0, then n*+s* > (<)n° 4=^ R* > (<)Ra.
d) Given 6 =  0, comparing Equations (4.14) and (4.15); n* < Ljy =>■ s* = 0.
Lemma 1(b) shows that the optimal traditional sector in the South is smaller than under
Autarky, however 1 (c) shows that since the social value of reserves is derived from their value as
9In this case gf =  ^7 =  —1-
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an input to R&D for intensive agricultural production, the overall level of Reserves will rise and 
fall with the size of the global intensive sector. How the socially optimal allocation compares 
with the Autarky state will depend upon the parameters of the model, particularly the relative 
productivity of the baseline sector in the North and the traditional sector in the South. A 
low value for 6 increases the likelihood that the socially optimal level of Reserves is higher 
than under Autarky. Lemma 1(d) shows that in the extreme case where the profits from the 
baseline sector are equal to zero (b = 0) the ambiguity is resolved and R* > R° whenever the 
North’s baseline sector remains active. In sum, the social planner is reluctant to have intensive 
agriculture in the South due to the loss of socially valuable Reserves this land conversion would 
entail, and where 6 = 0 the social planner would choose specialised regional functions: intensive 
production in the North and Reserves in the South.
Defining the optimal welfare under the social planner by:
U* = U*N + U*S (4.17)
allows us to define the extent of the social gains from cooperations, Uc , as the difference between 
the welfare under the social planner and that under Autarky:
u c = l T -  (Ufi +  E/f) (4.18)
Clearly, as the social planner is always able to select the Autarky outcome, Uc  > 0. Prom 
Lemma 1, when the Autarky solution is interior t* < ta and it follows that the inequality is 
strict - so there exist strictly positive gains from cooperation.
Figure 4.1 shows the Autarky and optimal outcomes. U* is the socially optimal welfare 
frontier and represents different distributions of the surplus. Although the Social Planner is not 
concerned with the regional distribution of cooperative gains from biodiversity preservation, a 
system of lump sum transfers can facilitate any desired distribution. This can also be interpreted 
as the bargaining frontier of a fully cooperative outcome.
Each one of the points along U* can be sustained as the Nash Equilibrium of a cooperative
bargaining game10. However, as is well known, choosing among these Nash equilibria, i.e. the
solution to bargaining problem, will depend upon the specifics of the bargaining process: the
nature of the interaction between the two agents, the institutions that determine or officiate this
10See e.g. Example 1 below.
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Figure 4.1: The Bargaining Frontier and Conflict Point
interaction, and the assumptions that one is willing to make concerning the behaviour of the 
agents. For the Biodiversity Bargaining Problem we have defined it is not easy to see how one 
might specify the structure of the bargaining game and therefore in moving towards a solution 
it is useful and informative to consider the theoretical bargaining solutions and the institutions 
that have actually arisen to address these issues. The following section addresses the former.
4.4.3 Bargaining solutions
4.4.3.1 Extreme point contracts
The bargaining problem can be resolved by the specification of a contract between the North 
and the South. Given that in the model specified there is no uncertainty or asymmetry in infor­
mation between agents, an optimal contract can always be constructed to achieve any allocation 
of the gains from coordination between North and South. The contract actually implemented 
will depend upon the relative bargaining power of the two regions, that is, the biodiversity 
bargaining problem needs to be resolved before any optimal contract can be implemented.
Extreme point contracts specify outcomes at the end points of the bargaining frontier U*. 
Such contracts are only acceptable when one or other party has absolutely no bargaining power. 
These types of contract are of particular interest in the present case since one of them is directly
158
relevant to the financial mechanism of the Convention on Biological Diversity. This relation is 
described in the following section. This leads to Proposition 1:
PROPOSITION 1: a) The optimal contract for the South when the North has no bargaining 
power is for the South to specify n* and s* and to offer North the transfer:
- T  = Ts(n , s) =  fyCR*) -  b] ( - n) + c(n + s) +  [Ufa -  6Lat] 
where R* = Ls — s* — t*.
b) Inversely, the optimal contract for North when the South has no bargaining power is for 
the North to offer South s* seed and the transfer:
r ta
T  = TN(t) = j  [1 -  k' (a:)] dx -  ir(Ls -  s* -  t)s*
PROOF: a) and b): See Appendix 1.
Proposition 1 states that if the North has no bargaining power the optimal contract offered 
by the South will specify (Us, Ufj) in terms of Figure 4.1, while inversely if the South has no 
bargaining power optimal contract offered by the North will specify (Ug, UN)n . Each contract is 
optimal in the sense that it allows the agents to attain the bargaining frontier, but each merely 
compensates the party to whom the contract is offered for the marginal costs of changing their 
behaviour, leaving their welfare at Autarky levels. It is in this sense that the contracts can 
be thought of as ‘extreme point’ contracts, since in each case welfare for the region offered the 
contract is bounded only by their participation constraint {Uf : i =  N ,S ) , i.e. the same as at 
the conflict point, and therefore they are indifferent between accepting or rejecting the offer. 
These specific contracts define the limits of the bargain.
4.4.3.2 Strategic destruction
One feature of many alternative bargaining solutions, including Nash Bargaining, is that the
value received by one player (U*) is not only increasing in the value of any outside option
available ([/“) but also increasing in the maximum value of cooperation for the other player:
the ‘bargaining pie’, U* — U“. Actions by one player which increase the value of cooperation
11 To see an example of this for the Nash Bargaining outcome see Example 1 and evaluate (4.19), below, and 
the welfare outcomes for a  =  1 and a  =  0. These represent the cases when all the bargaining power resides in 
the North and South respectively.
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for the other player, without reducing the value of their own outside option, can be used as 
‘threats’ to extract higher payoffs in a bargaining process (Nash 1953). Indeed, even where the 
threats are costly they may be credible depending upon the relative costs and benefits12.
One obvious threat available to the South in this model is to destroy Reserves, making the 
land upon which Reserves exist (Ls) a strategic variable. In reality the destruction of Reserves 
can be understood either as a literal threat to destroy resources directly, as witnessed in Latin 
America (World Bank 2003), or as a static representation of an ongoing and irreversible process 
of conversion that persists in the absence of cooperation. Both interpretations imply a reduction 
in the land available for production: the land endowment, and the level of Reserves. Destruction 
of Reserves by the South is strategically viable if the value the North places on protecting the 
remaining Reserves increases, thus strengthening the South’s bargaining position. If the South is 
able to costlessly destroy land, making it incapable of supporting either Reserves or traditional 
production, then any Reserves remaining in Autarky can be strategically destroyed without 
affecting the South’s conflict payoff. The degree to which the South will want to implement 
strategic destruction will of course depend on the specific bargaining structure.
For example, any point of the bargaining frontier can be the solution to an asymmetric Nash 
Bargaining Game (NBG). It is then easy to show that strategic destruction can be a viable 
option for the South almost regardless of the relative bargaining power of the two parties. The 
solution of the NBG is a point (Un , Us ) which maximises:
(UN -  V & n u s -  y s)<1_“) s.t. VN + Us =  V  (4.19)
where a E [0,1] denotes the relative bargaining strength of the North. The solution gives 
U*N = (1 -  a)U% + a(U* -  U§) and U*s = aU§ + (1 -  a)(U* -  U%) (Nash 1953). Hence, any 
point on the bargaining frontier U* can be supported depending upon the relative bargaining 
power.
The viability of strategic destruction in the biodiversity bargaining model can be shown 
as follows. Let Ls denote the maximum level of Reserves available to the South, and let 
Ls =  Ls — D be the amount of land the South wishes to maintain, where D is the amount 
of land destroyed. The South will maximise returns from any asymmetric NBG by selecting 
D* = Ls — max[L£,£a] where L*s maximises the value of (U* — Ufa) and has no effect upon
12 The possibility of incentives for stratregic destruction of environmental resources has also been highlighed 
by Copeland (1990) in the context of international fisheries management.
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the South’s conflict point Ug. Sufficient conditions for the South to credibly threaten positive 
levels of destruction are that Ls > ta (Ra > 0) and:
tt'(Ls ~ ta)(na) > 7r'(ZJ -  s* -  t*)(n* + s*) (4.20)
PROOF: See Appendix 2.
In essence, condition (4.20) ensures that destruction increases the difference between conflict and 
maximum welfare obtainable for the North: the size of the ‘bargaining pie’, despite reducing 
social welfare. Example 1 illustrates this process using a Nash Bargaining solutions to the 
biodiversity bargaining problem modelled here.
EXAMPLE 1. Strategic destruction in a Nash Bargaining Game (NBG): If we
assume the following functional forms: 7t(R) = Rs, where 8 < 1, c(x) = x@, where (3 > 1 
and k (t) = t1, where 7  > 1. Assume that 6 = 0. Then for L/v sufficiently large, destruction is 
worthwhile to the South if and only if:
  / 1 \ 7-1 1
L s > Vt) and^ > IT T ; (421)
PROOF: See Appendix 2.
Equation (4.20) states that for destruction to increase the value of cooperation for the North, 
and hence be a credible threat for the South, it is sufficient that the marginal value of Reserves 
under the Autarky solution is higher than in the Social Planner solution. Equation (4.21) shows 
an explicit example of how this outcome can depend upon the relative curvature of the seed 
cost and R&D functions, c (.) and 7t(R) respectively: seed costs must change more quickly than 
R&D productivity does in Reserves.
Example 1 and the preceding discussion reveal two important points with regard to North- 
South biodiversity bargaining which can be illustrated by reference to Figure 4.2. Firstly, in 
the process of bargaining over the rents from optimal land-uses, conditions exist in which the 
South can use the threat of strategic destruction to improve its payoff. It does this by increasing 
the value of cooperation to the North, in which its payoff is increasing, despite the fact that 
carrying out this threat would reduce the value of social welfare due to the loss of valuable 
Reserves. In terms of Figure 4.2, if the Nash Bargaining solution in the absence of threats is
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Figure 4.2: Strategic Destruction as Bargaining Ploy
represented by point a on the optimal bargaining frontier, and if the conditions for strategic 
destruction are satisfied and threats are carried out, the solution would move in a South South 
Easterly direction to point b : the North’s payoff decreases, the South’s increases (to Ug)13. 
The new solution, point 6, is on a bargaining frontier that is everywhere inside of the optimal 
frontier as a result of the loss of productive Reserves. Note that the use of destruction as a 
bargaining ploy is virtually independent of distribution of bargaining power. This means that 
the threat of destruction remains a possibility when the South is offered a contract like the 
extreme point contract specified in Proposition 1(b)14.
Secondly, the only way that the North can eradicate the incentive for strategic destruction 
is to offer the South a payoff that leaves the South at least as well off as if the threats had been
13 Note that the value U $ — U $ a, the maximal gains from cooperation to the North after destruction has taken 
place, is greater than the value Un  — Ufa, the gains before destruction. This reflects the sufficient condition in
(4.20). Note that the effective autarky point shifts from A  to A' after destruction.
14 It is important to recognise that there is a discontinuity at the extreme point which can make the strategy
of strategic destruction in Example 1, and in other bargaining models, only weakly rather than strictly preferred 
where destruction is costless.
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carried out, i.e. Ug , and therefore specify a solution to the bargaining game such as point c in 
Figure 4.2. In effect this means that, where strategic destruction is credible i.e. if D* > 0, any 
truly optimal contract must make two provisions; i) in order to remove the threat of destruction 
the South must be at least as well off as at the destruction solution, Ug, and hence must be 
compensated for the Reserves it would have kept under Autarky and; ii) compensation must 
be conditioned upon the stock of Reserves to ensure a solution on the optimal frontier. In this 
way a solution such as point c, in Figure 4.2 can be attained.
It should be noted that strategic destruction shifts the conflict point in such a way as to 
reduce the North’s conflict payoff but to leave the South’s unaffected. This reflects the costless 
nature of destruction in the South which in turn reflects the residual nature of Reserves under 
Autarky. In Figure 4.2 this is reflected by the conflict point moving due South from A to 
A' 15.16 However, the costless nature of destruction in this case does not drive the result since 
such threats are still credible provided the benefits outweigh the costs.
The precise nature of the bargaining solution will depend upon the particular circumstances 
underlying the bargaining process. In the absence of any institutional or bargaining structure 
in the biodiversity bargaining problem it is sufficient to define the extreme point contracts and 
to identify the possibility of strategic destruction as a bargaining strategy for the South under a 
wide variety of bargaining models. In particular it is important to recognise that the incentive 
for strategic destruction of Reserves exists even at the extreme points of the bargaining frontier. 
However, if we are willing to assume that both parties are sophisticated and fully informed, we 
could posit that where incentives for destruction exist, the solution to the bargaining problem 
would be a contract specifying a point such as point c in Figure 4.2. This point maximises 
global welfare and provides a more even division of rents than the suggested Nash Bargaining
solution, a, and the extreme point contracts.
15 In this way, the analysis here differs from other models of strategic destruction. Similar strategies have been 
the subject of some interest in the game theoretical literature and are relevant here. For example Ben-Porath and 
Dekel (1992) talk of ‘burning money’. In that case the purpose of such a strategy is to determine ones preferred 
outcome in a coordination game with multiple equilibria. Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) show that this can be 
done by destroying one’s own resources or simply threatening (signalling) to do so. The difference in our case is 
that the South can costlessly destroy Reserves rather than engaging in self sacrifice, and the problem is one of
surplus division rather than coordination.
16 In Figure 2 the point feLjv represents the welfare in the North when the Reserves in the South are competely
destroyed. Since we have assumed that 7r(0) =  6, welfare in the North is equal to This represents another 
limit to the bargain.
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Having developed the theory in this particular case it is now apposite to investigate the 
impact of current institutional approaches to the biodiversity bargaining problem and how 
these solutions relate to theory.
4.5 Investigating the Im pact o f Current Institutions: Contracts 
and Intellectual Property R ights
There are a number of different institutions which have emerged in response to the biodiversity 
bargaining problem. In this section we discuss two such institutions relevant to the case in 
hand, one based on contracts and the other on property rights. Firstly we analyse the Conven­
tion on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the contracts implied by its financial mechanism the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) ‘incremental cost’ approach. We show how this financial 
mechanism, which has emerged as the main coercive instrument for biodiversity conservation 
for signatories of the CBD, can be interpreted in light of the preceding. Secondly we model 
the impact of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), such as Plant Breeders Rights (PBRs) and 
patents, on this bargaining problem. In both cases we axe interested in the extent to which 
such institutions capture the value of biodiversity and facilitate mutually beneficial joint pro­
duction. Similarly, in both cases we show that current institutions appear to initially place the 
bargaining power in the North, and yet strategic destruction is a viable source of bargaining 
power for the South.
4.5.1 The CBD and strategic destruction
The CBD represents the major international institution that has emerged in response to what we 
have called the biodiversity bargaining problem. The CBD recognises that there are considerable 
gains to be made from cooperation in this regard. In short it recognises the bargaining frontier. 
However, article 20 of the CBD states explicitly that the implementation of commitments under 
the convention will depend upon the extent of financial transfers from the developed country 
signatories. This is implemented by means of the ‘agreed incremental cost’ concept of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) under which the North compensates the South for the 
costs it incurs in relation to the commitments contained in the CBD, e.g. the opportunity cost
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of foregone land uses17.
Applying the incremental cost approach to the case in hand, the indicated contract is one 
in which the North receives the cooperative gains from innovations/intensive production and 
compensates the South for the welfare loss associated with the alternative use of land that 
occurs as the South moves away from the Autarky allocation. Thus the South ends up at its 
conflict payoff, represented by point (C/jv, Ug) in Figure 4.1, which is the extreme point contract 
specified in Proposition lb above. More precisely this extreme point contract very much reflects 
the idea of ‘net incremental’ cost: the minimum compensation required to ensure participation, 
which maintains the South at its pre-contract welfare level (Cervigni 1998).
Ultimately, the optimal contract between the North and South is indeterminate in the 
absence of some previously agreed resolution of the bargaining problem and there is no basis in 
principle for preferring any one over the others. The incremental cost approach merely defines 
one of an entire family of contracts that could facilitate the optimal outcome. The choice of 
an extreme point contract does not represent a complete solution to the bargaining problem 
for two reasons. Firstly, it implicitly assumes zero bargaining power for the South (a =  1 in 
Example 1), and secondly it ignores the capacity of the South to engage in strategic bargaining, 
i.e. strategic destruction.
In reality bargaining power is not so unevenly allocated between regions and such bar­
gaining strategies have been observed in practice. For example, incremental cost contracts 
offered by the GEF and World Bank to farmers in Latin America to encourage both changes 
in agricultural practices to agro-forestry and conservation of remaining forests were met with 
the response ‘Bueno, corto todo’ (OK, I’ll cut the lot!) when compensation for the existing 
forests was excluded from the offered contract (World Bank 2003). This brings to light the 
fact that dissatisfaction with the share of the surplus can lead the South not only to reject the 
initial contract but also to exert bargaining power in the hope of securing higher welfare upon 
renegotiation. The South can and does bargain with destruction as predicted by the theory 
outlined above. Indeed the analysis suggests that in order to eradicate the incentives for strate­
gic destruction the optimal North-South contract should not only compensate the South for
17 Cervigni (1998) discusses the extent to which the compensation should reflect the gross or net incremental 
costs, where net incremental cost is net of any additional benefits that the recipient country alone obtains from 
the presence of an unconverted or preserved environment. In this way net incremental cost is that minimum 
compensation required to maintain the recipient at pre-agreement welfare levels.
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the incremental cost of biodiversity conservation, but compensation should also be conditioned 
upon the stocks of Reserves. This recommendation is intuitive and similar to previous work on 
international transfers (van Soest and Lensink 2000).
4.5.2 Bargaining under Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs)
The discussion above shows that resource ownership is an important determinant of the bar­
gaining outcome. In the case in hand the outcome turns upon the ownership of innovations 
and Reserves. Therefore, it is critical to investigate the nature of property rights that currently 
prevail in this sector and the impact they have on the solution to the Biodiversity Bargaining 
problem. In this section we model what we call the Prevailing Property Rights structure (PPR) 
and analyse some implications for North-South bargaining.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection of innovations has long been an important 
institution for R&D and the focus of much investigation in the North-South context (e.g. Help- 
man 1993), where Plant Breeders Rights (PBRs) and patents are pertinent examples in plant 
breeding and biotechnology. Indeed, the potential for conflict in enforcement of IPRs across 
countries led to calls for international harmonisation. This culminated in the General Agree­
ment on Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under the auspices 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)18. TRIPS specifies that any product or process in­
novation emanating from a signatory nation can be subject to patent protection, including 
plant varieties and animals. Yet, while property rights axe allowed in genetic resources, most 
states require that they be ‘improved’ or ‘products of human intervention’ rather than simple 
selections or discoveries of diverse genetic resources. This allows property rights to be taken in 
genetic resources by those states with the human capital and technological capacity to develop 
natural genetic resources. It should also be recognised that in the context of the plant breeding 
sector the discussion about IPRs over high yielding varieties (HYVs) reflects the other side 
of marginal land use decisions to the CBD. That is, since modern agriculture is one of the 
major causes of deforestation and loss of traditional landraces (Swanson 1996), the extent to 
which there is transfer of HYVs to the South represents another important determinant of the 
extensive margin and hence the level of Reserves.
The model developed here reflects this property rights structure, that is, the PPR scenario
18The 1993 round of the GATT negotiation proposed the establishment of such an agreement, leading to the 
1994 WTO TRIPS agreement.
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is characterised by IPRs for innovations in the North and very little in the way of intellectual 
property in the South. The model allows an analysis of the impact of this property rights 
structure on the choice of contract by our stylised North (endowed with technology) and South 
(endowed with biological resources). To reflect this apparent imbalance in the strength and 
implementation of IPRs for innovations in biotechnology, and the absence of specific property 
rights for genetic traits found in South, we assume that IPRs only exist for seed innovations 
emanating from the North. Distinct property rights (intellectual, cultural, historical etc.) axe 
assumed to be non-existent for the stock of information accumulated in in situ genetic resources 
supplied by the South19.
Ultimately, in the PPR model it is the North-South market for seeds that facilitates the 
solution to the biodiversity bargaining problem, with the solution being determined by the 
underlying property rights structure. The enforcement and location of IPRs gives the North 
some considerable advantage in determining the outcome. The PPR model places the North in 
the position of monopolist in the export to the South of seeds embodying technology and gives 
the North free access to the resources important for generating the innovations (the Reserves)20. 
In short, discoveries of genetic information contained in Reserves are treated as a global public 
good. Both of these characteristics of the North reflect to a large extent the current property 
rights with regard to innovations and access to genetic material (Goeschl and Swanson 2002). 
Given this, the North is able to capture the marginal rental value of both human and fixed 
capital inputs to R&D (from the North) and the rents associated with the genetic diversity 
(from the South)21.
Characterised in this way, it seems that there are two reasons why the prevailing property 
rights are unlikely to be a sufficient mechanism to guarantee the supply of biodiversity from 
the South. Firstly, IPRs contain no provision for the South to be directly remunerated for 
its contribution to the R&D process. Secondly, the emergence of an intensive agricultural
19 It can also be thought to tacitly represent the presence of informational spillovers which undermine the 
extent to which the rental value of an innovation can be uniquely attributed to a particular genetic resource in 
a particular country when similar traits are likely to be found in many other plant varieties in other southern 
countries.
20The importance of the location of property rights as a means to ensure efficient incentives at each layer of a 
vertical industry have also been highlighted in the literature (e.g. Grossman and Hart 1986). See Goeschl and
Swanson (2000, 2003a, 2003b) for a discussion relating specifically to the biotechnology industry.
21Evenson (1995) reminds us that plant genetic diversity had been estimated to represent up to 30% of the
marginal value of innovations in the plant breeding sector.
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sector in the South has the potential to lead to greater conversion of Reserve land through 
expansion at the extensive margin. However, there remains an important countervailing force 
in the PPR model: the impact of technology transfer. The North can internalise the value of 
biodiversity to the South through the export of seeds which embody innovations. Assuming 
perfect information, the South will understand that the productivity of intensive agriculture is 
dependent upon the presence of Reserves. Although such technology transfers can be globally 
suboptimal22, they cause the South to share the North’s interest in biodiversity conservation 
(supply), and represent an important mechanism when contracting directly on Reserves is not 
possible23.
This section examines the implications of the nature and location of IPRs for the resolution 
of the baxgaining problem. The way in which the market for seeds facilitates the solution to the 
bargaining problem and the countervailing effects that emerge are captured in the model. The 
bargaining power in the North which is captured by the presence of a first mover advantage 
in a sequential model. This allows the monopolistic North to dictate the price of seeds and 
the extent of the technology transfer to the South, i.e. the price and quantity of seeds. By 
extension, the North dictates the nature of the South’s land-use24. In this guise, the model 
consists of 2 periods. In the first period the North selects the profit maximising price and 
quantity of exported seeds, s, and the level of domestic production, n. In the second period the 
South chooses its land allocations taking the price of seeds, s, as given. The model is solved by 
backwards induction.
4.5.2.1 Two-period model of Prevailing Property Rights (PPR)
PERIOD 1: THE NORTH. The monopolistic North faces the inverse demand curve 
for seeds in the South, p (s) for each s > 0. Given this, the problem for the North is to select 
domestic production and export of seeds to the South, n and s, taking into account the South’s 
choice of Reserves, R. The North’s objective becomes:
maxf/jv = (7t(R )— b)n + p(s)s — c(n + s ) +  bLN
n,s
s.t. : 0  < n < L/v
2 2 For example, Lemma 1 showed that where 6 =  0 =*> s* =  0 for 0 <  n* <  L n -  Also, see Proposition 3.
23 We assume the absence of the transfers, T.
24 A first mover advantage for innovators is not uncommon in the literature. For theoretical approaches and 
empirical evidence see Petrin (2002) and Jones et al (2001).
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This yields the first order conditions:
n > 0 : 7r(R) — b — c'(n + s) < 0 (4.22)
^ dR
s > 0 : 7r'(R)— n + p (s) + sp' (s) — c'(n + s) < 0 (4.23)as
with at least one inequality in each case.
PERIO D  2: TH E SOUTH The South takes as given the price of seeds, p, and the 
maximum quantity of seeds supplied by the North, s. Given perfect information with regard to 
the role of Reserves in R&D, and hence the productivity of the Southern intensive sector, the 
South internalises the value of Reserves in making its land-use decisions. This captures what 
we have described above as technology transfer. Following on from the previous sections, the 
South’s objective then becomes:
max Us — [7r(Ls —t — s) — p]s + t — k(t) (4.24)
t,s
s . t : .t + s < L s , £ > 0 , 0 < s < s  
This yields the following first order conditions25:
t >  0 : 1  — tt'(Ls — t — s)s — k'(t) < 0  (4.25)
s > 0  : 7t(Ls — t — s) — tt'(Ls — t — s)s — p < 0  (4.26)
From (4.26), we see that the inverse demand curve for seeds in the South is26:
p(s) = n(Ls — t — s) — 7t'(Ls — t — s)s (4.27)
Given (4.27), t > 0 solves27:
d*Uds2
Tt is important that the second order conditions are also satisfied: =  tt"{Ls  — t — s)s — k"{t) <  0,
=  i r " { L s - t - s ) s - 2 i r ' ( L s - t - s )  < 0 , £ £ t = i r ” ( L s - t - s ) s - 7 r ' ( L s - t - s ) , a . n d  ( ^ ) - ( i ! g )  > 0.
These conditions are worked out explicitly in Appendix 3 for Example 2.
26In effect this assumes that s =  s .
271 >  0 provided that 1 — fc'(O) — ir'{Ls — s)s >  0.
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1 -  7T '{Ls -  t - s ) s  -  k'Ct) =  o (4.28)
Some comparative statics of these solutions come from total differentiation of (4.28), and 
show that < 028. Hence the optimal choice of traditional production in the South is decreas­
ing in the supply of seeds from the North. Furthermore, setting R = Ls — t — s yields:
l b - ! - 1 (429>
The relationship in (4.29) is of particular interest in our land use model since it characterises
the net marginal effect of intensive agriculture in the South upon Reserves. For example, where
(4.29) is less than zero, intensive agriculture will encroach upon Reserves. However, where
(4.29) is greater than zero the North can use the transfer of technology (provision of seeds) 
to the South as an incentive mechanism for increasing land held as Reserves. The necessary 
conditions for this incentive to exist are that t > 0  and j^= < —1 , so in this case intensive 
production and Reserves replace the traditional sector in the South29. Hence there are two 
possible motives for the North to transfer technology to the South. One is to obtain profits 
from the export of seeds and the other is to incentivise the provision of Reserves. The relative 
strength of these motives will determine the optimal marginal response by the South to an 
increase in intensive production and ultimately the net effect on Reserves as compared to the 
Autarky and social planner outcomes.
The 2 period PPR model represents another solution to the biodiversity bargaining problem 
outlined above. A number of important issues arise in the characterisation of this solution, 
primary among which are the relationship with the social planner solution and the incentives 
for strategic bargaining. Firstly, we analyse the welfare implications for each region under the 
PPR, then we analyse the incentives for strategic destruction that emerge in the South. The 
implications of the model are summarised in a series of propositions.
4.5.2.2 PPR vs Social Planner
The following proposition provides the first fundamental distinction between PPR and social 
planner outcomes:
28Note that %  =  -fr O ' * " * " < 0. This comes from the second order conditions.
i t n { L 8 — t —s ) a —f c " ( t )
29From the previous footnote: 7r'{Ls  —t  — s ) >  k"(t) ensures that ^  <  —1.
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PROPOSITION 2: When the social planner solution is interior, the PPR problem is never 
a solution to the social planner problem and therefore the solution falls within the bargaining 
frontier (U* in Figure 4.1)30. If b = 0, there are zero profits in the Northern baseline sector, the 
social planner chooses specialised functions for each region (intensive production in the North, 
Reserves in the South) and again the PPR and social planner solutions never coincide and the 
PPR solution falls within the bargaining frontier.
PROOF: Where the social planner solution is interior: n*,P,s*,R*,t* > 0, from (4.25), if 
(n*, s*) =  (n, s) then if R* = R  it follows due to the convexity of k (.) that t* < t. If b = 0 then 
by Lemma 1 s* = 0, but if s = 0 the PPR solution coincides with the Autarky solution, which 
is not the social planner solution. QED.
It is clear from comparison of (4.25) and (4.16) that the decentralised South always imposes 
an externality upon the North under the PPR in determining traditional and Reserve land 
use, albeit smaller than under Autarky. This externality, which arises because the transfer of 
technology (seeds) only internalises the private value of Reserves to the South, captures the fact 
that the South is not being explicitly remunerated for the provision of Reserves. This effect 
will tend to reduce the level of Reserves below R*. As a result, where the North is unable to 
contract directly over Reserves, and can only determine the price and quantity of seeds, the 
PPR outcome will be suboptimal and within the bargaining frontier. This situation is depicted 
in Figure 4.3.
This externality is but one source of inefficiency in the PPR model. Indeed a comparison
of (4.23) with (4.15) shows that there exist two further distortions. Firstly there is the effect
of monopolistic pricing reflected by the term p1 (s) in (4.23). This reflects the pure monopoly
distortion. Secondly, there is a distortion introduced by the term which reflects the optimal
30Indeed this is generally the case. There are several other cases to consider, a) n* =  L n ,s *  =  L s  '■ From 
the assumption that 7r' (0) =  oo, this is not a solution to the social planner problem (SP); b) Where s* =  s' =  0 
then PPR solution collapses to the autarky solution which by Lemma 1 is not a solution to the SP; c) where the 
autarky solution is interior, s* =  n* =  0 is not a solution to the SP and so the SP, autarky and PPR solutions 
will not all coincide in this way. The only other case to consider is where n* =  0 and s* >  0, i.e. the SP solution 
is not interior. If we assume that the PPR and SP land allocations are identical and that n* =  0 and s* >  0, 
we can set (23) and (14) equal and using the inverse demand curve p  (s ) we can rearrange to show that the PPR 
solution and the SP solution coincide only if p' (s) =  0, i.e, if the North has no monopoly power and the price of 
seeds represents their (global) social value.
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response of Reserves to intensive agriculture by the South. As discussed above, the sign of ^  is 
critical to determining the overall effect of technology transfer to the South on land allocations 
in the PPR model compared to the social planner and Autarky outcomes. Gatti et al (2004) 
discuss these effects in more detail, labelling the former effect the ‘IPR effect’ and the latter the 
‘Spillover effect’, referring to the extent of knowledge spillovers. They also show that where the 
marginal value in R&D is relatively high, Reserves in the PPR solution axe higher than under 
Autarky but that, given the other distortions, Reserves in the PPR regime axe generally lower 
than optimal: R* > R > Ra. This reflects the discussion above: on the one hand intensive 
agriculture may encroach upon the Reserve sector, but on the other this technology transfer 
may internalise the value of Reserves to the South sufficiently to increase the South’s provision 
of Reserves compared to Autarky.
In sum these two externalities ensure that the solution to the PPR falls within the bargaining 
frontier. However, our main interest here is the regional welfare arising from the PPR solution. 
This is captured by the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 3: When the PPR solution has s' > 0, the South is as least as well off under 
the PPR solution than under either Autarky or the optimal extreme point contract offered by 
the North under the GEF, i.e. Us > Ug. The North is better off under the PPR regime than 
under Autarky: Un  > Ufa.
PROOF: The Autarky solution is available in the PPR model but is not chosen.
Proposition 3 states that, although global welfare is less than that under the social planner 
solution or the GEF contract described above, the PPR regime offers a more favourable solution 
from the perspective of the South as compared to either Autarky or the GEF contract. The 
North is also better off under this regime than under Autarky31. Figure 4.3 provides a diagram­
matic representation of the PPR solution. Despite the inefficiency introduced by the North’s 
monopoly over innovations, and the South’s tendency to impose an externality upon the North 
in its land-use decision, both parties can improve their welfare compared to Autarky levels when 
IPRs underlie the bargaining process. The North-South market for seeds allows the South to 
share in the rents generated from Reserves as an input to R&D and aligns regional incentives
for the conservation of Reserves such that they increase compared to Autarky. Of course, the
31 It is ambiguous whether the North and/or the South are better off in the PPR than under the GEF with 
the threats of strategic destruction actually carried out.
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Figure 4.3: Strategic Destruction in the PPR model.
extent to which the sharing of rents aligns regional incentives depends upon the information 
available to the South and even then the threat of strategic destruction may persist.
4.5.2 .3 Strategic destruction: P re-P P R
In this section we follow on from Section 4.3 and investigate the extent to which incentives exist 
for strategic destruction The PPR scenario differs from the pure contracts case since, given the 
transfer of technology in the form of seeds, destruction of Reserves is a costly activity for both 
the North and the South. We model the decision to engage in strategic destruction as the 
‘Pre-PPR’ decision in which in a period 0 prior to the supply decisions of the North, the South 
makes a supply decision of its own: the supply of Reserves. As before, the ability of the South 
to make this supply decision prior to the North, reflects the only semblance of bargaining power 
that the South holds: the control of its land endowment and hence Reserves.
PERIO D  0: THE SOUTH CHOOSES DESTRUCTION For strategic destruction 
to be a credible action for the South requires welfare to increase as the land endowment de­
creases: < 0- From the 2 period problem described above, and using the inverse demand
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curve (4.27) Us can be written:
Us = (j l j  — P (s)) s + t -  k(t) = tt' s2 + 1 — k (t) (4.30)
Given R = Ls — s’ — t, and the envelope theorem, we obtain:
d L s  V. /  d L s  V  /  [  d L s
This leads to the following proposition:
s2 (4.31)
PROPOSITION 4: A sufficient condition for strategic destruction of Reserves by the South 
being a welfare enhancing policy is that the equilibrium level of the intensive sector in the South 
is increasing with destruction in the South: < 0. Indeed, < 0 is a necessary condition
when 7r" (.) = 0. Where ^  > (<) 0, this is more (less) likely where; i) n" (.) is large in absolute 
value; ii) c" (.) is large;and iii) n is large.
PROOF: It is easy to see from (4.31) the sufficiency of < 0 for the case where 7r" (.) < 0 
and the necessity of < 0 when ix" (.) = 0. The conditions i) - iii) under which < 0, can 
be derived from comparative statics analysis using equations (4.22) and (4.23) and Cramer’s 
rule32.
The general case is complicated so we illustrate the credibility of strategic destruction with 
the following example in which we assume that 7t(R) is linear (it" (.) =  0). This is a more 
restrictive case in the sense that while n" (.) < 0 , the incentive for strategic destruction may 
exist even when 1 > > 0. In the linear case below, < 0 is a necessary condition for
strategic destruction.
EXAM PLE 2. Strategic destruction in the IP R  model: We use the following 
algebraic form for the functions described above: 7t(R) = 8R, c(x) =  f3x2, k( t ) =  t2. Some 
algebra yields the following expressions for the quantities and prices that determine the South’s 
utility in the 2-period model:
r-  L i g . a i -  ■) (f.  -  u+> m - « I ■-)), g.  „ .  1 ,j .  (4.32)
2 \4S/3 — (<5(| — 1)) ) 2 2
and from (4.27):
32The condition being: ^  <  0 < 1.
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p(s) = S ( l s -  i )  + 2 ( ^ -  l )  6s (4.33)
There are a number of cases to consider, however we restrict our analysis to the interior. 
An interior solution for t requires that s' < | ,  while ^  < 0 if 8 < 4. It is only in this case 
that the North can employ its optimal pricing policy, p (s)33. From Proposition 4 we have that 
< 0  is a sufficient condition for < 0  in general, but a necessary condition in the 
linear case. The expression for s in (4.32) above shows that the necessary condition is satisfied 
when 8 < 2 and the second order conditions. Interior solutions for the remaining variables 
place restrictions on the other parameters in the system. However, the result is that strategic 
destruction occurs under the following parameter values for example: 8 = 1,(3 = \ ,b = \  and 
Ls  = 1. See Appendix 3 for a formal proof.
4.5.2.4 Discussion of the PPR model and strategic destruction
In the previous sections we have motivated a model of prevailing property rights in the biotech 
industry in which the North has monopoly power over the sale of seeds by virtue of the intellec­
tual property rights over embodied innovations. Within this institution the South is modelled 
as having no bargaining power over the price of seed and hence the North has some discretion 
over the intensive land allocation in the South by virtue of being a monopolist over seeds34. 
In the two period model the South makes residual decisions over the traditional and Reserve 
sector. The PPR model offers a solution to the bargaining problem described in Section 4.3 
which is facilitated primarily by the market for seeds and the technology transfer that this en­
tails. However, we have also shown that this institutional solution to the biodiversity bargaining 
problem may still introduce incentives for strategic destruction by the South and, importantly, 
the conditions under which these incentives exist are less restrictive than for the pure Nash 
Bargaining game outlined in Example 1. In the NBG case the productivity of Reserves {'k (R)) 
must be concave whereas Example 2 shows that such incentives exist in the PPR even in the
33Where ^  > 0 it is easy to show that < 0. Note that where s < |  the pricing formula becomes: 
p(s) =  6(Ls — t  — s) — 6s~= 6(Ls  — ■§) +  2 ( | — l)s. Hence when 6 >  4, >  0. In this case the South’s utility
becomes: Us =   ^ +  Ss2(1 — | ) ,  and therefore if 6 >  4 the South is better off with s =  0, i.e. under Autarky. 
In other words, when 6 >  4 the optimal pricing policy of the North does not satisfy the South’s participation
constraint and hence prices must be tempered to ensure participation.
34This is stark of course with the assumed fixed proportions technology, but this general point still holds
without this assumption.
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restrictive case where production is linear in Reserves. In short, the South has bargaining power 
to the extent that it can exert control over the supply of its own unique endowments in order 
to increase its welfare.
The PPR model brings to light some interesting points with regard to the behaviour of 
the North. When the North is a monopolist there are potentially two separate reasons for 
providing seeds to the South (see Gatti et al 2004, for more detail). On the one hand the 
North wishes to make profits from this transfer of technology and this is facilitated by pricing 
seeds according to the profit maximising pricing formula in (4.27) above. On the other hand, 
where ^ 7  > 0, the North can use technology transfer as a means of incentivising the South 
to conserve Reserve land. In general, in the former case the North will act more or less like a 
conventional monopolist by restricting seed sales to the South compared to the social planner. 
It is interesting to note that the extent to which the monopolist can exert this monopoly power 
is limited by the potential introduction of the traditional sector in the South, the presence 
of which increases the elasticity of demand for seeds35. In the latter case, where technology 
transfer encourages the conservation of reserves, the incentives for the North to restrict seeds 
will be diminished since the increase in Reserves will increase R&D and benefit both their 
domestic intensive productivity and the price they are able to charge the South. As the power 
of the incentive (value of ^ 7  ) increases, the Northern monopolist could end up supplying more 
seed than the social planner would choose. Of course, the extent to which this incentive exists 
is limited by the extent to which there is a traditional sector in the South to replace. Once 
t = 0, then the intensive sector and Reserve margins meet and further intensive production 
necessarily encroaches on Reserves: ^ 7  = — 1.
Which of these cases prevails depends upon a number of factors but hinges crucially upon 
the marginal value of Reserves to R&D: the higher the value the more likely it is that 7 7  > 0. 
Example 2, is illustrative of this point. Where the traditional sector exists in the South (t > 0), 
the term ^ 7  =  ( |  — l), where 8 is the marginal value of Reserves, is constant and hence 
the analysis is much simplified. If Reserves have a low value (< 2 ) then ^ 7  < 0 and the 
North behaves as a conventional monopolist by restricting the sale of seeds to the South.
35Evaluating (25) at t =  0, it is clear that the traditional sector, t, will be introduced when 1 — n' (R) s >  0. 
Note that where t  =  0, R  =  L s  — s, so as s becomes smaller the term ir1 (R) s declines. Thus, restricting the 
seeds sold to the South will increase the likelihood that the traditional sector will be introduced. This acts as a 
limit to the monopoly power of the North.
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Alternatively if Reserves have a moderate value (4 > 6 > 2) then ^  > 0. In this case the 
sale of seeds incentivises the South to provide Reserves hence reducing the incentive for the 
monopolist to restrict seeds since domestic intensive production becomes more productive as 
seed is exported36.
Under the conditions outlined in Proposition 4, strategic destruction still remains a viable 
means by which the South can increase its welfare. These conditions are also crucially related to 
the sign of and hence to the value of Reserves in R&D. When < 0, strategic destruction is 
more likely where the North has low monopoly power (7x" (.) is small in absolute terms), where 
the marginal costs of seed production/R&D costs do not increase too rapidly (c" (.) is small) 
and the intensive sector in the North (n) is small. These conditions can be understood easily. 
When ^ 7  < 0 and the North has minimal monopoly power it is less inclined to restrict seeds 
to the South making it easier for the South to coerce more seeds from the North. Furthermore, 
producing more seeds for the South is more likely where the marginal costs are not rising 
quickly, whilst the North is more inclined to encourage intensive production in the South where 
the opportunity cost of land in the North is higher, and hence the North’s intensive sector is 
small. These incentives are reversed when ^ 7  > 0.
As described above, which of these cases arises depends upon the marginal value of Reserves 
(tt1 (.)). Again, the linear case of Example 2 provides a simple illustration of this point. The 
observant reader will have noticed that the same critical value for 8 that determines the sign of 
^ 7  determines whether or not strategic destruction can be welfare enhancing for the South, i.e. 
the sign of 7 ^ .  In short, only where Reserves have a low value (< 2), and where the intensive 
sector in the South encroaches upon the Reserve sector, will strategic destruction be viable in 
the linear case. The opportunity cost of land in the North is also important here. In Example 
2 strategic destruction requires that the alternative use of land in the North yields positive 
marginal profit (b > 0). Where the opportunity cost of intensive production in the North 
is relatively high the North is encouraged to export seed to the South rather than produce 
domestically. If Reserves increase, intensive production is augmented and the North becomes 
increasingly inclined to increase land allocated to domestic intensive production rather than
36This is in part due to that fact that when 77 >  0 and becomes smaller, and demand becomes more 
elastic in the South. In the extreme, where a  >  4, both ^jjand > 0, i.e, the demand for seeds in the South 
is upward sloping. In this case the North cannot employ the optimal pricing policy and is bound to set a price 
which satisfies the South’s participation constraint: Us >  Us-
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export seeds to the South. With ^ 7  < 0, the amount of seed that the South receives can fall as 
Reserves increase. The corollary of this is that, the South can reduce Reserves by employing 
strategic destruction and therefore induce the North to export more seeds, which at the margin 
is welfare enhancing.
In the linear case, where 7^7 > 0, this incentive does not exist. However, in the general case 
the South may be able to exert what is a type of monopoly power on the North as measured by 
the second term in (4.31) even when ^  > 0. In this case the North responds to the strategic 
destruction by supplying more seeds in an attempt to incentivise the conservation of Reserves, 
or at least halt the destruction.
This discussion gives us some insight into the solution to the biodiversity bargaining problem 
offered by the PPR model and how this solution might be preferred to Autarky despite reducing 
global welfare. It also explains the mechanism by which incentives for strategic destruction can 
be introduced in the South by the prevailing IPR institution, despite the potential for increased 
southern welfare. Clearly, the value of biodiversity contained in Reserves is of considerable 
moment in determining the bargaining incentives, regional welfare, and the extent to which 
this market can approximate the global optimal. The PPR model shows that the prevailing 
IPRs are likely to provide an inadequate mechanism to harness the global value of biodiversity 
and that this leads to an inefficient solution to the biodiversity bargaining problem. The 
inefficiencies arise not only due to the absence of direct remuneration for Reserves and the 
presence of monopolistic behaviour which can increase the conversion of Reserves, but also due 
to the scope for strategic destruction that this bargaining solution can introduce.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper has characterised the issue of North-South interactions concerning biodiversity con­
servation as one of cooperative bargaining. The interdependence, and therefore the need for 
cooperation between these regions is described in the context of R&D in the plant breeding 
sector of the biotechnology industry. Only if the two regions can cooperate in combining their 
unique resource endowments of human and natural capital and establish a satisfactory division 
of the surplus, can global welfare be maximised. Using cooperative bargaining theory allows 
us to analyse two institutions that have arisen in order to solve the biodiversity problem: the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the TRIPS agreement on intellectual property
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rights and ultimately posit i) an additional and fundamental reason for the continued losses in 
primary forest observed even in the presence of these institutions and agreements, and in light 
of this ii) some presciptive findings for these institutions.
Chief among the ideas presented here is that the institutions which attempt to solve the bio­
diversity bargaining problem actually introduce incentives for strategic destruction of biological 
resources by the South. I.e. in a manner similar to the ‘rational threats’ described by Nash 
(1953) the South has the potential to destroy its valuable reserves of biological resources as a 
strategic bargaining strategy. For the Nash bargaining case, where the South can influence this 
value for the North through the destruction of its residual biological reserves, we provide the 
conditions under which a destruction strategy is viable. What is more, we show that this strat­
egy is largely invariant to the initial balance of bargaining power and is therefore potentially 
present at the extreme points of the bargaining frontier. The significance of these theoretical 
solutions is brought to light in the analysis of the bargaining solutions implied by the CBD and 
TRIPS and provides an answer to the following questions: Do existing institutions provide an 
agreed determination of this bargaining problem? Are these institutions efficient?
Firstly, the ‘incremental cost’ approach of the financial mechanism of the CBD, facilitated by 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF), can be interpreted as one of the end points of the family 
of optimal contracts: an extreme point contract. We show that the GEF reflects the North 
offering the South a contract for biodiversity preservation, which leaves the South no better 
off than in the absence of the contract. This indicates two things to us. Firstly, Southern 
indifference between the GEF contract and the conflict point may induce the South to use 
rational threats and employ destruction as a bargaining ploy. Indeed, such a response to the 
extreme point contract has been observed in Latin America with regard to the GEF (World Bank 
2003). Consequently this approach is unlikely to represent a real solution to the biodiversity 
bargaining problem. We then show that the optimal contract should both compensate the 
South over and above incremental cost by making compensation reflect the stock of reserves, 
while specifying precisely the level of the Reserves in order to remove completely the incentives 
for strategic destruction. This recommendation is in line with previous work in this area (van 
Soest and Lensink 2000).
Secondly, another possibility is that the agreement regarding property rights to embodied 
innovation might provide the vehicle for solving the biodiversity bargaining problem. Intellec­
tual Property Rights (IPRs) represent another important institutional mechanism for capturing
179
the value of biological diversity as an input to R&D. We analyse the prevailing property rights 
regime (PPR) where IPRs are located in the North, reflecting both the location of R&D and 
the relative strength of Northern IPRs in light of the TRIPS agreement. The PPR affords the 
North an advantage in bargaining with the South and facilitates cooperation largely on its own 
terms by acting as a monopolist in the market for seeds embodying innovations. This set up 
introduces a number of countervailing effects but the market for seeds facilitates the solution 
to the bargaining problem by transferring technology to the South and allowing the South to 
share in the cooperative gains. However, despite making the South better off than under the 
extreme point contract, we show that this outcome is inefficient for two reasons. Firstly, there 
are a number of countervailing distortions arising from the presence of a monopolistic North, 
the net impact of which depends extent to which intensive agriculture encroaches upon Re­
serves in the South. Secondly, the South may respond once more by asserting its sole source 
of bargaining power: the irreversible destruction of its biological Reserves. In either case the 
bargaining solution afforded by IPRs leads to an outcome within the bargaining frontier.
In conclusion, this paper shows how both the CBD/GEF and IPRs, and the allocation of 
bargaining power that these institutions imply, represent an inadequate mechanism for cap­
turing the global value of biodiversity. Indeed, in conclusion, in describing global biodiversity 
conservation as a cooperative bargaining game, this paper alerts us to the idea that the very 
institutions that have arisen to generate North-South cooperation have the potential to exac­
erbate the losses of biodiversity and habitat that were the impetus for their creation.
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4.8 A ppendices
4.8.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
If South selects (n, s, t) and a transfer payment:
- T  =  Ts{n,s :n,s,t) = / \ n (R ) -b  d x -  d{x)dx + [Ufa — M-R) ~ b)n + c(n + 5) -  bLtf]
J n  *- ■* J n + s
= 7t(R) — b {n — n) — c(n + s) + c(n + s) + [Ufa — (tt(R) — b)n + c(n + s) — bLn]
= tt(R) -  b (—n) + c(n + s) + [t/^ -
where R = Ls — t — 's 
North’s utility is given by
thus the North is indifferent between any level of n and s, including n and s. Introducing a, 
possibly tiny, penalty for deviation from the target levels specified would ensure compliance. 
Given North selects n and s, the South’s problem is to select (n, s, R , t) to maximise
Thus the South’s optimisation problem is therefore equivalent to the Social Planners problem 
and hence the solution is the same, (n*,s*,R*,t*).
b) The proof is equivalent for the other extreme point contract: If the North selects s and
t:
Us{n,s,R,t) = n(R)s + t — k(t) — Ts(n, s : n, s, R) 
= U* -Ufa = Uc + u$
[ta — £] — [k(ta) — k(t)] — 7t(Ls — s — t)s
Then the South’s utility is given by:
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Us(t) = 7r (Ls -  s -  t) s + 1 -  k (t) + Tn  ( t : s,t)
=  US
Hence the South is indifferent to any level of t including t. Once again, a small penalty for 
deviation from t ensures compliance. Given the South selects t the North’s problem is to select 
(n, s, R, t) to maximise:
UN(nts,R,t) = (it (R) — b)n — c(n +s) — Tn  ( t : s,t)
= U* - U $  = UC + XJ%
Once again, this is equivalent to the Social Planner problem and the solution is (n*,s*,R*,t*).
4.8.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Example 1: Strategic destruction by the South 
GENERAL FORMULATION:
S  =  „ 5  +  (, „ i t 5 1
dLs dLs dLs
For Ls > ta, from Equation (4.19) = 0, and =  (1 — Therefore for
all a > 0, ^ . 0  i f f  ^  0  and U§ is maximised when (JJ* — Uff) is maximised,
irrespective of the value of a. From equations (4.13) and (4.10) and the Envelope Theorem:
d(U*-U%) &U , , d U % ,axa,
dLs =  SL
= 7/ ( L s - s ’ -  f ) ( n ’ +  s*) -  7r'(Ls -  ta)(n“)
and so
- t’)( na) > id(Ts - s ’ -  t*)(n’ +  s’) =7- di-V \ ~  < 0  atdLs
and destruction of arable land will increase Utility for the South. QED
For Ls < ta, Ra = 0 and, from Equation (4.12),^rjr  ^ = 0, so from Envelope Theorem:
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dm dm „ . du— -  = a —^  + (1  -  a )—
dLs dLs dLs
= a (l -  k'(Ls )) + (1 -  a)[7r'(LS -  s* -  t*)(n* +  «*)]
> 0
and the optimal solution is therefore to increase Ls  up to ta which is the Autarky solution.
PROOF OF EXAM PLE 1: >From Equation (4.14) & (4.15) we have s* -  0 (as b = 0) 
and n* = (^ Ls~p  ^ > 0  when Ln  > n*.
Let $(Ls ,t,n) = 7r'(Ls -  t)(n) =  8(LS -  t ) 5 -1  (Ls ~ t)6~1+^ .
Destruction is beneficial to the South if, Ls > ta = and < 0 at Ls .
The last condition requires that $(Ls, ta,na) > $(Ls,i*,n*)
<=*• ( - 3 7 ') ( L ^ - n s~1+i& >
\ 0  s - y j
given that ta > t*, this inequality hold iff <^5 — 1 -f < 0  <$■ ft >
4.8.3 Appendix 3: Proof of Example 2.
Period 2:The South chooses s, t and R. The functional forms are 7r (R ) =  8R, c (x) =
fix2, k (t) = t2. This yields an expression for the South’s utility as follows:
Us = 8R +1 — t2 = 8{Ls — t — s) + t — t2 (4-34)
The first order conditions for maximisation yield:
t =  R =  LS -  i  +  ( |  -  1)3 (4.35)
and the inverse demand curve for s faced by the monopolist is,
p (s) =  8(LS - t - s ) - 6 s  = 8 ^Ls -  ^  + 2 ^  -  1^ 8s (4.36)
The second order conditions are as follows:
= n"{Ls - t  -  s)s -  k"{t) = -2 , = Tr”(Ls -  t -  s)s -  2n'(Ls -  t -  s) = -28,
d 2 JJ<t
d s d t = 7t"(Ls - t - s ) s -  7d(Ls — t — s) = —8, therefore ( 0 )  -  = 48 -  82 > 0
as required.
187
It is interesting to note that jj=- > 0 if 8 > 2, i.e. the North will provide seed to the South 
as a means of incentivising the provision of Reserves in the South. Even if this is not satisfied 
the North may still want to provide seed to provided that p sufficiently high.
Case 1: t > 0, i.e. s <
+ '1 - 8 s  f l - S s  x 2
So Us > \  = Ug is the participation constraint for the South and whenever s > 0  and <5 < 4, 
it follows that > 0  and Us > Ug as suggested in Proposition 3.
Case 2: t = 0, s >
If 8 < 4, then p (s) =  8Ls — 28s, R = Ls —s and
Us = (8 R - p ) s  = (8 (Ls — s) -  8LS + 28s) s = 8s2 > i  > i  =  U§
If 8 > 4, then the North must set the price in order to maximise profits given the binding 
participation constraint. I.e. the North must set the price to ensure that Us = Ug = 1/4. The 
pricing formula then becomes:
(8R -  p)s = (8(LS -  s) -  p)s = i  
p(s) = 8(Ls - s ) - ^ z
We do not consider this case further here. See Gatti et al (2004) for a deeper discussion.
Strategic Destruction:
Proposition 4 shows that for strategic destruction requires that < 0? and that a neces­
sary condition in the linear case where 8 < 4 and > 0 is that < 037. In order to the
conditions in which this can occur we need an expression for s.
Period l:The North chooses s and n Remembering that 7x{R) = 8R and c(n + s) = 
P(n + s)2, we have:
UN = (8R* -  b)n + p*{s)s -  (3(n + s)2 + bLN
37When a  >  4, ^ 5 -  =  0, strategic destruction has no direct impact on South’s utility but could perhaps be 
used to ’bargain’ over price p. This goes beyond this particular paper however.
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Case 1: t > 0, i.e. s = s < 
The North’s utility is given by:
Un = ^  ^Ls ~ 2  (2 ~~ — ^  n ^  ~ 2  ^  ^^ 4  ~ aS)  S ~ ^ N
The first order conditions give us the following solutions for s and n :
~ = ( ( 1 - 1  ) S - 2 0 ) s  + 6(Ls - i ) - b  (4 37)
and:
(4.38)
•5(3-1)
^  =  -2 0  < 0, =  (6 -  4) S -  20 < 0, =  « (| -  1) -  2/3, and ( ^ )  ( ^ )  -
( f e ) 2 =  4/52 +  2W 4 -  s ) -  (*2(!  -  x)2 -  4^ ( f  -  4) +  4/32) =  4«/3 -  «2( |  -  I )2- So max-
imisation requires that A8/3 — <S2(f — l ) 2 > 0, or (3 > ( | ( f  — -0) • Solving out for s and n
yields:
and:
^ 8 ( 3 - § ) s - b
n = —— 7—------  (4.40)
S(f - 1)
PRO O F OF EXAM PLE 2. From above strategic destruction requires < 0. In the 
linear case:
as «2(f - 1)
dLs  (45/3 -  (5(1 -  l ) ) 2)
Given the second order conditions the denominator is positive, so < 0 requires that 
6 < 2. For an interior solution a number of other restrictions need to be placed upon the 
parameters. Given (4.39) for s < and hence t > 0 we have:
(40 — 6 ( |  — l)2) +  62(1 — | )  (Ls — 5 ) 
(20 +  6(1 - 1))
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Given (4.40) some algebra gives us that n > 0 requires:
*(3 — f ) * 2(l | ) ( L S - 1 ) _
W 2 - # ) + « 2( l - | ) ( 4 - « )
Hence, if 8 = 1 the second order condition requires (3 > Jq- Then s > 0, requires b >
g3(1- |) ( z,g~2) _  = (Lg~?) an(j n > 0 requires b < ^ 3~ ?^ ^ ^  ~ H  =
(2/3+6(1 — 2 )) ( 2 /3 + ( |) )  *P+1 ’ ’ ieq U ireS  0 <  (6/3(2—6)+6 (1—| )(4—V)
f  (LS- 1) _  5(LS- 1 )
/3+§ “  4/3+6
(Note: 524/++i4  ^ > 1^^ 3+2  ^w^en P > F3 an<^  > 5 . Hence if we let /? = |  we have s > 0
and n > 0  when L^s~^). < & < For s < |  we need:
6<(i)+Kls-^
Thus strategic destruction possible if, for example, 8 = 1,(3 = \,b  = \  and Ls = 1.
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Chapter 5
The Sloping Lands Conversion 
Policy of the People’s Republic of 
China: Impacts on income, income 
distribution and poverty alleviation
A bstract1
This chapter investigates the impact of the Chinese Government’s Sloping Lands Conversion 
Programme (SLCP), or ‘Grain for Green’ policy. The primary objectives of the programme 
are to reduce environmental costs in river basins e.g. flooding, erosion and sedimentation 
of watercourses, and to alleviate rural poverty. To meet these objectives relatively generous 
yet temporary compensation is given to farmers for reforesting currently cultivated land on 
steep hillsides. Certainly there has been much reforestation under the SLCP, but what has 
been the impact of the programme on participants? In this chapter we employ programme 
evaluation methods (e.g. Heckman et al 1997, Blundell and Costa-Dias 2000) to estimate 
the impact of the SLCP upon household incomes and poverty alleviation, while correcting 
for the selection bias that plagues previous analyses. We use a variety of matching difference 
in differences methods (Heckman 1997, Abadie 2005, Athey and Imbens 2003) to estimate 
average and quantile treatment effects, each of which accommodates the potential for het­
erogeneous household responses to interventions as predicted by theory and witnessed in 
rural China and beyond (e.g. Chen and Ravallion 2003, Key et al 2000). Given this het­
erogeneity, and the dispute surrounding the appropriate measure of poverty in China, we 
estimate the impact on poverty alleviation for a wide range of poverty lines. Lastly, in 
light of concern that the impact of the programme, like the compensation, will be merely 
temporary, we use the results of our analysis to say something about the sustainability of 
the programme once compensation ceases.
l The author would like to thank the Chinese Council for International Cooperation for Environment and 
Development for funding this research. The survey and research agenda would not have been possible without 
the vision and hard work of Professor Zhang Shiqiu at Beijing University and my supervisor Pr. Tim Swanson. 
Furthermore, the survey itself and its specific focus was the result of discussions between Dr Andreas Kontoleon 
and Pauline Grosjean at the Universities of Cambridge and Toulouse respectively. Indeed, this chapter has 
arisen out of numerous discussions with Pauline Grosjean. Many thanks also to all the student enumerators at 
the Department of Environmental Sciences at Beijing University for their hard work and committment in helping 
to develop and implement the survey during the summer of 2004. Lastly, thanks to Jerry Warford for being the 
catalyst for my involvement in this project.
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5.1 Pream ble
The previous Chapter focussed upon the nature of international agreements in biodiversity con­
servation and the extent to which they may introduce perverse incentives for eligible countries. 
Therein, and by way of anecdotal evidence, the World Bank’s experience in Latin America was 
cited. Incremental cost contracts in which the compensation offered effectively covered only 
marginal changes in agricultural production, and not stocks of forest land as yet unconverted, 
were received by farmers with a certain amount of contempt: ‘bueno corto todo!’ (right, I’ll cut 
the lot!) being a common response (World Bank 2003). Clearly the amount of compensation 
at the level of the individual farmer is of particular importance for ensuring the sustainability 
of policies which aim to curtail deforestation or encourage reforestation. The message here is 
that not only will farmers have to be compensated for any loss of income, but compensation 
schemes must endeavour to improve incomes among participating farmers, sometimes elevating 
them from poverty, in order for such a policy to achieve its objectives in the long run. Of 
course, poverty alleviation is the prime objective of some interventions, particularly in devel­
oping countries, and in this regard the policy prescription in Chapter 4 appears to satisfy both 
environmental and poverty alleviation objectives: the north-south distribution of income under 
the no-destruction bargaining solution described in the previous Chapter is more equal and 
ensures greater preservation of environmental and biological resources. Beyond this, the link 
between environment and poverty is well established, and is particularly strong in developing 
countries, and initiatives exist originating from international organisations, national govern­
ments or more locally, which endeavour to achieve both environmental and poverty alleviation 
objectives by compensating households for land set-asides (World Bank 2003, Johnson et al 
1997, CCICED 2002). But how successful have these policies been in alleviating poverty at 
the household level and maintaining environmental benefits? What are the features of the pro­
gramme and the households that determine success? More generally, how can one adequately 
and robustly estimate programme impacts? These are the questions to which we turn in this 
Chapter. In particular we address the largest national set-aside compensation programme in 
the world: the Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP) of the People Republic of China, 
or ‘Grain for Green’.
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5.2 Introduction
In this Chapter we analyse an important national reforestation compensation scheme: the 
Sloping Lands Conversion Programme (SLCP) or ‘Grain for Green’ programme of the Peoples 
Republic of China. This policy started in 1999 and has two main objectives. Firstly, and 
primarily, the SLCP intends to generate river basin/watershed related environmental benefits 
by reforesting currently cultivated highly sloped land in the upper reaches of a number of 
important river systems. Indeed, the SLCP was hatched in direct response to the loss of 
topsoil, siltation of streams and the increased flood events witnessed in many river basins in 
recent years, most notably the Yangtze River and the Chao and Bai rivers in the North East 
of China, each of which was subject to severe floods in the summer of 1998. The blame for the 
severity of these floods was placed squarely with deforestation (World Bank 2001). Secondly, 
the SLCP endeavours to alleviate rural poverty, by offering relatively generous compensation 
packages to households for reforestation of their cultivated land in the form of cash, in-kind 
grain and occasionally tree-seedlings and technical assistance (Xu et al 2001).
The compensation provided to households under the SLCP is limited in duration to a period 
of 5 or 8  years, and for this reason, there is great speculation as to whether or not the SLCP will 
be sustainable in the long-run with regard to its two main objectives: environmental benefits 
and poverty alleviation (Uchida et al 2004, Xu and Cao 2 0 0 2 , Gong and Xu 2000, CCICED 
2000). Of course, these two goals are inexorably linked since participating households will only 
maintain lands reforested under the SLCP if their welfare in the period after compensation 
ceases is at least what it was under their former land-use practices. That is, the sustainability 
of the SLCP requires that the incomes of the poor households that are the stated focus of 
the programme are permanently raised as a result of the temporary subsidies, and hence some 
households will need to be lifted permanently out of poverty. But is this likely to happen and 
if so, how?
Ultimately, the implied hope among policy makers within the Chinese government in this 
regard is that temporary compensation for setting aside land will enable households to find 
alternative and more lucrative sources of income which permanently raise household welfare 
thereby removing incentives to revert back to their former practices when compensation ceases. 
One obvious way in which increased welfare is envisaged is through the production of forest 
goods from the forested SLCP land. Other alternatives include increased livestock production
193
or off-farm income.
So, the sustainability of the environmental benefits from the SLCP and the permanent 
alleviation of rural poverty rests upon the validity the assertion that temporary subsidies will 
induce permanent changes in the source and level of household income. But, what impact has 
the SLCP had upon the incomes of participant households to date? The empirical evidence 
in relation to this question is scant thus far and subject to numerous caveats and empirical 
problems. Uchida et al (2004), for example, provide an analysis of these impacts but only for 
participants. Although their results are indicative they lack a proper counterfactual comparison 
group of non-participants and only reflect impacts over a short adjustment period of one to two 
years. Since selection into the programme is likely to be non-random, their estimates of impacts 
are likely to be contaminated with selection bias, while their data may not cover a time-span 
sufficient for household responses to be manifested. Similarly, the idea that households will 
maintain SLCP land in the absence of subsidies is certainly at loggerheads with empirical (and 
anecdotal) evidence on participant households’ post-programme intentions. Uchida et al (2004) 
and Grosjean (2005) show that many households intend to revert back to former practices upon 
the cessation of compensation, while others believe that the compensation will simply continue 
indefinitely2. On the positive side, the latter study has shown a link between participation 
in the off-farm labour market and the propensity to maintain SLCP land once compensation 
ceases. However, while this is an important finding, in the presence of issues of selection into 
the programme, the extent to which participation in the programme has facilitated increases 
in off-farm labour incomes is not altogether clear. Consequently, the assumption that such 
changes will occur as a result of the SLCP remains heroic. For these reasons alone it remains 
an important task to analyse the impact of the programme on the level and composition of 
household incomes and poverty alleviation.
In light of this, the questions we wish to answer in this Chapter are as follows. Firstly, given 
the various attributes that influence participation, to what extent has this highly targeted policy 
selected poor households and increased their incomes compared to non-participants? How has 
the composition of income changed? and to what extent has the impact been sufficient to lift 
participant households out of poverty?. The latter naturally gives rise to a further question; 
Against which yardstick are we to measure poverty alleviation? This is particularly pertinent
2 Anecdotal evidence obtained by colleagues at Beijing University from Sichuan province suggests that some 
households will almost certainly reconvert SLCP forest upon cessation of the compensation.
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in the case of China since, not only is the appropriate choice of poverty measure in China the 
source of some considerable disagreement, research has shown that the impact of other poverty 
alleviation strategies in China can be hidden by the choice of poverty line (Chen and Ravallion 
2003).
In order to answer these questions and obtain unbiased and efficient estimates of the impact 
of the SLCP there are two econometric issues arising from particular features of the intervention 
and its target group. Firstly, as mentioned, there is the question of selection for participation 
in the SLCP. While in principle participation in the programme is voluntary, evidence suggests 
that whether selection is voluntary, compulsory or a mixture of the two, depends upon location. 
In each case selection is likely to be non-random and based on household and local characteristics 
that are not always observable to the analyst. Hence, the econometric approach must provide 
an identification strategy that accounts for this. Secondly, it is well known that there are local 
and household level determinants of rural poverty (see e.g. Jalan and Ravallion 2002, Park 
et al 2 0 0 2 ) and also that semi-subsistence households differ in the nature and severity of the 
constraints, frictions and market failures that they face, and which effectively define them (Key 
et al 2000). Consequently, responses to public interventions such as the SLCP are likely to 
be extremely heterogenous both geographically and at the household level. Indeed, this type 
of heterogeneity underlies the results of Chen and Ravallion (2003) since they imply that the 
impact differs across quantiles of the income distribution. It is clear therefore that any empirical 
approach which attempts to estimate programme impacts needs to accommodate observable 
and unobservable heterogeneity in two dimensions: selection into the programme and in the 
specification of the impact.
In order to answer these questions in a manner which accounts for the aforementioned issues 
of heterogeneity and selection we draw from the programme evaluation literature and employ 
a variety of techniques. The analysis of the impact of public interventions has fostered a bur­
geoning literature on programme evaluation and although it derives predominantly from the 
statistical and epidemiological literature, in economics at least, it has developed methodolog­
ically in the realm of the evaluation of active labour market programmes3. The overriding 
goal of the techniques applied to non-experimental data is to emulate a randomised control 
experiment and thereby overcome the issues described above which are commonly referred to 
as the ‘programme evaluation problem’: the fact that we are missing data on what would have
3See e.g. Blundell and Costa-Dias 2002, Heckman and Robb 1995, Heckman et al 1997 for excellent reviews.
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happened to participants had they not participated means that we cannot easily evaluate the 
real impact. These methods have been applied widely in the analysis of major public and donor 
interventions in China (e.g. Chen and Ravallion 2003, Park et al 2002) and in other developing 
countries (e.g. Henschel 2002, Bandyopadhyay et al 2004).
In this Chapter we take the following empirical approach. Our parameter of interest in the 
first instance is the ‘average treatment on the treated’ (ATT), that is, the average impact of 
the SLCP upon participants. We estimate this parameter for household income and the com­
ponents thereof using the panel structure of the data to account for selection on unobservable 
heterogeneity. We use propensity score matching methods following Heckman et al (1997) and 
an estimator weighted by the propensity score following Abadie (2005) to control for selection 
on observables. Then, mindful that average impacts may hide heterogeneous impacts at differ­
ent quantiles of the income distribution, and given our interest in the impact at lower income 
quantiles, we estimate Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE) following Lehman (1972), Koenker 
(2003) and Athey and Imbens (2005). Lastly, we estimate the impact of the programme on 
poverty alleviation, that is, the proportion of households living beneath the poverty line, for 
a variety of poverty lines commonly employed in China. This analysis draws from Chen and 
Ravallion (2003). In this way we establish the average impact of the programme and the extent 
to which the programme has been pro-poor. Finally, using these results we say something about 
the sustainability of the programme once compensation ceases and highlight future work.
We undertake our analysis of the SLCP using household level data gathered specifically for 
this purpose by the Department of Environmental Sciences at Beijing University, in collabora­
tion with the Department of Economics at the University College London during the summer of 
2004 in two distinct areas of China: Ningxia in the arid North and Guizhou in the more humid 
South. This Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.3 we describe the SLCP in some depth 
and the previous work that has been undertaken in this area. Section 5.4 discusses the issues of 
heterogeneity and selection while Section 5.5 describes the programme evaluation problem and 
the matching Difference in Differences estimators that we use to address these issues. Section
5.6 describes the empirical strategy, the data, presents the behavioural model for participation 
in the SLCP and provides an analysis of this decision. In Section 5.7 we present the Difference 
in Difference estimates of the average treatment on the treated (ATT) for income measures. 
The analysis of the impact upon income distribution and poverty alleviation occurs in Section 
5.8, with an analysis of income quantiles and quantile treatment effects (QTE) in Section 5.8.1
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and poverty alleviation in Section 5.8.2. Section 5.9 discusses and concludes.
5.3 The Sloping Lands Conversion Policy (SLCP)
5.3.1 Motivation and compensation
The Sloping Lands Conversion Policy represents an ambitious intervention to encourage refor­
estation of previously converted land by compensating farmers for changes in land use practices 
on sloping and other types of land. The proposed scale of the project is huge with the ultimate 
aim being the conversion of around 15 million hectares of cropland, approximately a third of 
which will be on land which has a slope of at least 25 degrees (Uchida et al 2004, CCICED 
2002). Since the policy commenced in 1999 approximately 15 million farmers have become 
participants in 20 provinces and over 27000 villages (Uchida et al 2004). In the first 2  years of 
the SLCP almost 1 .2  million hectares of cultivated land was converted to forestland or pasture, 
while an additional 1 million hectares of barren land was afforested.
The principle motivation for this large and expensive intervention is to address environmen­
tal damages associated with the cultivation of sloped lands. There is considerable evidence to 
suggest that the main cause of increased runoff and soil erosion in China is deforestation in 
the upper reaches of river basins and watersheds. This leads to a number of important costs 
which are incident throughout the watershed. Firstly, the severe flooding in the Bai, Chao and 
particularly the Yangtze river basins in 1998, which imposed considerable costs on downstream 
authorities and inhabitants, has been attributed to the denuding of formerly forested hillsides 
in the upper reaches of these basins. In both upstream and downstream areas the loss of fertile 
topsoil, the siltation of streams and reduced hydraulic capacity of the watercourses has inhib­
ited the productivity of agriculture, the availability of water resources and contributed to the 
increased the incidents of flooding. In some areas the river level at its peak is 7m higher than 
its historical river bank and in the Yangtze River alone investments of up to Y7.8 billion have 
taken place in order to mitigate this problem (Yang 2001) . In order to address these watershed 
costs the SLCP’s stated objective is to target highly sloped lands. However, the environmental 
costs of such cultivation in general are not limited to watersheds but also include airsheds. The 
increased incidence of dust-storms in the Northern plains, and the associated loss of topsoil that 
this entails, has also been attributed to the extensive cultivation of former pastures or natural 
grasslands and, despite its name, the SLCP has targeted these flatter areas with the purpose of
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returning the land to pasture or its natural grassland state (CCICED 2002). In this Chapter 
we focus upon the aspects of the SLCP that axe concerned with reforestation.
The compensation takes on a number of different forms and levels and is of a duration which 
depends upon the type of forest to which land is converted. Firstly, compensation can consist 
of cash, grain or seedlings for trees provided by the local forest agencies. Depending upon 
particular circumstances, SLCP participants receive approximately 1500 to 2250 kilograms of 
grain per hectare per year and an additional Y300 per mu per year in cash4. Lastly, seedlings 
are provided on a per hectare basis. These general levels of compensation vary from region 
to region reflecting local conditions. In the Guizhou and Ningxia, the regions studied in this 
Chapter and in Uchida et al (2004), the level of the annual cash compensation was Y300 and 
Y200 per mu respectively. These differences reflected the different opportunity costs of land 
encountered in each region. Uchida et al (2004) report that the compensation varies over time 
as well as space with the total value of compensation in the upper and middle reaches of the 
Yellow river varying from Y3150 per hectare in the first year of the programme, to Y2400 in the 
second year. In the Yangtze River basin annual compensation varied from Y4200 per hectare 
in the first year to Y3450 from the second year on. These variations over time reflect the initial 
fixed start-up costs while the variation over space reflects the productivity of land in regions 
with different climatic and agronomic characteristics. Uchida et al (2004) have analysed the 
extent to which these regionally fixed compensation levels lead to the prevalance of under or 
over compensation. They find that in general over compensation prevails and suggest that the 
same environmental benefits could be achieved at a lower cost. However, Ng and Pearce (2005) 
note that reductions in compensation in the name of cost effective environmental benefits must 
be tallied against the potential losses in poverty alleviation.
The policy varies across participants with regard to the duration of the compensation. 
Cultivated sloped land is converted either to ‘ecological’ forest or to ‘productive’ forest. In 
the former case the farmer has no rights whatsoever to the products that the forest has to 
offer: e.g. timber, while the role of custodian of such forests is generally assumed (CCICED 
2002). In this case land is converted to forest which serves a purely ecological function and 
compensation continues for a period of 8  years. For productive forests participants are allowed 
access and have property rights to the forest products: non-timber forest products: fruits, nuts 
mushrooms etc., and limited quantities of timber. In this case there is potential for the farmer
41 hectare =  15 mu.
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to replace income lost from cultivation of crops once trees become productive and for this 
reason compensation continues for a period of 5 years only, reflecting time required for trees to 
become productive (Xu et al 2000). The rules of the SLCP state that a minimum of 80% of 
the reforested area in any region must be ecological forest. Once more, there is a trade-off here 
between encouraging more commercial or productive forests at the expense of environmental 
benefits, and encouraging more ecological forests to the potential detriment of incomes, poverty 
alleviation and hence the long-run sustainability of the programme.
5.3.2 Implementation and institutions
The SLCP is implemented via a number of governmental bodies. Subsidies stem from central 
government and axe distributed by local government bodies at the county and village level. 
Local government is also responsible for inspections and other assistance in relation to the 
programme, such as provision of seedlings and certain technical assistance (Ng and Pearce 
2005). As mentioned above, the implementation of the SLCP by local government varies from 
place to place. Perhaps the most important aspect of this is the selection of the participants 
which, as already mentioned, differs in the extent to which it is voluntary from one village to the 
next. Furthermore, the emphasis of the programme differs with some villages focussing upon the 
poverty alleviation objective of the SLCP and other focussing upon the environmental benefits. 
It is also worth noting that in some areas the implementation of the SLCP has outpaced the 
arrival of funds, leading to some additional hardship for participants (Ng and Pearce 2005).
At the plot level the property rights to land and the management responsibility of forested 
land also varies from place to place. The most important distinction here is between household 
management under the Household Responsibility System (HRS) and collective management5. 
Similarly, there is frequently local government intervention at the plot level where village leaders 
or members of the implementation agency choose the plots to be included in the SLCP and 
the frequently the type of trees (Uchida et al 2004). Lastly, in line with the literature on the 
SLCP, our survey reveals that, while this is not necessarily a built in feature of the SLCP, there 
is some uncertainty with regard to the property rights to land converted under the SLCP and
5The HRS was introduced in the early 1980’s and represented a shift in the property rights to land from 
local government or collective ownership and management towards households. It is widely regarded that this 
shift increased the perceived security of property rights to land and invoked important increases in agricultural 
productivity (e.g. Dong 1996).
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the associated products.
5.3.3 Previous analyses of the SLCP: Results and shortcomings
Since 1999, there have been remarkably few attempts to evaluate the impact of the SLCP 
and its effectiveness and efficiency in reaching the stated objectives. The focus of these early 
studies has been upon the types of land targeted by the SLCP, its cost-effectiveness, the effect 
on incomes and consequently the extent to which the SLCP is sustainable (Uchida et al 2004, 
WWF 2003, Xu et al 2002). In particular, these studies highlighted the marketability of tree 
varieties in productive forests or the development of markets for such goods as being major 
determinants of poverty alleviation and sustainability of the SLCP. Institutions such as property 
rights to SLCP land, security of which generally encourages investment in the maintenance of 
the re-forested lands, were also highlighted. Investment in SLCP land, it is argued, would 
increase the opportunity cost of reforested land over cropland and hence reduce the incentives 
to revert back. There is also evidence to suggest that farmers’ income has indeed increased as 
a result of their participation in the SLCP (CCICED 2 0 0 2 ). This is attributed to two facts. 
Firstly, on average at least compensation has outstripped the value of lost production. For 
example, Uchida et al (2004) estimate that in purchasing power parity terms the value of the 
compensation offered under the SLCP is up to fifteen times that offered to farmers under the 
US Conservation Reserve Programme (CRP)6. Secondly, Uchida et al (2004) and Grosjean 
(2005) report that participation in the SLCP has indeed invoked the reallocation of labour 
towards more lucrative off-farm activities. On the other hand, preliminary evidence from the 
China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED 2002) 
suggests that poorly defined property rights to reforested lands has so far hindered investment 
in forestry related production activities which in turn has hindered the provision of ecological 
services and the sale of non-timber forest products.
In light of these results it is not easy to draw general conclusions with regard to the impact 
and sustainability of the SLCP. On the one hand incomes have been increased and labour has 
been reallocated, apparently to more lucrative activities. While on the other, institutional defi­
ciencies appear to be hindering income generation, poverty alleviation and hence sustainability. 
Furthermore, the empirical studies that have been undertaken to date suffer from a number of 
inadequacies which render their conclusions at least incomplete and at most highly suspect.
6This is a land set-aside programme of equivalent size in the US.
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For example, although Uchida et al (2004) undertook a survey of 190 households in two 
distinct regions in order to evaluate the impact of the SLCP, they only collected data on 
SLCP participants. Hence their conclusions are drawn on the basis of participants alone and no 
control is made for any changes in the outcome variables of interest: incomes, prices, wages etc., 
among non-participants. In a sense which will be described more clearly below, any measure of 
programme impacts calculated without reference to a control group is likely to be contaminated 
with Section bias. Furthermore, previous analyses of income changes are weakened by the data 
used to construct the cropping incomes, and hence the opportunity cost of land converted 
under the SLCP. The prices used were obtained from a secondary source from different regions 
of China (Sichuan and Shaanxi) chosen due to their similar agro-climatic conditions (de Brauw 
et al 2002). Furthermore, previous analyses (Uchida et al 2004 and Gong and Xu 2002) obtained 
data on the impacts over a one to two year period after the implementation of the SLCP. It is 
arguable as to whether this represents a sufficiently long time period for participant households 
to make permanent changes in the pattern of production. A longer time horizon is likely to 
provide a clearer picture. Lastly, the former studies of the SLCP do not pay specific attention 
to the impact of the programme upon income distribution or poverty alleviation, one of the 
most important objectives of the programme.
The following Section describes how the data available to us allows us to overcome many 
of these shortcomings and inadequacies. It also describes the objectives of the study in more 
detail in light of the preceding discussion.
5.4 Issues for E stim ation  of SLCP Im pact
5.4.1 Heterogeneity, selection and measurement of poverty alleviation
Assuming that the government of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) wants to ensure perma­
nent increases in income for participant households and hence sustained environmental benefits, 
the limited horizon of the programme implies that the government views the world in one of two 
ways. Either the government intends to extend the duration of the compensation once the cur­
rently specified period is over, or, there is the implicit hope that the duration of the temporary 
subsidies is sufficient to invoke permanent increases in participants’ income thereby eradicating 
any incentive for participants to revert back to their former production patterns once compen­
sation ends. The latter view is seen in the rules of the SLCP, which state the duration of the
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compensation scheme explicitly and that the duration for productive forests is shorter than for 
ecological forests. That is, in the latter case, more time is allowed for participants to adjust 
and find alternative sources of income. The sustainability of the SLCP in meeting its poverty 
alleviation and environmental objectives rests upon this fundamental underlying assertion and 
the ability of households to find alternative sources of income.
It is clearly important to shed some light on whether this underlying assertion bears any 
resemblance to the actual impact of the programme four years on, and this is our over-arching 
objective in this Chapter. The previous Section has described the shortcomings of the previous 
analyses of the SLCP. However, there are a number of other features of the programme, its target 
group and its objectives that need to be addressed in order for us to identify econometrically 
the parameters of interest.
Firstly, it will be important to take into consideration the heterogeneous local and house­
hold level characteristics which determine both household income and poverty as well as their 
responses to interventions. Previous work has shown the importance of both household and 
local characteristics in determining outcomes in rural areas. In China, Jalan and Ravallion
(2 0 0 2 ) find strong evidence to show that local public goods: e.g. roads and natural resources, 
are the most significant determinant of geographical poverty traps. Other studies highlight the 
importance of household level characteristics. For example, an important strand of the liter­
ature concerns the ‘constraints’ faced by, and which effectively define, semi-subsistance rural 
households: e.g. market imperfections, transactions costs and other frictions (see e.g. Key, 
Sadoulet and de Janvry 2000). One overwhelming conclusion of this work is that, not only do 
households face different constraints, the constraints also differ in their severity. Carter and 
Yao (2002) provide evidence of this in China with regard to land rental markets and credit con­
straints, Deininger and Jin (2000) study security of property rights, while Bowlus and Sicular
(2003), Matsche and Young (2004) and Vakis et al (2004) are concerned with heterogeneity with 
regard to access to off-farm labour market in China, Zimbabwe and Peru respectively. Grosjean 
(2005) shows that many of the market imperfections discussed in the theoretical and applied 
literature are reflected in our data. For example renting land is still prohibited or submitted 
to authorization in nearly 1 1 % of our surveyed villages, while only 2 2 % of households operate 
in this market. Furthermore, land rights are perceived to be insecure in some villages and land 
reallocation by local governments is still expected by certain households.
Such local and household heterogeneity is important for the analyst since the presence,
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absence or severity of such constraints has been shown to determine household responses to 
public interventions. Therefore, one can expect households to respond in heterogeneous ways 
to interventions such as the SLCP. For example, evidence for heterogeneous impacts of poverty 
alleviation interventions in China have been noted by Chen and Ravallion (2003), while in 
Kenya, Evenson and Mwabu (1998) show that the magnitude of the impact of agricultural 
extension on yields differs across the quantiles of the distribution of yields7. The conclusion 
that one must take from the sum of these contributions is that heterogeneity at the local 
and household level is the rule rather than the exception. Moreover, given that regions and 
households are likely to differ in ways which are not observable to the analyst, any econometric 
approach to the evaluation of the impacts of the SLCP should be sufficiently flexible to account 
for heterogeneous responses.
Secondly, and following on from this point, is the question of selection into the programme. 
As described above, our data and all the available evidence from previous studies suggests that 
the programme is predominantly involuntary with households targeted by local government on 
the basis of programme objectives: environmental and poverty alleviation, and more arbitrary 
attributes: e.g. ease of implementation (Xu and Cao 2002). In either case is seems clear that 
selection is unlikely to be random and will be based upon a number of local and household 
level characteristics which may or may not be observable to the analyst. As is well known, this 
presents particular problems for the identification of the impact of the SLCP and so the econo­
metric model needs to control for selection on both heterogeneous observed and unobserved 
local and household level characteristics.
From the policy perspective however, we are interested in the extent to which the selection 
of participants, and hence the targeting of the programme has improved the lot of the poor. The 
question of the effectiveness of targeting for rural poverty alleviation is not new in China and 
the trade off between direct assistance of the poor at a local level and more coarse regional level 
programmes has been the subject of much debate (Park et al 2002, Jalan and Ravallion 1998). 
In our case the questions are: Given the various attributes that influence participation, to what 
extent has this highly targeted policy targeted poor households; Has the SLCP increased poor 
participants’ incomes compared to non-participants? and; To what extent has the impact been 
sufficient to lift participant households out of poverty?
7 Evidence exists for small impacts as a result of large transactions costs (de Janvry and Sadoulet 2002) and 
responses being the opposite of those intended or expected (OECD 2001).
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This immediately gives rise to third question. Against which yardstick should one measure 
poverty alleviation? The definition of poverty is a subject of much debate in China as well as 
elsewhere. One important difference exists between the official poverty line in China, which in 
purchasing power parity (PPP) terms is equal to approximately Y640 per capita per year, and 
the international yardstick of $1 per day, or Y900 per capita per year in PPP terms, commonly 
employed by the international aid agencies. Given the potential for heterogenous impacts we 
should expect that the impact of the programme on poverty alleviation will vary depending 
upon the poverty line employed. Indeed, Chen and Ravallion (2003) show that this was the 
case for the South West China Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme, finding that although 
the average poverty alleviation impact upon the participant households was insignificant with 
regard to the poverty line of $1  per day, when measured against lower poverty lines the impact 
was much greater and economically and statistically significant. Therefore, if we are interested 
in measuring the impact of the SLCP upon poverty it makes sense to measure this impact 
across a wide range of poverty lines.
In short, in order to identify the impact of the programme upon the participants’ incomes 
and income sources and hence, its effect upon poverty alleviation, the following issues needs 
to be considered: heterogeneity of household responses, selection into the programme on the 
basis of unobservable household or village level characteristics, and the yardstick against which 
impacts are measured.
5.4.2 The objectives of the current study
The household survey undertaken for this study has a number of particularly desirable features 
which mean that we are uniquely placed to deal with the issues identified above. The data 
available to us and the transformations undertaken for the purpose of analysis are described 
in greater detail in Section 5.6.1 below. However, for the purpose of outlining the objectives 
of this study we describe the key features of the data which allow us to overcome some of the 
inadequacies of previous work in this area.
Firstly, we have collected pre- and post-programme data on participant and non-participant 
households in the regions in which the SLCP has been implemented. Firstly, our study covers 
the four year period from 1999 to 2003 and hence we are better placed to analyse the medium 
to longer term impacts of the programme upon the welfare and structure of farming activity 
among participant households. Secondly, we have detailed data at the individual level con­
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cerning income sources over time allowing a detailed analysis of the impact of the SLCP upon 
these outcome variables. Thirdly, we have household and village level data on the prices of 
agricultural production and wages paid off-farm. In addition, the panel nature of the data 
allows us to control for unobservable time invariant heterogeneity at the household and village 
level. This in turn allows us to control for non-random selection and make the SLCP mimic a 
randomised control experiment. Lastly, we have data on local institutions, constraints, and the 
implementation of the SLCP which allow the participation decision to be precisely modelled. 
All of these features represent an improvement upon previous work.
The over-arching objective of this Chapter is the analysis of the impact of the SLCP upon 
the incomes of participant households. Given the preceding discussion the specific objectives 
are therefore:
1. To evaluate the impact of the programme on household incomes in total and the com­
ponents thereof (livestock, crops, forest products and off-farm activities) controlling for 
selection into the programme and allowing for heterogeneous responses.
2. To evaluate the impact of the programme on incomes at different quantiles of the income 
distribution and hence the impact on the distribution of income.
3. To estimate the extent to which the SLCP has alleviated poverty as measured by several 
yardsticks.
4. To draw inference from the preceding analyses as to the overall impact of the programme, 
its impact on poverty alleviation and its sustainability once compensation ceases.
5. To provide guidance for future work.
The analysis that we undertake in what follows is entrenched in the statistical and econo­
metric literature on programme evaluation and in particular the literature concerned with 
‘matching’ (e.g. Heckman et al 1997, 1998, Blundell and Costa-Dias 2 0 0 2 , Abadie 2 0 0 2 ). Given 
the discussion concerning the heterogeneity of responses among rural households it is important 
that the empirical approach caters for the possibility of differential impacts across households. 
This is something that many of the matching estimators that we propose accommodate in a
more comprehensive manner than previous analyses8. The following Section describes the pro­
8 Uchida et al (2004) use a fixed effects logit model which controls for individual time invariant specific effects 
in a similar manner to the Difference in Differences estimator that we propose.
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gramme evaluation problem and hence why previous analyses are likely to have produced biased 
results. The estimators for non-experimental data axe then described before moving onto the 
empirical strategy
5.5 Program m e Evaluation M ethods
In this Section we describe the general programme evaluation problem and the ideas that have 
been developed to overcome it. Our outcome measures for the SLCP will be total incomes 
and the components of income and our aim is to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates of 
the changes in these outcome measures that are attributable to the SLCP programme. Our 
parameter of interest is the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) which is a measure of 
the impact of the SLCP on the outcome measure for participants compared to the case in which 
they had been non-participants. In our case we establish the extent to which the SLCP has had 
an impact in incomes and income sources. To identify ATT  we must overcome the programme 
evaluation problem and find conditions under which non-paxticipants can be used as a suitable 
comparison group for participants. We describe the traditional matching estimator, as it relates 
to Rubin and Rosenbaum (1983), and the extensions to this estimator that have been proposed 
more recently (Heckman et al 1997). In particular we focus upon estimators that allow us to 
exploit the panel structure of our data, namely the matched Difference in Differences estimator. 
We describe the parametric, non-parametric and semi-parametric variants of this estimator that 
we ultimately employ.
5.5.1 The program evaluation problem
The programme evaluation problem is effectively a missing data problem. That is, an individual 
or a household can only be observed in one state at any one time: they axe either a participant 
in a programme or non-participant at time t. If the participation in the programme is denoted 
by the variable D: D = 1 for participants and D = 0 for non-paxticipants, and our outcome 
variables are respectively denoted Y\ and Yo, then at any one time we observe the following 
data for an individual:
Y  = DY1 + ( 1 -  D) Y0
This representation is common in the literature and stems from Roy (1951) through to Quandt
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(1972) and Rubin (1978). The usual version of this model is written as a function of observables 
(to the econometrician) and unobservables, additively in separable form:
Y0 = go(X) + U0 (5.1)
Yi = gi(X) + U! (5.2)
where X  represents the observable determinants of the outcome variable Yk for an individual fc, 
gi (X) is the function which captures this relation when an individual is a participant (i = 1) and 
a non-participant (i = 0), and Ui represent the unobservable determinants. The impact for an 
individual of a policy intervention can be represented by the term A = Y\ — Yq. Clearly, were 
Y\ and Yq observed simultaneously for individuals there would be no programme evaluation 
problem since A would be observed for each individual. It is the fact that Y\ is not observed
for non-participants while Yo is not observed for participants that the programme evaluation
problem exists. That is, counterfactuals are not observed for individuals. For this reason 
focus is usually placed upon the population and summary statistics for mean impacts (A) for 
individuals with characteristics X.  The parameters of interest frequently include:
Average Treatment on the Treated: A T T  = E { Y \ -  Yq\X, D — 1) = E  (A|X, D = 1)
(5.3)
Average Treatment on the Untreated: ATU = E  (Yi — Yo\X, D = 0) = E  (A|X, D =  0)
(5.4)
Average Treatment Effect: A T E  = E  (Y\ — Yq\ X )  = E  (A|X) (5.5)
Of these parameters it is the former which has perhaps received the most attention. A T T  
measures the difference between the treatment and non treatment outcome for programme 
participants, that is, the treatment group. In terms of the separable model of (5.1) and (5.2) 
A T T  can be written:
A T T  = 9l (X) -  g0 (X) + E(U 1 -  U0\D = 1) (5.6)
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The programme evaluation problem still remains even when cast in this light since estimating 
ATT requires information on the counterfactual quantity E  (Yq\D =  1) while the observed data 
only allow the calculation of the following quantities:
E (Fi |X, D = 1) = si (X) + E (t/i\X, D = 1) (5.7)
E  (y0|X, D = 0) = go (X) + E (U0\X, D = 0) (5.8)
One estimator might use observed data to estimate ATT, by taking the difference between
5.7 and 5.8, however this estimator contains selection bias reflecting self-selection into the
programme on the basis of unobservable characteristics9. To see this consider the decomposition 
of this estimator:
E (Yi|X, D = 1 ) - E  (Y0\X, D = 0) = E (Y 1 -  Y0\X, D = 1 )+{E (Y0\X , D = 1) -  E  (Y0\X, D = 0)}
= ATT + BIAS  (5.9)
Here, the last term in braces on the right hand side represents the selection bias. In terms of 
the separable model above the bias can be written as:
B IA S  = E  (U0\X, D = l ) - E  (U0\X, D = 0) (5.10)
which makes clear the selection on unobservables: as long as E  (Uq\X, D = 1) ^  E  (Uo\X, D = 0), 
the bias exists.
Experiments can be designed in order to circumvent this problem through randomisation.
By randomly selecting actual participants and non-participants among those who have selected
themselves as potential participants an unbiased estimate of ATT can be obtained since for
those who selected themselves as potential participants E  (Uq\X, D = 1) =  E(Uo\X, D = 0)
between eventual participants and non-paxticipants.
For non-experimental data a plausible comparison group is not immediately available and
the problem of selection bias can remain. Fortunately there exists a number of solutions to
9In fact, selection could take place on some other basis, e.g. by the parties implementing the programme
such as local authorities. However, provided selection takes place on the basis of variables unobserved to the 
econometrician the selection bias term remains.
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this problem which axe commonly applied to non-experimental data. Each of these solutions 
presents an identification idea that effectively constructs a suitable comparison group from 
which to estimate the parameter of interest or some averaged version thereof. In what follows 
we describe a number of the estimators that are relevant to the programme in hand: the SLCP. 
The discussion takes place with regard to the average treatment on the treated parameter 
(ATT) although the ideas hold analogously for the other parameters such as those presented 
above.
5.5.2 Estimators for non-experimental data
5.5.2.1 Matching
The idea of matching is highly intuitive and it has been used extensively in the evaluation of 
social programmes in developed and developing countries alike (see e.g. Heckman et al 1997, 
Bhandyophadhyay et al 2004). Interestingly, Chen and Ravallion (2003) used a number of 
matching techniques to evaluate the impact of poverty alleviation strategies in south western 
China. Estimation of A T T , for example, using matching can be thought of as follows.
For each individual, k, in the treatment group a measure of the change in the outcome 
variable, A*,, is constructed e.g. A*, =  Q\k — Qoj, for each member where individuals from 
the participant group and individuals from the non-participant group, j , are matched on the 
basis of the similarity of their observable characteristics. Where the scalars Q \k  and Q o j  are 
quantities containing the outcome variables Y ik  and Ybj10- Of course, there are many ways in 
which one could determine a suitable match for an individual i, and in reality, rather than 
matching participants with single non-participants many matching estimators use a weighted 
average of non-participants’ outcomes as the basis of the comparison. Hence, where Jo and I\ 
are indices for non-participants and participants respectively, matching estimators of ATT  can 
be generally described as first constructing the following estimate of A for each programme 
participant (Heckman et al 1997):
A f c  =  Q ik  -  ^ 2  W n q,Ni Q o j  ( 5 - 1 1 )
jzio
where ^2jej0 W n 0,Nx ( k , j )  represents the distance measure employed to compare participants
10For example, the impact could be defined as A =  Yu — Yoj. In fact, as we shall see, the measure of individual 
impact may include adjusted values of these outcome variables.
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and non-participants and No and N\ is the number of non-participants and participants respec­
tively11 . The matching estimate for ATT  can then be represented as a weighted average of this 
measure12:
ATTmatch = 2^ WNo,Ni (k )  Qik ~ 2^ W n 0,n i ( k , j )  Qoj  (5-12)
k e h  L  j d o
where Efce/i w n 0 ,N i ( k)  is used to select different domains of the variables used to generate 
the match: the conditioning variables, Z. Different matching methods use different forms of
E je /o  w *o,Ni  (k , j ) and Efc€/i w N0,Ni (k) •
The identification idea that underpins this estimator is that by conditioning upon the ob­
servable determinants, Z , of the programme participation decision, D selection bias (BIAS)  
is eradicated. In general terms the solution to the programme evaluation problem offered by 
matching is based upon the following assumption13:
(Yl tY0) ± D \ Z  (A-l)
That is, the outcome variables are statistically independent/orthogonal (where orthogonality is 
represented by _L) of the conditional participation decision, where Z  represents the observable 
variables upon which the decision is decision is conditioned14. This independence rules out the 
selection on unobservables and for this reason this method is frequently referred to as ‘selection 
on observables’ (Heckman and Robb 1986). This identification assumption solves the selection 
problem since (A-l) implies that, if the means exist:
B I A S  =  E (Yo\X, D = 1, Z ) - E ( Y q\X,D = 0, Z)
= *  E (Y0\X, Z) — E (Yo\X, Z) = 0 (5.13)
11 This is usually a positive valued function and defined such that for each k E h ,  Y , je i0 (k, j )  =  1.
12 Note that matching with a single individual and simply taking the difference in means for participants and
non-participants fall out as special cases.
13 Matching does not require additive separability as describe in the model above. In fact the assumption
(Yi, Yo) -L D \Z  is the general form of the matching assumption Navarro-Lozano (2004).
14We make a distinction here, which is useful later on, between the set of observable variables which determine
outcomes, X ,  and the set of observable variables that determine the participation decision, Z. These may or may
not coincide.
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This means that the missing counterfactual, E  (Yo|X, D = 1, Z ) , can be estimated by E  (Yo|A, D = Q,Z 
to estimate ATT  as described in (5.6) above. Effectively, it is assumed that the bias does not 
exist when conditioning on Z.
It seems intuitive to match like people to like, and that matching upon on a many character­
istics would be desirable. However, particularly when dealing with non-parametric estimators, 
high dimension matching can be a problem for efficiency. Fortunately, Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) showed that if in addition to (A-l) the following assumption holds:
0 < P (Z) < 1 (A-2 )
that is, persons with the same characteristics Z  can be observed as either participants or non­
participants for all values of Z, then:
(Yu Ya)L D \P { Z )  (A-l’)
and hence matching can take place on the basis of the propensity score, P  (Z ) , alone and ATT  
can be consistently estimated. To see this note that, given assumption (A-l’): we have both:
Pr (D = 1| Ylt Y0, Z) = Pr (D =  1\Z) = P (Z) (5.14)
and:
BIA S  = E  (Y0| A, D = 1, P (Z)) -  E  (Y0 |X, D = 0, P (Z))
= *  E  (Y0 |A, P (Z)) -  E  (Y0 |X, P (Z)) = 0 (5.15)
Hence, the bias in (5.9) disappears and matching among individuals can take place on the one 
dimensional propensity score P  (Z ), even though Z  may have many components.
The identification conditions for the estimation of ATT  are weaker than those outlined 
above. Since it is only an estimate of the counter-factual mean E  (FolA-, D = 1) that is required 
here, for matching to provide an unbiased estimate of ATT  requires only the weaker condition 
that Yo JL D\P (Z ) . By a similar logic it is clear that to estimate the average treatment on the 
untreated, ATU in (5.4), requires only that Y\ _L D\P (Z) since the counterfactual mean in this 
case is E (Yi\X, D = 0). Indeed, as Heckman et al (1997) note, under the stronger assumption
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of (A-l) all the parameters of interest described so far coincide, whereas under the weaker 
assumptions they are distinct.
The assumption that 0 < P  (Z ) < 1 effectively assumes that the support of Z  is the same 
for participants as for non-participants. This is a strong assumption and has been shown to be 
untrue in many cases (Heckman et al 1997). It is usual to condition on the common support of 
these variables, say 5 , in order to use matching, that is, only where there is common support 
of Z  is it reasonable to match participants and non-participants. This issue is addressed in the 
analysis below.
Whether matching takes place on the propensity score or on particular variables alone, 
individuals are matched to one another on the basis of a predefined distance measure and 
given that there are a number of distance measures that can be employed there is naturally 
a discussion to be had regarding which of these measures is likely to be the most efficient in 
any particular context. Heckman et al (1997) undertake an analysis of the different matching 
estimators and their associated distance measures and compare the outcomes of these estimators 
to the results obtained from a randomised control group. That is, they compare the matching 
estimators for non-experimental data to results for the experimental data that they try to 
emulate. Similar analyses have been undertaken in the context of China, for example, Chen 
and Ravallion (2003) and Park et al (2001) employ a number of matching techniques which 
differ in the distance measure and find that this choice is of some importance for the evaluation 
of the policy.
In the following Section we turn to an approach nested in the framework above which 
allows us to exploit the panel nature of the data that we intend to use. Indeed, the Difference 
in Differences estimator not only exploits the panel data but it also allows for a more flexible 
underlying behavioural model of economic choices than that of the pure matching model. In 
this light we introduce the 3 estimators of the parameter of interest, the average treatment on 
the treated (ATT). The first is the fully parametric estimate of treatment effects that appears 
in Ashenfelter and Card (1985), the second is the non-paxametric estimator of Heckman et al 
(1997) and the third is the semi-parametric approach recently described by Abadie (2005).
5.5.2.2 Difference in differences estim ators (DID)
Linear D ID : The linear Difference in Differences estimator is one of the most common
methods of evaluating the impact of a programme on relevant outcome variables. The DID
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estimator makes use of panel data, that is, pre- and post-programme data axe required for the 
participants and non-participants, and hence we observe the participants switching from an 
untreated state to a treated state. Even in the presence of panel data, however, the outcome 
variables in any time t, Yq (t) and Y\ (£), are not observed for any one individual, and the 
programme evaluation problem remains. The presence of panel data allows an alternative 
solution to the programme evaluation problem and associated selection issues15.
Abadie (2005) provides a succinct explanation of the DID  estimator based on the formula­
tion of Ashenfelter and Card (1985), which we draw from here16. Letting Yk (t) be the outcome 
for individual k , where for the pre-treatment period in period t = 0  and for the post-treatment 
period t = 1 . As before the dummy variable Dk (t) = 1 for the treated population and Dk (t) = 0 
for the untreated, hence Dk (1) = 1 for the treated and Dk (1) =  0  for the comparison group17. 
Assuming separability as in equations (5.1) and (5.2) above, suppose that the outcome variable 
is determined by the familiar components of variance model:
Ykt = OL.Dk (t) + (4>k + 0(t) + £k (t)) (5.16)
where the error term has been decomposed into three unobservable components: an individ­
ual specific component, (f)k, a common (macro) time specific component, 0 (t) , and an indi­
vidual specific mean zero temporary component £k (t) ' -Uk (t) = (j)k + 0 (t) + £k (t) • In this 
parametric formulation, the parameter a represents the impact of the programme on the out­
come variable. In this simple form this treatment is common across all treated individuals 
and not determined by observable characteristics X , that is, this model does not account for 
heterogeneous impacts. As in the usual error components model, the parameter of interest 
is not identified without further restrictions. Abadie shows that a sufficient condition for 
this is that selection for treatment does not depend upon the individual transitory shocks. 
£k (t), that is, P (Dk (1) =  1|£k (t)) = P (Dk (1) — 1), and that this assumption implies that 
E  [(1, Dk (1), t, Dk (t)) * £k (£)] =  0. This allows the parameters of the following representation 
to be identified by ordinary least squares18:
15Heckman and Robb (1995) show that strict panel data is not always required and that repeated cross-sectional
data can solve the programme evaluation problem equally well in many instances.
16 Intuitive explanations can also be found in Blundell and Costa-Dias (2002) for example.
17Of course, Dk (0) =  0 for all parties.
18Where vk (t) =  <t>k -  E[<j>k\Dk {\)\  +  efc ( t) , <5 =  8 (1) -  8 (0), /x =  E[<j>k\Dk (1) =  0] +  5(0), 
and r  =  E  [<j>k\Dk (1) =  1] — E  [4>k\Dk (1) =  0]. Note also that E  [4>k\Dk (1)] =  E  [<f>k\Dk (1) =  0] +
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Yk (t) = n + r.Dk (1) + S.t + a.Dk (t) + Vk (t)
The DID  estimator is so called because under the identifying assumption:
(5.17)
a = {E \Yk (1) |Dk (1) = 1] -  E [Yk (1) |Dk (1) =  0]}-{E \Yk (0) |Dk (1) = 1 ] - E  [Yk (0 ) |Dk (1) -  0 ]}
(5.18)
and OLS provides the sample counterpart to this parameter.
This parametric approach to the estimation of ATT  provides us with a starting point for 
the estimation of the impact of the SLCP upon various outcome variables in China. Indeed, 
where panel data is available the parameter can be estimated either by a simple t-test of mean 
differences between treatment and control groups or by simple OLS regression of Yk (1) — Yk (0) 
on a constant and Dk (1). In fact this approach allows us to see the implication of the identifying 
assumption since the OLS regression yields:
ATTDID = a (5.19)
= {E [Yk (1) -  Yk (0) |Dk (1) = 1] -  E  [Yk (1) -  Yk (0) \Dk (1) = 0]}
+ E [ek (1) -  ek (0) \D =  1] -  E [ek (1) -  e* (0) |£) =  0]
The DID  estimator therefore assumes that the trend in ek (t) for non-participants is the same 
for participants had they not been participants, that is:
E [ek (1) -  £* (0) \D = 1 ] =E [ek (1) -  (0) | D = 0] (A-3)
The DID  estimator has been explained thus far in the absence of additional covariates, X, 
upon all or part of which the participation decision and the outcome variables may depend. 
More importantly, given the identification assumption for A T T d i d , these covariates may also 
control for heterogeneous outcome dynamics (Abadie 2005). Covariates are commonly incor­
porated linearly (Ashenfelter and Card 1985):
Yk (t) = /i + X fk7r (t ) + r.Dk (1) + S.t + a.Dk (t) -I- vk (t) (5.20)
[E [4>k\Dk (1) = 1 } - E  [<(>k\Dk (1) = 1] -  E [4>k\Dk (1) = 0].] .Dk (1).
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where the coefficients on X  change over time and Xk must be uncorrelated with Vk (t). To 
reiterate, cast in this form the treatment effect, a, is modelled as being constant across all 
individuals. By generating a number of interaction effects it is possible to estimate how the 
impact of the programme varies over different values of X: e.g. by gender of region. It should 
also be clear that the DID  estimator allows for selection on unobservables reflected in fa which 
was disallowed under conditional independence assumption of the simple matching procedure. 
That is, a wider variety of behavioural models are compatible with the DID  estimator, including 
selection on expected returns.
The parametric approach described thus far is useful to the extent to which it allows the 
identification of the parameters of interest and predictions to be made out of sample. In effect 
the parametric approach represents another form of matching in which parametric assumptions 
have been substituted for the matching criteria described above. In this way the treatment and 
comparison groups are made comparable. However, these assumptions are not innocuous and 
may introduce bias where the parametric approximation is weak and significant heterogeneity 
exists in the impact of the programme. In general non-parametric estimators are desirable in 
the DID  framework.
N on-/sem i-param etric M atching DID estimators: Heckman et al (1998): Heckman
et al (1997) generate a number of extensions which combine matching and DID  techniques. 
The advantage of these extensions is that they combine the desirable features of each estimator. 
For example, the simple matching approach described above does not conform to conventional 
economic models of selection in which selection takes place on the basis of unobservables and yet 
matching is not without some intuitive appeal. However, the DID  approach does allow selection 
to take place on unobervables in the form of fa and 0*: the individual and time specific effects. 
By combining the two it is possible to cater for more realistic economic models of programme 
selection whilst maintaining the intuitive appeal of the matching idea in controlling for selection 
on observables.
Heckman et al (1997) show that their matching DID  estimator can be written in terms of 
(5.11) and (5.12) by simply assuming Qlk = (Ylkt -  Yokt>) and Q0j = (Y0jt -  Y0jt>) . In fact 
the equivalence extends further since the DID  estimator can be written in terms of the simple 
single period matching estimator. That is:
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A T T d id  = ATTmatch,t ~ ATTmatch,t' (5.21)
Furthermore, Heckman et al (1997) show how the efficiency of the matching approach can be 
enhanced by exploiting the separability assumptions commonly employed in econometrics, as ex­
hibited for example in (5.16), and exclusion restrictions on the selection and outcome equations, 
that is exploiting the fact that the variables which determine outcomes are not necessarily the 
same as those that determine programme participation. The latter is highly relevant where panel 
data is concerned. This leads to the regression corrected matching DID  estimator in which 
Qik = ((Yikt ~ X ktp0) -  (Yqw -  X kt>(30^  and Q0j = ( (Yojt -  X j t@oj _  ~ XjtPoj'j
for participants k and non participants j. (30 is a parameter vector estimated on non-participant 
data (see Appendix 1 for details). Each of these adjustments have been successful in reducing 
bias in the evaluation of employment training schemes and other policy interventions and we 
employ these methods in addition to those mentioned above for comparative purposes19. The 
identification conditions for this estimator are similar to those for the simple matching esti­
mator described in (A-l) and (A-l’) above, however, the conditional independence condition 
now relates to the residuals of the regression on the outcome variable rather than the levels 
themselves (See Heckman et al 1998, p268).
The Abadie estim ator (Abadie 2005) Abadie (2005) proposes a semi-parametric DID 
estimator which incorporates covariates in a manner related to Heckman et al (1998a) and 
Ashenfelter and Card (1985). The role of the covariates in Abadie (2005) is similar to that of 
Ashenfelter and Card (1985) in that they serve two important roles for the DID  estimator, 
aside from allowing the separation of the determinants of outcome and participation. Firstly, 
the presence of covariates can allow the estimate of the parameter of interest (e.g. ATT) to differ 
among individuals, or more usually groups of individuals. In the parametric case of Ashenfelter 
and Card this could be achieved by generating interaction terms with the desired components 
of T with the variable representing participation. In the non-parametric case a certain amount 
of integration will be required across the desired components of. T. Secondly, and more impor­
tantly with regard to the identification condition of the DID  estimator, conditioning on the
19For example, Glick et al (2004) use the regression adjuted methods to evaluate the impact of capital account 
liberalisation on the prevalence of currency crises. Navarro-Lozano (2003) employs this technique in the evaluation 
of training schemes in Mexico.
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covariates can extend the identification conditions for the DID  estimator to situations in which 
differences between the treatment and non-treatment groups cause differences in the dynamics 
of the outcome variables. Provided these differences are the result of observed characteristics, 
conditioning on these characteristics means that the usual identification condition (assumption 
A-3) above becomes a conditional identification condition20. That is by conditioning on vari­
able measuring the observed differences, say x, the conditional participation decision remains 
independent of the individual transitory shocks, that is:
P (Dk (1) -  l |s , sk (t)) = P  (.Dk (1 ) =  l\x) (5.22)
and assumption A-3 still holds. Under these conditions it remains possible to retrieve the 
parameter of interest using the DID  estimator (Abadie 2005).
Abadie (2005) proposes a simple estimator for ATT  of both conditional regression adjusted 
and unconditional forms. The estimator is simple compared to the matching DID  estimator of, 
e.g., Heckman et al (1998a) since it is based purely upon the differences in the outcome variable 
across time for individuals for participants and non-participants, that is, A = Yk (1) — Yk (0), 
and although the propensity score must be estimated there is no need to engage in the matching 
procedure in the generation of the counter-factual comparison group for each participant. The 
estimator generates a weighted average of the differences across time for each individual where 
the weights are a function of the propensity score. In short, the unconditional DID  estimator 
of ATT  described by Abadie (2005) can be written as:
ATT$ id = E \Yi (1) -  Yo (1) \D = 1] — E Y (1 ) - Y ( 0 )  D - P ( D  = l \ X)P( D = 1 ) ' 1 - P ( D  = 1\X)
As Abadie (2005) notes, this estimator works by weighting down values of A for the non­
participant group which for those values of the covariates which are over-represented in the
20The classic example of such a case is that of ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’ (Ashenfelter 1978), which describes the 
observation that participants to the programme suffer a momentary reduction in income in the period immediately 
prior to becoming participants. This fact immediately sets the participant group apart from the non-participant 
group by implying that participation is occurs if pre-pregramme income falles below some threshold. Such a case 
means that the equality of trends implied by the identification condition of the D I D  estimator will no longer hold. 
By conditioning upon income prior to participation, however, a conditional version of the D I D  identification 
condition will hold and the D I D  estimate of the programme impact will remain unbiased (Ashenfelter and Card 
1985, Abadie 2005).
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among this group, and weighting up the values of A which are under represented21. The im­
plementation of this estimator is a simple two step procedure first requiring the estimation of 
the propensity score and then the use of the predicted values to calculate the sample analogue. 
This procedure, along with the conditional version is described in greater detail in Appendix
1 . Although the identification is obtained non-parametrically the various steps of the estimator 
can be undertaken parametrically. This is particularly useful where one has small datasets and 
where high dimensional non-parametric estimators become difficult to interpret and more im­
portantly, inefficient22. Note that in this case regression adjustment takes place via a regression 
on the differences, and so time invariant and time varying parameters can be used in principle.
5.5.2.3 The relative merits of the estimators and procedures
In Section 5.3 the structure of the SLCP was discussed and the manner in which households 
and plots are selected into the programme, as the discussion of the estimators above makes 
clear, the nature of participation decision is a crucial element of the identification assumptions. 
For example, the simple matching estimator presented in Section 5.5.2.1 relies entirely upon the 
assumption that selection into the programme is based upon characteristics that axe observable 
both to the individual and analyst. Of course this precludes self-selection into a programme 
on the basis of unobservables, represented by Uo and U\ in the foregoing separable example, 
and hence it is inconsistent with the behavioural models commonly employed by economists 
to analyse such decisions23. In short the matching model is relevant when selection into the 
programme is based on observable characteristics only and therefore would be useful estimator
21 Over-representation is reflected by low values of P  ( D =  1|Z)  j P { D  =  0|Z)  and vice versa.
22Abadie (2005) also explains succinctly how the inclusion of additional regressors can account for differ­
ences in the dynamics of the outcome variables for participants and non-participants which could invalidate the
identification assumptions for the D I D  estimator.
23Navarro-Lozano (2004) provides a simple exposition of this point in the context of the Roy (1951) model.
Consider the Roy model described in (5.2) and (5.1) above. In this where the participation decision is made by
individuals based on the expected monetary gain, that is:
D  =  1 (Yi -  y0 -  C ) ,
=  1 (9l (X ) - g 0 ( X ) - C + U 1 -  Uo)
where 1 (.) is an indicator function and C  is the cost of participation. In this case the selection into the programme 
takes place on the unobservable gain (f/i — Uo) which is ruled out by matching.
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in the event that programme participants are not self-selected but participate by diktat from 
the implementing agency, and the agency selected on the basis of characteristics observable by 
the analyst.
The matching DID  estimator, however, supports broader and perhaps more realistic mod­
els of economic behaviour in programme selection. For example, if we think in terms of the 
familiar components of variance model shown in equation (5.16) above and we think of the 
outcome variable as income, the time invariant individual or household specific component, 
can be thought of as representing the permanent component of household income. This indi­
vidual component is swept out when differences are taken. Given the conditional independence 
assumption that is required for the matching DID  estimator to be consistent participation can 
take place on the basis of this unobservable individual specific component. For example, the 
following participation rule would be eligible:
participation and may reflect individual preferences such as discount rates, preferences for 
programme participation.
In the case of the SLCP the perceived ability to find alternative income sources will be 
reflected here. Indeed, Grosjean (2005) posits that the impact of the programme may be to 
relax previously binding constraints, hence enabling a permanent release from poverty. Again, 
this behaviour could be captured here. Since the conditional independence rule refers only 
to the individual transitory component, £k (£), selection into the programme of this nature is 
acceptable in the DID  approach24.
Similarly, these arguments could be couched at the village or district level. This means that 
the DID  estimator can control for village level unobservables and therefore certain types of 
associated bias. For example, Heckman and Robb (1995) show that certain DID  estimators 
can also be robust to choice based sampling and contamination bias. Choice based sampling 
bias results when the probability of sampling an individual or household does not reflect the 
population probability that the household is a participant. This would be the case in the model
24 Ashenfelter and. Card (1985) provide some analysis of the empirical implications of selection rules and the 
structure of the outcome equation in this light.
0 otherwise
where Y  could represent some an individual valuation of the expected benefits of programme
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in equation (5.16) where the usual conditional independence assumptions hold for differenced 
error components. Hence, where longitudinal data is available the analysis of treatment effects 
becomes subject to less restrictive behavioural assumptions and importantly, can control for 
time invariant local and individual heterogeneity.
The relative merits of parametric and non-parametric approaches to estimation are well 
known (see e.g. Hardle 1990, Greene 1998). Convergence of fully non-parametric estimators 
is dependent upon sample size, kernel choice, bandwidth and the number of regressors and 
is not generally y / n .  High dimensional non-parametric regression will require large datasets 
in order estimates to be accurate, while the results become difficult to interpret with dimen­
sionality greater than two since 4 dimensional pictures would be required. Furthermore, the 
choice of bandwidth and the weighting functions represents a relatively arbitrary decision. Non- 
parametric estimators have the benefit of flexibility in the representation of functional forms 
without resort to parametric assumptions. In the case of matching they also easily accommo­
date the heterogeneous treatment effects that we have argued will prevail. These benefits are 
important for programme evaluation and it is against these benefits that the difficulties and the 
arbitrariness need to be traded off. Semi parametric approaches reflect this trade off by com­
bining non-parametric and parametric components and frequently achieving y/n convergence.
Our dataset is relatively small and hence in the work that follows we present and contrast the 
results of non-parametric, semi-parametric and parametric estimators of the average treatment 
on the treated. As we describe below, we use the matching DID  approach in our analysis of 
the average treatment on the treated and analyse a number of different outcome variables in 
this framework. We also provide a specific behavioural model for participation in the SLCP 
which reflects the available evidence on this issue.
5.6 Em pirical S trategy
In this Section we describe precisely how we go about achieving the objectives 1-5 of our study. 
The empirical strategy is as follows.
1. We model the participation decision, estimate the propensity score and analyse the par­
ticipation decision.
2. Using these estimates we estimate the average treatment on the treated (ATT) for mea­
sures of total income and the components of income using three estimators. We use a
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number of strategies in order to ensure that the choice of estimator does not determine the 
outcomes. In each case we argue that sample selection is accommodated and in the latter 
two cases heterogeneity in the impact measure is accommodated. The three estimators 
are:
a) the simple unmatched DID  estimator
b) the matched DID  estimator of Heckman et al (1998)
c) the semi-parametric efficient estimator of Abadie (2005).
3. We use unconditional and regression adjusted approaches in each case since regression 
adjustment has been shown to reduce bias25.
4. We estimate the impact of the SLCP on the quantiles of the distribution of income. That 
is we estimate Quantile Treatment Effects (QTE) in net income using two methods
a) a simple DID  approach
b) a matched DID  approach using the empirical distribution of participants incomes and 
the counterfactual values estimated in the matched DID  approach previously.
5. Using the empirical distribution of net incomes we use matched and unmatched DID 
methods to evaluate the impact of the SLCP on poverty alleviation for a range of poverty 
lines.
In this Section we describe the data and analyse the participation decision in the SLCP. In 
the following Section we show and discuss the results of the estimations of ATT. In Section 5.8 
we look at the QTE  and the impact on poverty alleviation.
5.6.1 Data
The SLCP survey was implemented in July and August of 2004 by a survey team from Beijing 
University. The same two regions were selected as those studied in previous work by Uchida et a 
(2004): Ningxia and Guizhou provinces, although alternative villages were selected. These sur­
veys came on the back of a piloting exercise in June 2004 undertaken in Zhangbei county, Hebei 
province. In Guizhou province 12 townships and 21 villages were selected for survey and 131
25Appendix 1 describes the estimation procedure of the semi-parametric regression adjusted procedure of 
Heckman et al (1997) and that of Abadie (2005).
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households consisting of participants and non-participants were surveyed. In Ningxia, 15 town­
ships and 23 villages were selected, and 155 households were interviewed. In tandem with the 
household surveys 40 village questionnaires were undertaken, 23 in Guizhou and 17 in Ningxia. 
Additional secondary data was also obtained from the local Forestry Bureaux. Households were 
selected at random within the villages among participants and non-participants.
The survey elicited responses from households for individual and household level character­
istics and contained 4 Sections. Section A contained household level characteristics: family size, 
land and capital endowments, and individual characteristics: education, age, sex and labour 
allocation. Section B obtained production level data for the pre and post programme periods. 
Virtually all participants joined the programme in 2000, and this is the ‘pre-programme’ year 
for both participants and non-participants. Plot level data on crop, forestry and livestock out­
puts and prices were obtained, for both sold and consumed output. In addition individual level 
data concerning the off-farm labour supply and earnings for each individual in the household 
w e i s  obtained for the pre- and post programme period. Section C focussed solely upon the 
participants in the SLCP and obtained qualitative responses with regard to their perceptions 
of the programme, their future intentions and the manner in which the SLCP had been im­
plemented while Section D contained the choice experiment. Section C and D are the focus of 
other research (Grosjean 2005). In addition a village level survey was undertaken.
Once the data had been entered a number of changes were made in preparation for the 
analysis. Income variables were generated using price and quantity data provided by households 
for each agricultural product. Input costs were also used to generate net-income measures. 
Many households produced crops for own consumption and in that case the value of production 
was imputed using market prices, as is common practice in such cases (Deaton 2000, Capeau 
and Dercon 1998)26. A number of manipulations were undertaken in this regard in order to deal 
with missing data. These are explained in more detail in Appendix 2. All prices and values were 
expressed in 2002 terms. Village level data from the village leader survey was also attached to 
the main dataset. This provided details regarding the implementation of the programme, local 
infrastructure and the level and types of subsidies provided under the SLCP. A monetary value 
of compensation was calculated which meant adding a value of grain based on local prices, to 
the monetary component.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show some important attributes of the households in each region in
26Even where households were autarkic in certain crops, they were able to reveal market prices for their crops.
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Guizhou Household characteristics Non-participants Participants
Personal mean sd mean sd
Family size 4.82 1.31 4.63 1.57
Education 1.13 0.39 1.32 0.54
Ethnicity (%) 73.20 0.44 85.67 0.35
Off-farm participation (%) 50.00 0.51 58.33 0.50
Agricultural characteristics
Land endowment (mu) 4.49 4.38 7.60 4.76
Cultivated land (mu) 3.93 2.63 2.86 2.71
Land rented in (mu) 0.58 1.25 0.74 2.60
Land rented in (%) 20.88 0.41 19.79 0.40
Land rented out (mu) 0.0 0.0 0.10 0.54
Land rented out (%) 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.22
Agricultural capital (Yuan) 1380.23 5376.91 260.20 1077.68
Livestock (Head) 9.14 13.55 7.82 10.62
Table 5.1: Guizhou: Descriptive statistics pre-programme
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Ningxia Household characteristics Non-participants Participants
Personal mean sd mean sd
Family size 5.0 1.49 5.41 1.76
Education 1.05 0.39 1.37 0.45
Ethnicity (%) 65.71 0.48 63.33 0.48
Off-farm participation (%) 62.85 0.49 60.00 0.49
Agricultural characteristics
Land endowment (mu) 18.12 10.79 25.94 19.16
Cultivated land (mu) 16.78 11.29 10.66 8.28
Land rented in (mu) 0.60 2.34 1.09 2.87
Land rented in (%) 11.42 0.32 19.16 0.39
Land rented out (mu) 1.14 2.78 0.22 1.69
Land rented out (%) 17.14 0.38 4.16 0.20
Agricultural capital (Yuan) 2665.85 4845.53 1304.54 2179.81
Livestock (Head) 5.28 6.64 7.33 10.17
Table 5.2: Ningxia: Descriptive statistics pre-SLCP
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the pre-programme period and how these differ across participants and non-participants in 
the SLCP. On the whole the regions are rather similar although households in Guizhou have 
on average a less valuable stock of agricultural machinery, smaller families and lower land 
endowments. Some of these attributes are linked of course and stem from the higher population 
density in Guizhou, one of the underlying reasons for the smaller land endowments. Activity in 
the land rental market is minimal and somewhat similar in each region, as is average education: 
A value of 1 represents primary education, while a zero represents no education. Household 
participation in the off-farm labour market is rather similar in each regional sample. These 
data fit with the expectations for these regions.
There are some noticeable differences between participants and non-participants. Partici­
pants appear to be more educated, with lower agricultural capital and fractionally larger land 
endowments. In Guizhou participants are more likely to be of Han ethnicity. The differences 
are not stark however. In determining the impact of the programme upon the participants 
these compositional differences will be important.
5.6.2 Participation in the SLCP
5.6.2.1 The participation decision: Who decides?
Above we described some of the confusion surrounding the participation in the SLCP. In prin­
ciple participation in the SLCP is voluntary, suggesting that participants in the programme are 
self-selected. However, there is anecdotal evidence (CCICED 2002, Xu and Cao 2002, Uchida 
et al 2004) that the autonomy of individual households is less than complete and that par­
ticipation in the programme is determined largely by the implementing agency, sometimes to 
the extent of being completely involuntary (CCICED 2002, Gong and Xu 2002). Indeed, not 
only has participation and the selection of plots frequently been involuntary, often the nature 
of the reforestation, e.g. the types of trees planted, has also been at the discretion of the local 
government. For example, Uchida et al (2004) find that in many cases the compensation for the 
set-aside land did not cover the opportunity cost and hence it seems unlikely that self-selection 
by households into the SLCP would take place in such circumstances. This is also suggestive 
of involuntary participation in the programme27. As a result, Uchida et al (2002) model the
27 Of course, there are certain caveats to this intuition based not only upon the unreliable estimates of oppor­
tunity cost provided by Uchida et al in the absence of local price data. In addition it could be expected return 
from participation is increased despite the low imputed value of the subsidy. Grosjean (2005) suggests that the
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selection of plots as being at the discretion of the implementing agency.
The village survey undertaken in this study sheds some light on this issue One of the ques­
tions asked was whether or not participation in the SLCP was voluntary and out of 40 village 
leader surveys undertaken, (covering our sample of 286 households) only 3 village leaders stated 
that participation in the SLCP was voluntary (representing 21 households). In the majority of 
cases, 25 villages (143 households), participation was deemed involuntary and entirely at the 
discretion of the local government and in 12 villages (100 households) selection involved a com­
bination self-selection by households and final selection by the local government implementing 
agency. In short it is clear that the selection into the program was largely at the discretion of 
the implementing agency, albeit in about 40% of households from a self selected pool. Selection 
of plots was on the basis of a number of criteria: slope, degradation, ease of administration and 
monitoring. These findings axe in line with previous findings by Xu and Cao (2002) who ques­
tioned the targeting of the SLCP sites by the local government and discovered that contiguity, 
proximity to roads and selection criteria other than slope were frequently used, contrary to the 
aims and objectives of the SLCP.
In reality therefore, there are multiple participation rules being employed in the SLCP. In 
many cases the situation appears to be as described by Uchida et al (2004), however there 
is a significant minority of cases in which the local government chooses from a self-selected 
group. The modelling of this process is of importance for two reasons. Firstly, establishing 
the important determinants of household selection allows us to analyse the extent to which the 
local governments are targeting in accordance with the objectives of the SLCP. Secondly, the 
estimation of the participation decision provides the basis for propensity score, the values of 
which will be used to correct for sample selection bias in the estimation of the impact of the 
SLCP (Smith and Heckman 2003).
5.6.2.2 The behavioural model of participation in SLCP
As described in Section 5.5.2.1 above, the identification assumption of the simple matching 
estimator relies upon the fact that selection is based upon observables only. Selection upon 
unobservables is ruled out and consequently so are many models of economic behaviour, such 
as the Roy model. However, as described above, the presence of longitudinal data, and the use of 
the matching DID  estimator allows a broader array of behavioural models, including selection
compensation might release households from previously binding constraints.
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on the basis of expected returns from the programme, and the observable and unobservable 
household determinants of this. It therefore makes sense to present a behavioural model for 
the participation decision in the context of a matching estimator (see e.g. Ashenfelter and 
Card 1985, Heckman et al 1997, 1998). Furthermore, Heckman et al (1997) and Smith and 
Heckman (2003) make clear that in estimating the propensity score it is important from the 
perspective of efficiency and consistency of the estimators to define the selection process as 
accurately as possible. In this Section we do this for the SLCP, drawing upon the discussion 
about the implementation of the programme and the household survey data.
The discussion above made clear that a multiple participation rule approach is required to 
reflect the decisions of the parties involved (Heckman and Robb 1995, Smith and Heckman 
2003). We model the participation in the SLCP as a three stage process involving local gov­
ernment and households. In this framework three decisions are taken: 1) the local government 
decides whether or not the programme is to be implemented on a voluntary basis or not; 2) 
Households select whether or not they wish to participate in the programme (where partici­
pation is involuntary this stage simply reflects their desire rather than the outcome); 3) the 
local government chooses the participants (where participation is voluntary the local govern­
ment chooses among self-selected households, otherwise an unconditional choice takes place)28. 
Figure 5.1 depicts the decision tree for this process.
We assume that the decision over whether participation will be voluntary or not depends 
upon the features of the village in which the decision takes place as well as the district within 
which the village lies. These village and district level characteristics are captured by L. Local 
governments are assumed to maximise environmental benefits minus the opportunity costs 
of lost agricultural production as in Uchida et al (2004). We assume that households select 
themselves for the SLCP on the basis of their expected returns. Following Heckman and Robb 
(1995) and Blundell and Costa-Dias (2002) this participation decision can be thought of in 
terms of the following parameterisation for household k with characteristics X,  in a village with 
characteristics L:
SSk = f  (X, L) + 14 (5.23)
where /  (X , L ) represents the expected net benefit of participation for the decision maker, k ,
28 Notice that we have grouped the 3 villages in which participation was assumed to be purely voluntary with 
those households for whom participation depends on self-selection and local government decisions.
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Local Government
CompulsoryVoluntary
Household Household
Not ParticipateParticipate
Local Government Local Government
Participant Non- participant Participant Non- participant
Figure 5.1: Decision tree for participation in the SLCP
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and Vfc represents the unobservable components of the decision. In this mould Dk =  1 if SSk > 0 
and Dk = 0 otherwise. We model the last step of the participation decision in a manner similar 
to Uchida et al (2004) and assume that the local government selects household on the basis of 
a number of local and household characteristics, conditional upon whether implementation is 
voluntary or not, and in the voluntary case at least, conditional upon self-selection of households.
To understand how we perceive the 3 steps of the participation procedure to fit together 
it is illustrative to look at the conditional probabilities of participation for a household with 
characteristics X  given the decisions made by the local government with characteristics L. 
Participation depends upon each of the following probabilities:
Probability of Voluntary Participation Implementation (V = 1 = voluntary):
Pr(V = l|L) (5.24)
Probability of Consideration by Local Government (S S  =  1 = self selection):
Pr (SS = 1\V = 1,X,L) + Pr (V = 0|SS = 1,X , L) + Pr (V = 0|SS -  0, X, LX5.25) 
=  Pr (SS  =  1| V = 1,X,L) + Pt (V = 0\L)
Probability of Selection by Local Government (LG = 1 = local government selects):
Pr (LG =  1|V =  1,55 = 1, X, L) +  Pr (LG = l \SS  = 1, V = 0,) + Pr (LG = 1\V = 0,SS = 0)
(5.26)
= Pr (LG = 1| V = 1, SS  = 1, X, L) + Pr (LG = 1| V = 0)
The probability of voluntary participation is simple enough to understand, and this is con­
ditioned solely upon the characteristics of the village and district: L. The probability of con­
sideration by local government represents the probability of remaining eligible for participation 
once self selection has taken place. This probability is conditioned upon the characteristics 
of the individual and the decision upon whether or not participation is to be voluntary. It 
should be noted that if the participation is involuntary then self-selection has no effect upon 
the probability of participating, hence the presence of Pr(V = 0, L) in (5.25). The last step 
is the probability of selection by the local government given involuntary implementation and
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voluntary implementation with self-selected households. This model of participation yields the 
following ex ante probabilities for participation in the SLCP:
Probability of Participation:
Pr (Par = 1\X,L) (5.27)
= Pr (LG = l\SS = 1, V = 1, X, L) * Pr (SS = 1\V = 1, X, L) * Pr (V = 1|L)
+ Pr (LG = l\V = 0, L) * Pr (V = 0|L)
Probability of Non-participation:
Pr (Par = 0|X, L) (5.28)
=  Pr (LG = 0|55 =  1, V = 1, X, L) * Pr (SS =  l\V = 1, X , L) * Pr (V = 1\X)
+ Pr (SS = 0\V = 1,X,L)*  Pr (V = 1| L)
+ Pr (LG = 0\V = 0, L) * Pr (V = 0|L)
A detailed understanding of the participation decision by could be obtained by analysing 
each individual step. For example, Heckman and Smith (2003) analyse participation in employ­
ment training schemes by estimating each of the 5 component probabilities of this participation 
process. Unfortunately we only have observable data on the first and last decisions in this 
model and subsequently undertake the analysis for the these steps only. That is, we do not 
have data with regard to individuals self-selection into the programme. Due to paucity of data 
we estimate the participation decision in one step recognising that combining these three de­
cisions means that the estimated coefficients represent only the net effect of each explanatory 
variable on participation29. The effect on each component step remains unidentified30.
2 9 We could estimate a model for the probability of implementation being voluntary followed by a model of 
the participation of the voluntary and involuntary subsamples to estimate the conditional probabilities in each 
case. The latter yields an estimate of the probability that the local government chooses a self selected household: 
Pr {LG =  1|S S  =  1, V =  1,X, L) * Pr (SS  =  1\V =  1 , X, L) , and the probability that local government selects 
a household under involuntary implementation: Pr (LG =  1|F =  0, L , X) . When multiplied by the probabilities 
estimated in the first step this would yield an estimate of the probability of participation for each implementation 
regime.
30Heckman and Smith (2003) encounter similar problems in their analysis.
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5.6.2.3 Estimating the propensity score
Following the justification above, we estimate the participation decision using a probit model on 
the entire sample, controlling for the village level and household variables X  and L, including 
whether implementation was voluntary or not. Combining the three decision rules into estima­
tion one allows a simple estimation of the propensity score. From this we can also gauge the 
extent to which the implementing agency for the SLCP is achieving the objectives of the SLCP 
in the selection of households, that is, the efficient targeting of sloped land and poverty allevi­
ation (Uchida et al 2004). The results of our estimation are shown in Table 5.3 and discussed 
belowr31.
These results show that the households with lower average productivity (Agprod) are se­
lected by local governments. This is shown by the statistically significant coefficient on the 
average productivity of the household’s cultivated land. This variable is the best proxy that we 
have for the slope of the plots selected since this information was not gathered for all plots. The 
positive coefficient on per capita income suggests that higher income households are more likely 
to be selected for the SLCP, although the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level. Also, 
the positive and significant coefficient on land per capita suggests that households with larger 
endowments of land per household member are more likely participants. Family size (Famsize), 
the average age of the household (Agehse), and Ethnicity have do not have a significant impact 
upon participation.
With regard to the variables which reflect the characteristics of households able to self 
select into the programme, that is the interaction effects each with the prefix ‘Vo/’, higher 
educated households (Voled) with no children under 5 years of age (Volkids), with lower levels 
of agricultural capital (VolCap) have a higher probability of participating in the programme 
other things remaining equal. The latter could be interpreted as a measure of measure of wealth 
among agricultural households. As explained above these coefficients reflect the net effect of 
each of the stages of the decision process in Figure 5.1 above, but describe some of the observable 
features of self selection by households. The sign on the income interaction term is negative 
suggesting that poor households are again more likely to be participants if they are allowed 
to volunteer. Overall, however, the results suggest that poor households are not specifically 
targeted by the SLCP although lower productivity land is being targeted.
31 Here and henceforth, ", * and ** mean statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
231
Variables Coefficients z-value
Village level
Hezhang -0.266 0.62
Pengyang -1.143* 2.39
Weining -0.089 0.20
Yuanzhou -0.019 0.05
Jingyuan and Zhijin Reference value
Voluntary -0.055 0.08
Household level
Incpc (Y '000s) 0.12A 1.71
Volinc (Y '000s) -0.10 0.97
Agprod (Y '000s/mu) -1.00** 2.51
VolAg (Y '000s/mu) 0.67 0.84
Famsize -0.020 0.22
Volfam 0.019 0.15
LandPC (mu) 0.033** 2.58
VolCAP (Y '000s) -0.08A 1.74
Volcred 0.411 1.07
Education -0.056 0.41
Voled 0.595a 1.93
Agehse (yrs) -0.006 0.55
Volkids -0.562 * 2.20
Ethnicity 0.234 1.10
Non Han Reference value
Constant 0.896 1.12
Observations 286
Pseudo R2 0.187
Likelihood ratio (x2 (19)) 58.79
Hits (y = 1 if p > 0.5) 81%
Table 5.3: The model for propensity score: determinants of participation in the SLCP
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The propensity score was estimated using the model described in Table 5.3 above. How­
ever, a fully interacted model was estimated in which each explanatory variable was interacted 
with a dummy representing the presence of voluntary selection into the programme (V o l d u m ). 
However, in order to maintain the ‘balancing’ property required for the matching procedure 
undertaken in the following Section, the more parsimonious model was used excluding cer­
tain interaction terms 32. Using this model the balancing property was satisfied at the 1% 
significance level meaning that the distribution of the covariates between participants and non­
participants was sufficiently similar to satisfy the conditional independence condition. Figure 
5.5 in Appendix 3 shows the density of the estimated propensity score for participants and non 
participants. This shows that participants and non-participants share considerable support of 
the propensity score estimated as above, a valuable property for the matching procedure.
5.7 SLCP Program m e Evaluation: M atching E stim ates of Im­
pacts on H ousehold Incom e
5.7.1 Income descriptives
The ultimate objective of this Chapter is to establish the impact of the SLCP upon the incomes 
of participant households. The estimation of the propensity score was a necessary step towards 
this. The outcome variables for which we estimate the ATT  are described in Tables 5.4, 5.5 
and 5.6 These tables show the different components of real income and their means in Guizhou 
Ningxia and for the pooled sample respectively, both pre and post SLCP and for participants 
and non participants.
Table 5.6 shows that on average there is similarity between participants and non-participants 
suggesting that these groups are reasonably comparable. Indeed, the similarity between par­
ticipants and non-participants has already been borne out in the analysis of the propensity 
score described above and detailed in Appendix 3, in which is was shown that participants and 
non-participants share much of the support of the propensity score. The comparison at the 
regional level, however, is not so clear and there are statistically significant differences between 
the participants and non-participants in terms of the level of incomes within regions, while 
the composition of incomes differs across regions. Furthermore, the comparison with previous
32The balancing score is defined by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) as a function b(X)  such that the distribution 
of X  conditional on this function is the same for the treatment and the comparison groups: X  L  D \ b ( X ).
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Pre SLCP
Income
Participants Non-participants
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Gross 2186.46 2822.15 1212.83 1253.86
Net 1757.67 2407.62 947.62 1247.61
Off-farm 947.87 1805.87 677.41 1134.98
Crop 747.65 1031.55 415.33 353.58
Livestock 289.31 533.84 118.12 209.30
Forest 86.04 811.71 2.22 12.38
Other 131.46 422.09 0.00 0.00
Post SLCP
Income
Participants Non-Participants
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Gross 2319.2 2703.96 1669.79 1604.22
Net 1908.03 2249.41 1370.95 1645.69
Off-farm 1126.09 1727.88 1088.59 1640.52
Crop 401.77 521.03 473.89 324.16
Livestock 320.31 663.31 94.10 153.77
Forest 3.19 18.05 0 0
Other 136.92 435.56 11.25 63.64
SLCP 298.69 270.32 - -
Table 5.4: Per capita incomes in Guizhou province (Yuan 2002 prices)
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Pre SLCP
Income
Participants Non-participants
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Gross 1553.44 1276.08 1883.64 2381.73
Net 1120.52 1269.20 1476.69 2223.08
Off-farm 666.84 1041.70 850.27 1378.61
Crop 614.27 376.86 564.02 407.24
Livestock 245.52 502.74 120.99 287.94
Forest 3.95 35.54 23.91 139.73
Other 25.16 179.61 354.87 1888.88
Post SLCP
Income
Participants Non-participants
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Gross 1940.29 1470.95 2282.91 2480.85
Net 1972.88 2517.39 1739.22 1367.72
Off-farm 966.86 1264.53 1107.01 1558.97
Crop 350.31 308.15 623.19 479.70
Livestock 121.92 374.90 84.14 178.59
Forest 11.69 68.59 33.10 189.82
Other 74.83 493.93 490.55 2159.53
SLCP 376.87 392.31 - -
Table 5.5: Per capita incomes in Ningxia province (Yuan 2002 prices)
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Pre SLCP
Income
Participants Non-participants
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Gross 1834.79 2126.01 1548.23 1919.38
Net 1403.69 1885.18 1212.16 1809.20
Off-farm 791.74 1435.69 763.84 1256.52
Crop 673.55 743.78 489.67 385.92
Livestock 264.98 516.04 119.55 249.88
Forest 37.65 521.56 12.94 99.04
Other 66.79 303.51 9.59 61.84
Post SLCP
Income
Participants Non-participants
Mean Sd Mean Sd
Gross 2108.70 2112.77 1976.35 2096.70
Net 1728.24 1834.50 1605.13 1834.50
Off-farm 1037.62 1486.79 1097.80 1588.65
Crop 376.31 415.13 535.94 409.58
Livestock 210.10 530.84 89.12 165.51
Forest 20.00 209.28 17.16 130.73
Other 100.05 458.43 62.51 328.53
Table 5.6: Per capita incomes for the whole sample
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estimates of income levels is also revealing.
For example, Table 5.4 shows that our sample is relatively poor compared to samples used 
for the analysis of the SLCP before. Uchida et al (2004) report that in their participant sample 
the average per capita income in Guizhou in 2000 is between Y3000 and Y4000, compared to 
our per capita value of Y2000. Our Ningxia sample is more in line with their findings however 
with per capita income of around Y2000 compared to their estimation of around Y2500 for 
the year 2000. These differentials are potentially worrying, particularly when one notices that 
participants in Guizhou appear to have significantly higher incomes than non-participants in 
the pre-programme period. The cause of these income differentials is not attributable to one 
source however and arises from higher average income contributions in livestock, crops, forestry 
and from off-farm labour. In Ningxia the disparity goes the other way with non-participants 
having fractionally higher incomes than participants and yet the composition of income is quite 
similar among productive activities. The disparity narrows in Ningxia in the post programme 
period suggesting a positive effect on incomes.
That the treatment and control groups differ in observable characteristics is important for 
the programme evaluation techniques that we use since the identification assumptions for the 
DID  estimator imply that outcomes would have evolved in the same way for participants had 
they not participated as it is observed to evolve for the non-participants. The estimators that 
we have described above provide a number of techniques, and employ a number identification 
assumptions which endeavour to control such differences in estimating the programme impacts. 
In what follows we describe the estimates of our parameter of interest (ATT) using parametric, 
non-parametric and semi-parametric techniques. We also compare unconditional and regression 
adjusted estimators for completeness. The latter represents an attempt to control for biases 
that emerge from any mismatching of participants with non-participants and to control any 
differences in income dynamics that result from observable characteristics. As described above, 
this has been undertaken with some success in the literature (e.g. Heckman et al 1997, Abadie 
and Imbens 2002, Navarro-Lozano 2004).
5.7.2 Matching estimates of Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT)
Table 5.7 shows the unconditional matching estimates of the impact of the SLCP upon the vari­
ous components of income using the three programme evaluation methods applied to the levels of 
the outcome variables. Table 5.8 shows the estimated programme impact using the conditional,
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regression adjusted versions of these estimators. There exist a number of non-parametric match­
ing techniques nested in the general formulation shown in Section 5.5.2.1 and 5.5.2.2. For this 
reason we employed two separate techniques for the propensity score matching: local linear and 
stratified matching. These techniques reflect different choices of the weights ^iV0,7Vi (&, j)
and J2keh WNo,Ni (k) . in (5.12). Local linear matching generates the counterfactual compari­
son for each programme participant by calculating an a non-parametric local linear regression 
weighted by the kernel function in which non-participants whose propensity score is closer to 
those of participants is given more weight than those further away33. Stratified matching, on 
the other hand, involves estimating ATT  by placing participants and non-participants into in­
tervals of the common support of the propensity score such that the covariates that estimated 
the propensity score satisfy the balancing property. This ensures that the assignment of house­
holds into the participation or non-participation group is considered to be random. ATT  is 
then estimated by taking weighted averages, weighted by the number of observations in each 
block, of block specific treatment effects. For comparative purposes the results of the stratified 
matching procedure are presented in Appendix 3 alongside the local linear matching estimates. 
In each case we assume a common support for the propensity score since it is a requirement 
for consistency given the identification assumption. This does not reduce the sample sizes 
considerably due to a large shared support of the propensity score (see Appendix 3).
For regression adjustment we use district level indicator variables to control for locally 
specific determinants of outcomes. Also, given that selection in to the programme has been 
shown to be in the basis of agricultural productivity we control for this household variable in 
the regression adjustment. The same regressors are used in each of the three regression adjusted 
estimators shown here. In this way we conditioned on observed differences between participants 
and non-participants over time and control for differences in the dynamics that depend upon 
these regressors (Abadie 2005). The Abadie estimator that we For brevity we present and 
discuss the results for each approach only for the case of net incomes in Appendix 5.
In column two of Table 5.7 we have the parametric estimates of ATT did for each outcome 
variable, that is, the regression of the difference in the outcome variable upon the dummy 
variable for participation in the SLCP and a constant. Column three shows the estimates for
33The nature of the weights depends upon the kernel function chosen and the bandwidth. We chose the 
Epanechnikov Kernel and some inspection we chose a bandwidth of 0.03. These choices are largely arbitrary 
however the results were relatively robust to bandwidths ranging from 0.01 to 0.1.
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the kernel propensity score matching procedure. In column four the estimates of treatment in 
the treated are obtained using the semi-parametric approach of Abadie (2005), the method of 
which is described in Appendix 1.
For all of the results presented below bootstrapped standard errors are calculated and shown 
in parenthesis. Table 5.7 and 5.8 below show the estimated parameters. Furthermore, Tables 
5.7 and 5.8 present results in terms of per capita values. Appendix 4 shows the results at the 
household level34,35.
5.7.2.1 Discussion of income impacts
The estimates in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 tell largely the same story, although the magnitudes and 
statistical significance of the estimates differ. Considering Table 5.7 first, we see that the 
unconditional estimate of the impact of the SLCP on total gross income are negative for partic­
ipants suggesting that incomes reduced through programme participation. This impact is not 
statistically significant at the 10% level however. Indeed, the only statistically significant im­
pacts emerging from the unconditional estimates are the expected reductions in crop incomes. 
The different estimators axe broadly similar and suggest that annual household crop income 
is reduced by between Y200 and Y350 per capita on average for participants. This represents 
approximately 10% of average per-capita incomes in these regions (Uchida et al 2004). The row 
labelled ‘Crop+SLCP’ measures the ATT  for post programme cropping incomes once the SLCP 
compensation has been added on. For gross incomes and for all estimators in Table 5.7 this 
figure is close to zero and statistically insignificant. The implication of this result is that par­
ticipants are, on average, being fully compensated for their lost crop production. This assumes 
that the quality of the grain is commensurate with that which is lost. Off-farm incomes are 
impacted positively while forest and livestock incomes are marginally reduced for participants, 
although none of these impacts are statistically significant. It should be noted that the Abadie 
estimator diverges from the parametric and kernel matching estimators in one important case 
showing larger positive impacts for off-farm labour income: Y179 per capita rather than more 
modest estimates of approximately Y80. In addition to forest incomes, off-farm labour is con­
sidered to be an important alternative source of income to which participant households can
34In order to control for household scale effects the analysis is undertaken at the per capita level (see e.g. 
Deaton 2000).
35For all tables standard errors are in parenthesis while the symbols and ** mean significance at 10, 5 and 
1% repectively.
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Income Sources ATT  on Per capita Income
Gross Incomes Parametric Local Lin­
ear
Abadie
Total -154.20
(158.78)
-14.94
(177.99)
-90.00
(205.67)
Total-SLCP -496.33**
(160.62)
-356.44**
(201.23)
-415.42*
(195.32)
Crop -343.50**
(75.00)
-280.68**
(88.99)
-280 .79** 
(90.43)
Crop +SLCP -1.37
(68.11)
60.82
(96.19)
42.27
(85.85)
Off-farm 88.08
(122.30)
79.70
(160.50)
179.92
(265.20)
Livestock -24.46
(65.23)
-23.24
(37.66)
-30.42
(49.26)
Forest -21.76
(38.22)
-19.27
(17.96)
-26.62
(26.88)
Net incomes
Total -68.43
(154.67)
53.24
(180.79)
-40.78
(208.77)
Total-SLCP -410.56**
(154.60)
-288.26**
(147.69)
-364.18"
(197.61)
Crop -248.11**
(72.36)
-189.85*
(89.96)
-206.40**
(83.66)
Crop +SLCP 94.02
(69.79)
151.65*
(74.01)
117.66"
(70.03)
Livestock -25.00
(61.00)
-25.59
(54.76)
-30.43
(53.01)
Forest -27.52
(35.02)
-21.68
(17.25)
-32.82
(24.81)
Table 5.7: The per capita ATT of the SLCP for the components of household income 
matched DID
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Income Sources ATT  on Per capita incomes
Gross Incomes Parametric Local Lin­
ear
Abadie
Total 354.17"
(72.82)
212.06*
(95.75)
117.21*
(55.00)
Total-SLCP 49.46
(153.62)
-129.44
(93.14)
-114.77"
(59.40)
Crop -265.86**
(49.68)
-186.33**
(40.92)
-169.49**
(34.58)
Crop +SLCP 41.66
(34.70)
155.17**
(39.63)
91.39**
(24.09)
Off-farm 253.56*
(114.85)
336.48**
(70.67)
159.09**
(65.21)
Livestock -46.59"
(24.98)
-20.00
(35.26)
-56.97**
(18.08)
Forest -17.04
(18.97)
-10.36
(23.16)
-19.38**
(6.54)
Net incomes
Total 340.30*
(151.67)
214.78**
(84.07)
140.66*
(62.59)
Total -SLCP 11.25
(66.55)
-137.89
(94.46)
-114.65*
(60.02)
Crop -216.79**
(35.93)
-186.71**
(40.82)
-135.79**
(25.75)
Crop+SLCP 78.69*
(35.04)
154.79**
(39.55)
145.14**
(24.62)
Livestock -12.11
(31.75)
-10.65
(37.42)
-85.35**
(17.57)
Forest -18.23
(33.93)
-16.84
(21.26)
-17.20**
(6.24)
Table 5.8: Regression adjusted estimators for ATT
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turn once their labour is released from cultivation (Uchida et al 2004). As such, the ability to 
access to the off-farm labour market will be an important determinant of the extent to which 
the SLCP can induce sustained poverty alleviation and will be an important determinant of the 
sustainability of the programme itself once compensation ceases. The statistical insignificance 
of these results do not bode particularly well in this regard.
Of course it is more interesting to look at net incomes. Table 5.7 shows a similar picture. 
The impact upon total net incomes is again close to zero and statistically insignificant for all 
the estimators. However, the ATT  for net crop income is smaller and negative, suggesting 
input costs have fallen considerably and consequently the net income measure ‘crop+SLCP’ is 
now positive and significant at the 5% and 10% level for the local linear and Abadie estimators 
respectively. This shows that once input costs for crop production are taken into account on 
average the SLCP more than compensates the participants for their change in production. There 
are nominal decreases in forest and livestock incomes but these are statistically insignificant. 
That there is no impact upon forest incomes shows the extent to which the participants in the 
SLCP convert their land to ecological forests rather than productive forests. In our sample, 
over 85% of participants convert land solely to ecological forest under the SLCP. It also tells of 
long lead times on income generation in forestry.
However, we should be concerned to test to see whether the estimators of the impact of the 
SLCP can be further refined. As described above there are a number of reasons why regression 
adjustment may reduce biases shown to exist for unconditional matching estimators such as 
those in Table 5.7 (e.g. Heckman et al 1997, Abadie and Imbens 2002). Table 5.8 shows the 
results once these regression adjusted estimators axe employed.
Table 5.8 has some similarities with Table 5.7 in that crop incomes axe significantly reduced 
for participants as expected, and that the ATT  for livestock and forest incomes are nominally 
negative and statistically insignificant for the parametric and local lineax estimators. However, 
once the regression adjustment has taken place a number of important distinctions appear in 
Table 5.8. Firstly, the ATT  for gross and net total incomes becomes positive and statistically 
significant for most estimators. In particular, annual total net incomes increase for participants 
by between Y100 and Y350 per capita. This increase is driven by statistically significant 
increases in off-farm labour incomes and, of course the SLCP compensation. The latter is 
evidenced by the increases in net crop+SLCP income component which is statistically significant 
at least at the 5% level for each estimator
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5.7.2.2 Income impacts and sustainability of SLCP
One of the key questions regarding the SLCP is its sustainability once the temporary subsidies 
cease. It seems clear that for households to maintain forested lands after the cessation of 
subsidies a minimum requirement is that the welfare of participant households will be at least 
as high in the absence of compensation as it would be if households were to revert back to their 
pre-SLCP practices. It is the essence of the programme evaluation problem that we cannot 
observe the income of households in the counter-factual world, that is, in a situation in which 
participant households have reverted to former practices, and so the best we can do is generate 
a counterfactual estimate from our matched comparison groups and simulate this procedure. 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 provided one estimate of this comparison in the quantity ‘Total-SLCP’ 
which effectively measures the impact of the removal of the subsidy from participants. Total- 
SLCP represents the comparison of participants’ total gross or net income once the monetised 
value of the SLCP compensation is removed with that of their matched counterfactual. If our 
estimator is a good one, then this quantity represents the best measure of the income that the 
participant could obtain if they were to revert back to their former production patterns and 
income sources. This income measure provides some indication of the impact on participants 
of the planned cessation of compensation at the end of the programme, given the changes in 
the composition of incomes that have occurred in the intervening period.
For the unconditional matching in Table 5.7 for both net and gross Total-SLCP the ATT  
is negative and significant for all estimators and is in the region of Y400 per capita per annum. 
This loss in income comprises of reduced crop, livestock and forest income which remains 
uncompensated by any increases in off-farm incomes. In short, these results do not bode well 
for the sustainability of the SLCP since it suggests that once the compensation ceases households 
will revert back to their original production and labour allocation patterns.
However, net Total-SLCP changes from being large, significant and negative for the un­
conditional estimators in Table 5.7 to being small, positive and insignificant for the regression 
adjusted estimators. The exception to this is the Abadie estimator for which a significant neg­
ative impact is recorded for Total-SLCP, and for which the positive income changes in off-farm 
labour income are more conservative. In terms of the sustainability of the SLCP the picture 
painted in Table 5.8 remains inconclusive. On the one hand the parametric and local linear 
estimates show that, on average, farmers need not revert back to their former practices upon
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the cessation of subsidies since on average income would not be increased by doing so. On the 
other hand, the Abadie estimator shows that the possibility remains that incomes will fall upon 
cessation of subsidies since incomes in their absence are lower for participants that they would 
have been had they not participated. This suggests that there will be winners and losers in 
the post programme period and hence no general story can be told. Ultimately the decision 
to reconvert land after the compensation has ceased will be taken at the household level and 
requires a closer analysis of these decisions. Although in this Chapter we do not analyse indi­
vidual decisions or post programme intentions this general view is in line with parallel work on 
these data36. In later Sections the analysis is refined to allow a slightly more detailed look at 
the issues of poverty alleviation and sustainability.
The regression adjusted estimators differ from the unconditional estimators in their evalua­
tion of the impacts of the programme and yet tell broadly the same story. In sum, the relative 
ATT  estimates show that the average impact of the SLCP upon the treated is to shift the 
composition of income away from crops, livestock and forests towards off-farm sources. The 
estimators show that, despite these structural changes, the incomes of participants are, on aver­
age, only maintained above those of non-participants due to the presence of the SLCP subsidies. 
The estimators shown tell largely the same story and yet there appear to be some important 
differences. The next Section discusses these differences further.
5.7.2.3 Unconditional vs regression adjusted results
Heckman et al (1997) undertook a comparative study of the biases associated with a number 
of different matching estimators, including the regression adjusted and unconditional matching 
estimators used in this study. Bias was measured against the estimates from a randomised 
control group. They found that the regression adjusted estimator had a number of desirable 
qualities. In general this estimator performed better than others especially when omitted time 
invariant characteristics are an important source of bias. We have motivated these estimators 
on the basis of their ability to accommodate this type of heterogeneity. Secondly, they found 
that, although in their study the simple DID  or matching methods often had a lower overall 
bias, the regression adjusted DID estimator had a much lower pointwise bias. That is, the 
low overall bias resulted from large equal yet opposite pointwise biases which coincidentally 
cancelled out. The regression adjusted estimator is less likely to be biased in any given situation
36Grosjean (2005) provides an analysis of stated post programme intentions of the households in our sample.
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it is argued. In addition, the regression adjusted estimator was shown to be more robust to 
alternative specifications of the propensity score. Other applications have found that regression 
adjustment provides more refined estimates of treatment effects. Glick et al (2004) find that 
controlling for a number of country level characteristics not included in the estimate of the 
propensity score improves the significance of treatment effects of capital market liberalisation 
for example. Abadie et al (2001) also provide evidence for the reductions in bias resulting from 
mismatching that regression adjustment allows for.
In our case one positive feature of the regression adjusted estimates of Table 5.8 is that the 
standard errors are generally smaller than those of Table 5.7, with the Abadie estimator domi­
nating the others in this respect. The regression adjusted estimates are more accurate37 either 
as a result of the refined matches for the treatment group or due to the ability to control for the 
variables upon which the selection rule depends and other geographical differences between par­
ticipants and non-participants that may affect the level and dynamics of the outcome variables 
over time. The use of geographical variables and the pre-programme agricultural productivity 
endeavour to do this. In sum, although we cannot test the extent of biases associated with our 
estimators against a randomised control experiment. It is solely on the basis of these arguments 
and the features of the estimates that we are inclined to prefer the regression adjusted estimates 
in Table 5.8.
5.7.3 Summary of average impacts (ATT)
The programme evaluation results are again partly in line with expectations given the nature of 
the programme. On average SLCP participants have lower cropping and livestock incomes. The 
released labour shifts on average towards off-farm activities as an alternative income source. 
That there is no significant increase in forest incomes however reflects the fact that there are 
long lead times for forest products and also that ecological forests are the rule rather than the 
exception. Some differences emerge between the estimators in this analysis, with the regression 
adjusted estimators being preferred for the reasons described above.
Using the average treatment effect for ‘Total-SLCP’ as a crude measure of the sustainability
37However, some authors have noted that the D I D  estimator can occasionally generate estimates of the 
standard error that are biased downwards (Bertrand et al 2003). Bootstrapping procedures that we undertake 
here offer a potential solution to this problem. Ultimately the comparison between unconditional and regression 
adjusted D I D  estimators on the basis of standard errors remains valid though.
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of the SLCP we find no strong evidence either way with regard to likely post programme 
behaviour. None of the impact estimates for this quantity are strongly statistically significant 
suggesting that on average households are indifferent between maintaining SLCP land and 
reconverting. Clearly, however, post programme behaviour is a household level decision and 
differences will and do exist between households in this regard.
In the following Section we undertake programme evaluation of a difference sort focussing 
more closely upon the impact of the SLCP on features of the distribution of income. In this way 
we are able to make clearer statements about the extent to which the SLCP has contributed 
to poverty alleviation and say something more specific about the types of households for whom 
we can expect sustained participation in the SLCP even after the compensation stops.
5.8 Poverty A lleviation the D istribution o f SLCP Im pacts
5.8.1 Quantile Treatment Effects (Q T E ( t ))
The average treatment effect is a useful measure for the impact of a policy or intervention. The 
previous Sections have provided us with estimations of the average treatment on the treated 
(ATT) for a variety of important outcome variables. However, although this parameter is of 
interest when we want to investigate the average impact of the programme for participants, and 
hence it can tell us something about the relative costs and benefits of the policy, the average 
is a rather crude measure of the impact. It is a summary statistic of the entire distribution 
of matched impacts and therefore, although we have been careful to allow for heterogeneity 
of impacts across households, this statistic does not reflect changes in the distribution of the 
outcome variable38. However, for a variety of reasons we are interested in understanding the 
impact of the programme on other features of the distribution of the outcome variable. Not only 
does the theory of household behaviour outlined above suggest that responses to interventions 
will be heterogeneous, the SLCP’s poverty alleviation objective mean that it is of interest to 
discover the extent to which participation in the programme has affected low income households.
Quantile regression provides another mode of analysis which allows us to model the impact
38 So far the assumption in the parametric D I D  model has been that the A T T  has been the same for all 
participants. We could have made the impact conditional on certain characteristics of X  by generating interaction 
effects (Abadie 2005). Both cases fall under the ‘constant treatment effect’ umbrella. As described above, the 
non- and semi-parametric matching estimators relax this assumption for the calculation of ATT.  Heckman 
(1998), for example, discusses relaxing this assumption further.
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of the programme at different quantiles, r, of the income distribution. The parameter of interest 
here is generally known as the quantile treatment effect or QTE  (r) and as above we estimate the 
impact on the treated. Quantile regressions have a number of advantages over mean regressions 
including providing more detailed descriptive analysis across the distribution of the outcome 
variable than simple mean analysis, robustness to distributional assumptions and the ability to 
deal with censored data39. Not only that, but inter-quantile regression allows us to understand 
the impact of the programme on the distribution of incomes, that is, one can estimate the 
impact of the programme on inter-quantile ranges. In the case in hand the robustness quality 
is of particular importance given the skewed nature of income distributions.
In this Section we present two approaches to quantile regression as explained concisely in 
Athey and Imbens (2005), and Ho et al (2004). Each of these methods exploit our panel data 
and estimate the quantile treatment effect via difference in differences methods. In particular, 
the difference in differences QTE  (r) is defined by:
QTE  (r) =  (Ff,1 (r) -  F (r)) -  (F ^1 (r) -  F ^ 1 (t )) (5.29)
where Fu (y) is the distribution function for the outcome variable, y, for a person of participant 
status i = 0,1 for non-participants and participants respectively, at time t = 0,1 for pre and 
post-participation40. In this way individual specific heterogeneity is swept out in a manner 
similar to the analysis of ATT  above allowing for our behavioural model to remain valid41. The 
difference between the two quantile regression estimates shown here is the data used to obtain 
the sample analogue of (5.29)42.
Firstly, following Athey and Imbens (2005), we undertake a simple parametric quantile 
treatment effect model using the quantile regression version of the unconditional model in 
(5.17). Secondly, we follow Ho et al (2004) and undertake a matched quantile regression using 
the counterfactual data generated by our local linear regression adjusted matching procedure
39Koenker and Basset (1978) provide a summary of the relative advantages and disadvantages of quantile 
versus mean regression.
40Inference for these estimates is well established. See for example Koenker and Basset (1978). Standard errors
are bootstrapped once more with 100 repetitions.
41 Meyer et al (1995) and Poterba et al (1995) provide applications of quantile regression to panel data along
these lines.
4 2 Athey and Imbens provide a highly intuititive account of these estimators in addition to an alternative D I D  
estimator for Q T E ( t ).
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Net income Unmatched (obs : 572) Kernel Matched (obs : 864)
Quantiles (r) Q TE(t ) Std. Err. QTE  (r) Std. Err.
25% 607.75 366.48** 76.39 330.96** 131.19
50% 1115.69 451.21** 98.98 472.85** 145.19
75% 2133.89 140.82 236.04 286.26 334.61
Net income post programme
25% 591.41 -31.56 104.49 18.362 94.29
50% 1122.50 -64.00 135.33 84.656 114.31
75% 2188.75 -145.74 310.27 -15.459 246.67
Table 5.9: Quantile treatment on the treated for net incomes
described above. This is our matched QTE{t ). In each case we analyse the treatment effect 
of the SLCP on the 25%, 50% and 75% quantiles of the income distribution.
Table 5.9 shows simultaneous quantile regressions for the 25%, 50% (median), 75% quantiles 
of two outcome variables: net income with compensation and net income without compensation. 
As before the latter measure of income provides us with some idea of the post programme income 
levels at the selected quantiles of the distribution.
A number of things axe worth noting here. Firstly, the unmatched and matched quantile 
treatment effects tell the same story by and large. The 25% quantile treatment effect is positive 
and significant at the 1% level, as is the slightly larger statistically significant impact upon 
median (50%) incomes for both methods. The impact upon those at the highest quartile of the 
distribution is low and insignificant both statistically and economically. The impact of Y366 
and Y330 upon the lowest quartile represents an increase of approximately 50% of per capita 
income, which is considerable. The impact of Y451 and Y472 represents approximately 40% 
of pre-programme median per capita income. This suggests that the positive estimates for the 
ATT  for net income noted in Tables 5.8 and 5.7 in Section 5.7.2 are observed as a result of 
increases in the lower quantiles of the income distribution.
These results show that the SLCP is making positive and progressive changes to the incomes 
of poor farmers despite the loss of land use. In some ways this is to be expected since a policy 
which offers a fixed amount of compensation for setting aside land will benefit more those whose 
productivity on land is lowest and this is a feature frequently associated with poor households.
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The compulsory nature of the programme means, however, that some high productivity house­
holds are chosen to be participants and as such compensation may not sufficiently account for 
lost production. It appears that these households are in the higher income quantiles judging 
by the insignificant impact upon the income of the 75% quantile.
The impact upon poverty arising purely from compensation is temporary like the com­
pensation itself. Permanent increases in income for low income households will only arise if 
households have no incentive to revert back to former production patterns when the compensa­
tion ceases. Given this we ought to be concerned with changes in income sources brought about 
by participation in the programme. Section 5.7.2 showed that off-farm income was the most im­
portant substitution taking place for participants and as such the potential for the programme 
to induce participation in this market will be an important determinant of the sustainability 
of the programme. Work undertaken elsewhere on these data shows that on average there is 
a positive impact on the propensity to participate in off-farm activities for participants in the 
SLCP (Grosjean 2005). Although this says nothing about the impact at different quantiles of 
the income distribution, together with analysis of average impacts, and the average impacts for 
participants and non-participants in the off-farm labour market shown in Table 5.13 in Appen­
dix 4, it suggests that the positive effect in Table 5.9 for lower quantiles arises is partly due to 
this shift in labour allocation43.
In summary, the compensation policy is sufficiently well targeted towards the poorest to 
ensure significant increases in incomes for the poor. There are two reasons why this may 
be occurring. Firstly, the compensation for loss of crop incomes outweighs the value of the 
crops for household on the lower quantiles of the income distribution. Secondly, low income 
households may have been more successful in finding alternative incomes. The sustainability 
of the programme is dependent upon the extent to which the latter adjustments represent 
permanent increases in welfare.
In order to provide some indication of the latter we analysed the quantiles of net income 
with the compensation removed. The lower panels of Table 5.9 shows that, although all the 
estimates are negative, there is no statistically significant difference between participants and
43 Grosjean (2005) provides some analysis of this response. In addition, if the quantile regression described 
above is undertaken with an interaction term for participation in the SLCP and participation in the off-farm 
labour market dummy the associated coefficients are positive and significant for the 25% and 50% quantiles. These 
results are preliminary however and are not shown due to their inherent endogeneity problems and represent the 
focus of future work.
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non-participants at any quartile once compensation is removed. Given the significant decrease 
in cropping incomes shown in Section 5.7.2 this suggests that participants at each quartile 
have found alternative sources of income in a manner described in Table 5.8 above. Given 
that the counterfactual comparison group represents the best estimate of the potential income 
of the participants had they not been participants, this suggests that incomes would not be 
significantly raised by reverting back to former land-uses.
The use of quantiles of the distribution of the outcome variables provides another layer of 
descriptive analysis of the impact of the SLCP upon households. What we have shown here 
provides the beginning of a more detailed analysis of the extent to which the impact of the 
programme is heterogeneous among income groups. Hence it provides a measure of the extent 
to which one of the fundamental objectives of the programme: improving the incomes of the 
poor, is being achieved both during the programme and, to some extent, in the post programme 
period. However, the question remains, although we have shown positive impacts on income 
for participants of the SLCP, to what extent have households been lifted out of poverty by any 
useful measure? We turn to this in the following Section.
5.8.2 Poverty alleviation
5.8.2.1 Poverty lines
The previous Section has shown that the programme has different heterogeneous effects upon 
households at different points of the income distribution. In particular the positive average 
treatment on the treated noted in Section 5.7.2 appears to be arising from increases in the 
incomes in lower quantiles of the distribution of incomes. This implies that the programme is 
targeting the poor as intended and potentially lifting these households out of poverty. In this 
Section we analyse the implications of these findings for the alleviation of poverty and assess 
the extent to which participant households axe indeed being lifted out of poverty. Using the 
data generated from the programme evaluation techniques used above we analyse the impact of 
participation in the SLCP upon further features of the distribution if incomes in order to test 
the poverty alleviation qualities of the programme.
Of course, the extent to which poverty alleviation takes place is dependent upon the de­
finition of the poverty lines. Many definitions exist and are used in practice. Frequently, in 
rural semi-subsistence and autarkic households the poverty line is determined by reference to
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the amount of grain produced per capita in a given household (Park and Wang 2001). There 
are many multi-dimensional measures of poverty: the Human Development Index and Human 
Poverty Index (UNDP 2004) provides an oft cited example. One of the most universally applied 
poverty lines is $1 per capita per day, that is, households that spend less than an average of 
$1 on consumption each day are considered to be poor. With regard to income the measure 
is frequently set at $2, but in each case a conversion to local currency using purchasing power 
parity (PPP) is required.
The choice of poverty line has received much attention in China and recent studies plotting 
China’s progress in alleviating poverty have employed a wide variety of poverty lines each 
differing in their rationale and monetary value. Furthermore, the official poverty line in China 
also differs from those widely used for international comparisons. In short, poverty and poverty 
alleviation are measured by a variety of yardsticks. For example, the official poverty line for 
2002 in China is Y637 per capita per year. This figure is based upon the cost of minimal calorific 
intake (2100Kcal/day) and some non-food consumption for basic necessities (Park and Wang 
2001). This translates into approximately $0.75 per day in Purchasing Power Parity terms 
(PPP)44. More recently, the official poverty line has been increased to Y882. Coincidentally, 
this poverty line translates into the $1 per capita per day (PPP) yardstick commonly used 
as an international poverty line for consumption. There has been much debate concerning 
the appropriate level at which to measure the incidence of poverty in China, with one common 
feature of this discussion being that the official poverty line is too low and hence underestimates 
poverty (Reddy and Minoiu 2005). This has lead other researchers to use higher poverty lines 
such as $1, $1.5 and $2 per day in PPP terms used by Fang and Fan (2002), Chen and Wang 
(2001) and Sala-i-Martin (2002) respectively. The highest poverty line that this author has 
found applied in China was Y2152 per capita per day, but the precise rationale for this measure 
remains unclear (Xue and Zhong 2003, quoted in Reddy and Minoiu 2005).
Naturally, differences in the measure of poverty lead to differences in the measurement of
the extent of poverty alleviation. Indeed, along with the discussion of the baseline level of
poverty, biases in the rate of change in the statistics over time and disagreement on how to
calculate the cost of living in particular regions, the choice of poverty line has given rise to large
literature discussing the measurement of the Chinese government’s progress in this regard (e.g.
Yao 2000, Park and Wang 2001). There is general agreement that significant progress has been
44The PPP conversion factor applied by the World Bank is Y1.78:$l
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made to lift rural households out of poverty during the last 20 or so years. The disagreement 
centres on the extent of this lift. The official estimate from the Chinese National Bureau of 
Statistics suggests that the 90’s was the most successful decade during which two thirds of the 
rural poor were lifted out of poverty. Worryingly, however, recent years have seen something 
of a reversal of this trend, with rural poverty rising by 3% between 2002 and 2003 (Reddy 
and Minoiu 2005). Reddy and Minoiu provide a detailed analysis of poverty alleviation under 
different assumptions for the calculation of the $1 PPP levels in China and find a less optimistic 
picture, as do Khan and Riskin (2001).
Commonly, the measurement of poverty against a single poverty line is considered a sufficient 
test for poverty alleviation. However, recent work by Chen and Ravallion (2003) reveals that the 
choice of poverty line is of considerable moment when undertaking programme evaluation and 
the reliance upon one poverty line for comparison may hide the real impact of the programme. 
For example, programme evaluations of the World Bank poverty alleviation interventions such 
as the South West Poverty Reduction Programme, reveals that the impact of the programme, 
that is, the numbers of households lifted above the poverty line, was minimal when measured 
from the perspective of the $1 per day (Chen and Ravallion 2003). Not only did they discover 
that the impact was much larger when compared to the lower official poverty line of Y800, they 
also found that the impact varied widely across poverty lines. In this sense, and in light of the 
heterogeneous impacts estimated in the previous Section, it makes sense to test the impact of 
the SLCP against a variety of poverty lines. There are a great many reasons in the case in hand 
why a similar analysis will be useful with regard to the SLCP. Beyond measuring any success 
in alleviating poverty, by establishing the winners and losers from a the SLCP we will gain 
a better understanding of those households who would be most likely to reconvert land once 
subsidies cease. That is, we can go some way to identifying the likelihood that the programme 
is sustainable.
Given the disputes concerning appropriate poverty lines, in this Section we follow the ap­
proach of Chen and Ravallion (2003) in analysing the impact of the SLCP on the incidence 
of poverty, recognising the fact that the impact of the programme need not register at any 
predefined poverty line and hence an analysis across a number of definitions is important.
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5.8.2.2 SLCP impact on poverty alleviation
In this Section we measure the impact of the SLCP upon poverty alleviation, that is, the 
proportion of households considered to be living in poverty. One clear way in which to measure 
changes in the proportion of people living at or below a given income level is to observe the 
change in the cumulative distribution function for income (CDF). Figure 5.2 shows that during 
the period covered by our data (2000-2004) there has been significant reductions in poverty 
by most measures across all the households in our sample. Figure 5.2 shows the change in 
the CDF for net income for the entire sample of participants and non-participants since the 
pre programme period. The difference in negative showing that the proportion of households 
below any of the income levels shown in Figure 5.2 is higher in the pre-programme period. For 
example, from the perspective of the official poverty line of Y640, there has been a 15% drop 
in the number of households falling below this level. Indeed the largest changes in the CDF 
have occurred at the lowest quantiles of income. Of course, this does not reveal the impact 
of the programme in this respect, but rather general trends of poverty alleviation. Statistical 
significance is achieved at approximately -5%45.
Figure 5.3 shows the local linear matched differences in differences estimates for the cumula­
tive distribution function (CDF) for per capita net incomes. Here we have calculated the vertical 
difference between the CDF for participants net incomes (post minus pre) and then subtracted 
the same measure for non-participants, where the non-participants incomes were assumed to 
be the counterfactual incomes calculated from the matching procedure undertaken in Section 
5.7.2. Appendix 6 shows the same statistic for the stratified matching and the unmatched DID  
techniques. In each case the outcome is largely the same in that the major improvements in 
net income have arisen in the lowest income quantiles, particularly, those below Y1500, while 
the programme has had a benign effect upon those in the higher income quantiles compared to 
non-participants. Indeed, the stratified matching result even suggests that the higher income 
quantiles may have suffered as a result of participation in the programme. One explanation for 
this, remembering that in large part the programme is implemented involuntarily in our study 
area, is that uniform compensation may not have been sufficient to compensate the losses of 
richer, more productive households, whereas the opposite is true for poorer households. This 
may reflect the findings of Uchida et al (2004) who suggested that targeting was not always
45 In this section, significance is detemined using probit analysis on the probability of being poor given a 
particular poverty line. The results are not shown here.
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Figure 5.2: Trend in income poverty
cost effective in this regard.
Despite having shown the impact of the programme across a wide variety of poverty lines, 
in order to fix ideas we discuss the three particular poverty lines commonly used in China 
and beyond: the official poverty line of Y640, the $1 a day value of approximately Y900 and 
the higher value of $2 per day (Y1800) frequently used as a measure of income poverty (see 
e.g. Sala-i-Martin 2002). In this way we can assess the impact of the programme in terms of 
previous work. Figure 5.3 shows that in terms of the income poverty line of Y1800 per capita 
the programme has had a minimal effect with a reduction in poverty close to 0%. This is true 
of the alternative techniques shown in Appendix 6. That is, even though Figure 5.2 showed 
that there have been improvements by this yardstick for the entire sample, the change over 
time in the number of people that are at or below this level of income does not differ between 
matched participants and non-participants in the SLCP. At the lower poverty lines however, 
this is not true and it appears that the SLCP has had a significant poverty alleviation effect 
when measured from the lower official poverty line or even the $1 per day measure (Y900). 
Again, this pattern is repeated across the different techniques used. At the official poverty 
line, the SLCP compensation has reduced poverty by approximately 10% points. Statistical 
significance here is at approximately -4%.
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Figure 5.3: SLCP impact on income poverty
Of course, of critical importance for the long-term success of the SLCP is the post pro­
gramme impact. If the SLCP is to achieve both of its targets of environmental benefits and 
poverty alleviation in the long-term it is important that outcomes are improved for participants 
even when the compensation ceases. We have very little to bring to bear on this issue in this 
Chapter apart from considering whether households have found sufficient alternative sources of 
income, and effectively increased the opportunity cost of their labour in cultivation, such that 
even in the absence of SLCP subsidies households are not tempted to return to their previous 
modes of production. We do this here as we have above by simulating the cessation of subsidies 
and analysing matched differences in differences of the CDFs for net income with the SLCP 
subsidies removed from the post programme income. Figure 5.4 shows the outcome.
Figure 5.4 shows that once subsidies are removed, the impact of the programme is to in­
crease the number of participant households in the lower quantiles of the net income distribution 
compared to counter-factual non-participant households. Statistical significance is attained at 
approximately +7%, that is approximately between Y1200 and Y1700. What are the implica­
tions of this? One implication is that some participant households will be able to improve their 
lot by reverting back to former land uses one compensation ceases. This would imply that the 
poverty alleviation afforded by the SLCP shown in the previous figures, and reflected in the
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Figure 5.4: SLCP impact on income poverty: Post programme without subsidies
quantile treatment effects, will have been transitory46.
Of course, although illustrative of the immediate impact of the cessation of subsidies, this 
is a slightly naive analysis of post programme behaviour. Hence, this is a bold prediction since 
there may be other courses of action available. Despite this, it is not without some corroborat­
ing evidence. Work undertaken on these data by Grosjean (2005) has shown that just over 60% 
of participating households registered an intention to reconvert land in the event that compen­
sation ceases. This intention was shown to be influenced negatively by participants ability to 
find alternative incomes, particularly off-farm incomes, again fitting in with the findings in this 
Chapter47.
46 One question arises here. Why is there a significant increase in the probability of falling beneath the poverty 
lines measured between Y1200-Y1700, when the quantile regression did not pick up any significant difference 
between participants and non-participants once compensation had been removed. The answer lies in the fact 
that the latter analysis is based upona count of households beneath the poverty line regardless of whether the
monetary impact was statistically significant.
47The probability of reconverting post programme was also heavily influenced by a number of other insti­
tutional factors such as security of property rights to SLCP land, the mode of programme implementation: 
voluntary/involuntary, whether or not farmers participated in the choice of tree varieties, and participation in 
rental markets (Grosjean 2005).
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5.9 Conclusion
The SLCP was hatched in direct response to the loss of topsoil, siltation of streams and severe 
flood events witnessed in the Yangtze river basin in 1998. The blame for the severity of these 
floods was placed squarely with deforestation resulting from the cultivation of sloped lands in 
the upper reaches of these river basins (World Bank 2001). The objectives of the SLCP are 
therefore twofold. Firstly, the SLCP endeavours reduce these basin wide environmental damages 
by reforesting cultivated sloped land. The second objective of the SLCP is to reduce poverty 
among the rural households cultivating these sloped lands. Both of these objectives are achieved 
by way of relatively generous yet temporary compensation packages consisting of cash, grain 
and occasionally seedlings and technical assistance. The impact of the programme has been 
impressive with regard to the first objective, with approximately 1.2 million hectares of mainly 
sloped land converted to forest. With regard to the second objective the evidence thus far is 
less clear, with previous estimates suffering from a number of important data shortcomings and 
econometric problems, particularly sample selection. In short, the extent to which household 
incomes have been increased by the programme is not at all clear (Uchida et al 2002).
Above all however, there is concern that these environmental gains will only have the 
longevity of the compensation itself. That is, once the compensation ceases, participants will 
simply revert back to their former land-use practices. This is almost certain to happen if the 
temporary compensation fails to induce permanent increases in household incomes and hence 
in many cases, permanent release from poverty. It is easy to see that the two objectives of the 
SLCP are very much linked when viewed in this light since, in the long-run, the first objective 
will not be achieved without the second. Moreover, permanent poverty alleviation will only 
be achieved if temporary compensation for reforestation induces households to find alternative 
and more lucrative sources of income to the extent that they are better off even in the absence 
of the compensation.
In this paper we estimate the impact of the programme on the incomes of participant house­
holds using programme evaluation techniques applied to panel data commonly employed in the 
evaluation of active labour market programmes (Blundell and Costa-Dias 2000), but frequently 
and increasingly used in the evaluation of public and donor interventions in developing countries 
(e.g. Chen and Ravallion 2003, Park et al 2001, Bhandyopadhay 2004). These techniques allow 
us to accommodate the econometric problems that have plagued previous analyses, namely
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non-random participant selection based on observable and unobservable household and local 
heterogeneity and the potential for heterogeneous programme impacts across households. We 
estimate average treatment on the treated (ATT) for incomes in total (gross and net) and each 
of the sources of income represented in our data: on-farm income (crop, livestock, forestry) and 
off-farm income, using a number of estimators based on the propensity score: matched differ­
ence in differences (Heckman et al 1998) and a new more efficient approach from Abadie (2005). 
Each of the non/semi-parametric estimators used has its roots in the parametric approach to 
programme evaluation of Ashenfelter and Card (1985), which is also estimated here.
We find that, using our preferred estimators, the SLCP has had a positive impact on net 
incomes for participants compared to non-participants over the time period. This increase in net 
income has arisen from two sources. Firstly, on average the SLCP compensation outweighs the 
opportunity cost of cultivated land, and secondly, participant households obtain more of their 
incomes from off-farm sources. Livestock and forestry incomes have decreased for participants. 
We then undertake a simulation of the cessation of compensation by comparing incomes net of 
compensation for participants to the counterfactual control group and find that the differences 
are negative yet not significant. This provides some, albeit weak indication that were the SLCP 
compensation to end today, given the choice households could increase their income by reverting 
back to former practices.
Mindful that the average treatment effect may hide heterogenous impacts for different in­
come groups, and given our interest in understanding the impact of the programme on the 
poor, we undertake a matched quantile regression analysis following Athey and Imbens (2004) 
to estimate the quantile treatment effects (QTE). The analysis shows that the impact on net 
incomes has been significant both statistically and economically for the lower quartiles of the 
income distribution (25% and 50%) but not for the upper quartile (75%). That is, the impact 
of the programme has been most pronounced on the incomes of the poorest increasing their 
incomes by approximately 40% in some cases. Unlike the average estimates, quantile regression 
estimates are robust to distributional assumptions.
The heterogeneity of the impact across households at different quantiles of income means 
that the impact of the programme on poverty alleviation is likely to differ depending upon 
the yardstick against which it is measured. Such is the finding for other poverty alleviation 
strategies in China (e.g. Chen and Ravallion 2003). We use difference in differences to test the 
impact of the SLCP on poverty alleviation against a continuum of poverty lines we find that this
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is indeed the case. When considered from the $2 (Y1800 in PPP) per capita per day poverty 
line used internationally to measure income poverty, we find that the impact of the programme 
is negligible. However, at the official poverty line in China of Y640, and the $1 (Y900) per 
capita per day poverty line, the reduction in poverty as a result of participation is large and 
significant. However, on performing the same simulation of the cessation of compensation as 
above, it is shown that the proportion of households living beneath the lower poverty lines is 
significantly higher for participants. Again, this provides weak evidence for the assertion that 
households would revert back to their former land-use practices when the compensation ends 
given the choice.
In summary, the SLCP appears to have targeted poor households well and the combination 
of temporary compensation and the ability to find or increase off-farm labour income has 
improved the lot of the poor by increasing their incomes and lifting many households out of 
poverty by most reasonable measures. However, there is some evidence to suggest that these 
gains may only have the longevity of compensation itself. Although the simulations used are 
quite naive, their conclusions correspond to other work on the post programme intentions of 
the farmers in these data which suggests that up to 60% of participants intend to revert back to 
former land-uses once the compensation ends (Grosjean 2005). The evidence presented in this 
Chapter suggests that the targeting of the programme leads to poverty alleviation, however the 
beneficial impact of the programme is unlikely to be sustainable.
Some important caveats need to be stated. Firstly, our outcome measure is income which 
is well known to be a noisier variable than other measures of household welfare such as con­
sumption (Deaton 2000 Besley 1995) Secondly, it is also well known that incomes are likely to 
be understated when elicited by household survey. Deaton (2000) suggests that in some cases 
income reported in household surveys may only be 60% of that recorded in national accounts for 
example. In the other direction, our constructed income variable may have overvalued certain 
components of income by using elicited market prices for producer consumed produce. Lastly, 
although we have pre and post programme data, the analysis could always be improved by 
obtaining data from additional time periods.
What is clear from this work is that the analysis of the impact of the programme could 
benefit from a more detailed evaluation of the impact of the programme on off-farm labour 
decisions. In the absence of increases in forest or livestock incomes, the ability to find off-farm 
labour income appears to be the one adjustment to household production that is critical in
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determining the sustainability of the SLCP.
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5.11 Appendices
5.11.1 Appendix 1: Procedure for the regression adjusted D ID  estimators 
(Heckman et al 1998, Navarro-Lozano 2004, Abadie 2005)48
In order to undertake Heckman et al’s regression procedure we adapt the procedure of Navarro- 
Lozano (2004) and undertake the following steps in order to estimate the parameter of interest, 
the average treatment on the treated (ATT). The results of each step are discussed in the text.
1. We estimate the propensity score, P, using a probit on the dummy for participation and 
explanatory variables Ztf.
2. We keep only the observations of non-participants whose propensity score falls on the 
support of the treated group.
3. For the regression adjusted estimator we undertake steps a) - d) below. Otherwise we 
define Qoj = (Yojt — Yojt>) and Qik — (Y\kt -  Yokt>) and undertake the straight difference
in difference estimator or undertake e.g. local linear or local constant (kernel) matching
on these values as suggested in points 4-6 below.
a) Run a local linear regression of Yojt> on P. Form the residuals egjt' = Yojt' ~ Yojt'
b) Run a local linear regression of each element of X t> on P. Let X t> be the predicted 
values. (Note that here one chooses the exclusion restriction since Xt>,the determinants 
of the outcome variable, may or may not include all the elements of Zt>, the determinants 
of participation). Form the residuals ex = X t> — X t>.
c) Run a linear regression of £ojt1 on ex  and save the estimated parameters of this regres­
sion: j3w-
d) Repeat a)-c) for time period t to obtain vector (30t.
d) Define Qik — (Yim — XtPot) — (Yokt' ~ and Qoj — (^ojt ~ ~ (^ojt1 ~ Ht'Pot' j^
4. Run a local linear regression of Qqj on P  and let Qoj be the predicted value.
5. Insert Qqj into the equation for ATT^jd shown in (5.21) in the text.
6. We then use bootstrapping to obtain standard errors.
48 A routine to implement this estimator written for STATA 8.0 and is available from the author upon request.
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The attentive reader will notice that the estimation of vectors (30t and (30t/ is not explicitly 
defined in Heckman et al (1997) in which only the vector (30t is defined.
The regression/bias adjusted Abadie (2005) estimator requires that the DID  identification 
assumption (assumption A-3) holds and that the support of the propensity score for the treated 
is a subset of that for the untreated. Assumption A-2 is sufficient for this. Given these conditions 
it can be shown that a linear least squares approximation to the conditional parameter of interest 
(ATT (T) = E  [Yi (1) -  Y0 (0) \T, D = 1]) can be given by T 0 O where:
00 = argmjnE  [p (D = 1|X). {/>0 (Y) (1) -  Y0 (1)) -  T7?}2] (5.30)
where as above, p0 = - (See Abadie (2005) for more details). Note that
(5.30) implies a weighted OLS regression of T  on p0 (Yi (1) — Yo (1)), weighted by y/P (D = 1|X). 
The unconditional (on T) estimate of ATT  is then obtained from replacing Y  (1) — Y  (0) with 
the predictions from the parametric approximation to the parameter of interest T'fi equation
(5.20) in the text.
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5.11.2 Appendix 2: The data
A number of transformations of the data have been undertaken. Of these the most noteworthy 
have been with regard to crop and livestock prices. Firstly, missing crop prices in the pre-SLCP 
period were replaced with yearly averages, and where these were not available, the overall 
average for the pre SLCP periods. This was made possible due to very detailed price data 
collected from the majority of farmers. In the post-SLCP period, prices were replaced with the 
overall average. Once prices had been replaced crop incomes were imputed.
With regard to livestock we were occasionally confronted with missing values for revenues 
or quantities. These were replaced using regression techniques based upon the unit values 
calculated from those households for which data on revenues and quantities were complete. 
The unit value for good i is represented by V (i), the quantity by q(i) and the unit value by 
p (i) and hence the following identity holds: p(i) = V (i) /q(i). We follow Capeau and Dercon 
(1998) and treat observed revenues and quantities as random variables and use a model which 
accounts for variations in the quality of livestock in different regions. Hence the identity can 
be represented as a stochastic model:
In Vik -  In qik = InPijkdj -I- ln<^ - + zit
for individual i and good k in location j  where the LHS is the stochastic representation of 
the log unit value and dj are dummy variables for the towns in which the observation was 
made. represents an unobserved fixed effect for the town while Zu represents a temporary 
random innovation. The fixed effect can be thought of as representing the unobserved quality 
of the livestock sold and is assumed to remain constant over time. The coefficients from a 
random effects regression using pre and post programme data, which are equal to an estimate 
of In pu, are used to replace the livestock prices where they are missing in a particular town 
using the corrections proposed by Goldberger (1968) for such logarithmic functional forms. 
See Capeau and Dercon (1998) for details. This represents a common method for valuing 
subsistence production in rural communities. For all sources of income values were transformed 
into 2002 prices using the CPI for each region.
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Percentiles
1% 0.10
5% 0.38
10% 0.47
25% 0.63
50% 0.81
75% 0.91
90% 0.95
95% 0.97
99% 0.99
Mean 0.775
Sd 0.175
Observations 274
Table 5.10: The quantiles of the propensity score 
5.11.3 Appendix 3. The propensity score
There are a number of conditions with regard to the propensity score that must be satisfied. 
Firstly, it is useful to summarise this statistic across participants and non-participants. In this 
way we can see the extent of the common support. In this Appendix we also show the estimates 
of the propensity score from the second estimation method described in Section 5.6.2.2.
Table 5.10 details the quantiles of the propensity score. Figure 5.5 shows the density of 
the propensity score for participants and non-paxticipants and reveals the extent to which they 
share common support: a condition important for the consistency of matching estimators.
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Figure 5.5: The density of the propensity score
5.11.4 Appendix 4. Household level incomes changes and alternative match­
ing techniques
Table 5.11 and 5.12 show the household level treatment effects for different evaluation methods 
and a comparison of the two matching methods used for the evaluation of per capita incomes.
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Income Sources Household Incomes
Gross Incomes Parametric Stratified Kernel Abadie
(SP)
Total -656.52
(682.60)
-48.55
(1038.50)
-204.62
(854.63)
-483.34
(1026.92)
Crop -1649.43**
(268.32)
-1441.27**
(272.54)
-1426.09**
(258.43)
-1383.67**
(267.33)
Crop +SLCP -10.07
(269.33)
208.76
(248.37)
223.94
(192.80)
126.55
(263.35)
Off-farm -304.99
(563.59)
580.78
(960.42)
521.51
(854.79)
1297.79
(1645.07)
Livestock -146.30
(311.75)
-104.92
(227.02)
-167.45
(233.86)
162.50
(249.24)
Forest -21.76
(38.22)
-49.00
(66.75)
-51.89
(75.08)
-80.38
(81.62)
Net incomes
Total -134.63
(682.32)
506.48
(1029.43)
232.77
(864.22)
-90.19
(1073.79)
Crop 1162.11**
(244.28)
-1007.16**
(220.38)
-1025.48**
(246.04)
-1010.59**
(255.00)
Crop + SLCP 477.25"
(274.50)
642.87**
(287.19)
624.55**
(213.89)
499.63*
(267.22)
Livestock 112.51
(293.44)
-76.48
(267.92)
-126.05
(210.84)
-95.46
(302.54)
Forest -101.63
(112.13)
-69.54
(70.28)
-85.09
(62.18)
-121.37
(79.04)
Table 5.11: Household level income changes with different DID estimators
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Income Sources Per capita Incomes
Gross Incomes Stratified Kernel
Total -14.94
(177.99)
-49.23
(154.89)
Crop -280.684**
(88.99)
-272.91**
(79.69)
Crop +SLCP 60.82
(96.19)
68.59
(77.42)
Off-farm 79.70
(160.50)
64.853
188.78
Livestock -23.241
(37.66)
-33.64
44.30
Forest -19.27
(17.96)
-19.745
19.33
Net incomes
Total 53.239
(180.79)
7.77
(187.24)
Crop -189.85*
(89.96)
-196.03**
(69.48)
Crop +SLCP 151.646*
(74.01)
145.47*
(76.34)
Livestock -25.59
(54.76)
-35.78
(42.90)
Forest -21.682
(17.25)
-24.68
(16.99)
Table 5.12: Per capita income changes with Stratified and Kernel matching
Outcome Variable Household
No off-farm labour Parametric Local Linear Abadie
Off-farm Income 2038.73** (440.75) 2908.76** (531.42) 1000.79** (366.37)
Off farm labour
Off-farm Income 677.61 (887.90) 1715.26** (374.76) 1161.12* (577.50)
Table 5.13: The ATT for household off-farm labour incomes for participants and non­
participants in that market
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Parametric Local linear diffs Abadie
Constant 1,009.57 (479.88)* -169.58** (30.34) 382.55 (284.82)
Hezhang -161.48 (434.07) -42.34 (91.76) 294.42 (337.52)
Jingyuan -123.23 (514.18) 318.92A (184.74) 417.21 (413.82)
Pengyang -274.85 (454.05) -310.21** (99.10) 245.42 (399.95)
Yuanzhou -93.78 (430.69) -38.95 (30.55) 405.51 (312.74)
Agprod -1.30 (0.29)** 1.31* (0.50) -1.09 (0.35)**
Lab -0.26 (0.19) 1.19** (0.12) -0.21 (0.18)
Treat (a) 340.30* (151.67) - -
Observations 286 70 286
R-squared 0.09 - 0.12
Table 5.14: Regression adjustment estimates for net income per capita
5.11.5 Appendix 5: Regression adjustment results
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 show the results of the regression adjustment regressions for each of the 
estimators considered in the text. Abadie (2005) shows that there is a broad similarity between 
each of these models since they can be thought of in terms of a differenced version of equation
(5.20) in Section 5.5.2.2:
Yk (1) -  Yk (0) =  S + X'kn + a.Dk (1) +  (vk (1) -  vk (0)) (5.31)
where 7r =  7r (1) — 7r (0). Cast in this light the parameters of the conditioning variables are time 
varying and hence the model admits time invariant regressors for regression adjustment. The 
similarity with the local linear approach of Heckman et al (1997) described above ought to be 
clear since in that case a matching estimator is generated for each time period based upon the 
non-participant data and hence separate parameters are estimated in each time period, that is 
we effectively estimate 7r(l) and 7r(0) separately. These parameters are shown in Table 5.15 
whereas 5.14 reflects the differences between them. The Abadie model requires a parametric 
approximation to the differences in the outcome variable and we choose the same regressors for 
this, allowing a comparison.
Our choice of regressors reflects a reduced form whereby the impact of the programme is 
entirely captured by the participation dummy or the residuals in the case of the non-parametric 
estimators. Therefore we limit ourselves to district level dummies, agricultural productivity and 
total labour days supplied. These allow heterogeneous impacts as required in our case. Many 
of the parameters are significant.
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Local linear pre Local linear post
Constant 50.32 (193.55) -119.25 (159.00)
Hezhang -333.20 (595.00) -375.55 (469.44)
Jingyuan 2.523.28* (1162.90) 2.842.21** (986.87)
Pengyang -160.67 (595.07) -470.88 (560.57)
Yuanzhou 91.24 (63.63) -127.70* (53.21)
Agprod -1.18 (4.07) 0.13 (0.62)
Lab 2.05* (0.85) 3.24** (0.56)
Observations 69 67
R-squared 0.24 0.47
Table 5.15: Local linear regression adjustment for net incomes per capita 
5.11.6 Appendix 6. Poverty alleviation: Alternative estimators
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Figure 5.6: SLCP impact on income poverty: Stratified DID  matching
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Figure 5.7: SLCP impact on income poverty: Unmatched DID  estimator
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